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CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

A TREATISE ON FREE AGENCY,

MAINTAINING
THAT THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE MORAL FREEDOM
OF THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD;

ALSO,

A DISSERTATION ON THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION,

COMPRISING
ITS MOST REMARKABLE INTERNAL EVIDENCES RESPECTING
THE ANTIQUITY OF THE EARTH, &c.


BY
THE REV. EDWARD DOWLING, A.M.

"Δόξα ἐν ὑψηλοῖς Θεῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκία."

Λουκ. ii. 14.

LONDON:
J. HATCHARD AND SON, PICCADILLY; J. COCHRAN, 108,
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1829. 8⁶



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DEDICATED
TO
THE MOST NOBLE
THE
MARQUESS OF ANGLESEY, K. G.
&c. &c. &c.

TO
THE MOST NOBLE
THE
MARQUESS OF ANGLESEY, K.G.
&c. &c. &c.

MY LORD MARQUESS,
IN presuming to dedicate this little work to your Lordship, I do so with sentiments of no ordinary description. Among many inducements, however, to entertain my feelings in silence, I am not ignorant of your Lordship's dignified aversion to the incense of eulogium, as relying more on signal services rendered to your country, than on any ineffectual attempt in others to give them a suitable propriety of expression. Yet, I cannot resist the impulse of paying.

some tribute (however inadequate) to him, whose kind influence has been so beneficial to my native land. Mercantile interests, the mild administration of the laws, the steady course of impartial justice, under your late Viceroyalty, gratefully claimed in your Lordship a patron of distinguished pre-eminence. Here is a theme, on which the energies of my country will not permit her to be silent: amid all her afflictions from party indiscretion, the language of her heart must be heard. Conscious of your actual love for Ireland, which exceeds that of her best sons, she will long cherish in her mind the revered impressions produced there by such a national benefactor. Her prayers, too, may ascend in memorial on high, and the good offices you have performed in her behalf be remembered, where no misconception prevails. Meanwhile, in this her probationary state, till your benign wishes be realized, she cannot cease to sigh

for that peace and good-will, that harmony and prosperity so generously designed by magnanimity of the most disinterested and exalted character.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquess,

With unfeigned and profound respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient, faithful,
and devoted Servant,

EDWARD DOWLING.

*Phibsboro', near Dublin,
Jan. 31, 1829.*

ADDRESS TO THE READER.

IN the present undertaking it is merely intended to place the Attributes in such a point of view as seems in accordance with an omnisciently benign Creator. Having long revolved, with deep and unfeigned regret, the gloomy manner in which this truly elevated subject hath been treated by injudicious zeal, the writer wishes with great humility to plead the cause of divine truth as really calculated to awaken our lively gratitude and best affections. And let it be clearly understood that he has no desire to enter into the unfriendly mazes of controversial excitement. Seconded by the combined voice of reason and Revelation, he would speak like a friend, and not like an enemy, to all those who may conscientiously differ with him in opinion.

Though resolute to maintain his own sentiments till convicted of error, he shall ever prefer that pure language of benediction which flows from the fountain of universal benevolence. Christianity itself, if properly estimated, and duly attended to in our converse with our fellow-men, would be far indeed from intentionally dropping any additional acid into the already *too* effervescent cup of mortal existence. Receive, then, what is here presented, in the aspect in which it is offered; and do not consider it at variance with the most sincere good-will to all mankind. Remember what a great diversity exists, as to the human countenance, and be not surprised to meet as great a diversity in human thoughts. Be zealous and indefatigable as the course of time itself. Admire the mighty thunders as well as the bright sunshine of your best friend. But whilst you contemplate even the tempest itself, look chiefly to its future beneficial results; and let not its awful terrors completely eclipse, in *your* estimation, those enlivening rays that graciously follow its apparently angry visitation. Dwell not too much on the gloom-cast portion of

the prospect before you. Reflect, that, if not beheld in a good light, existence herself may lose her most attractive smiles. Though the direst spirit of the storm may veil the earth for a time in the darkness of his course, be not impatient or desponding, but rest well assured that beneficence sits at the helm of creation. Wait till the conflict of the elements be over, to breathe with delight a more vivifying atmosphere, renovated and purified by a collision of little more than momentary duration.

As to the moral condition of man, at a very early period it sadly experienced the deplorable consequences of setting up human arrogance in opposition to divine wisdom. The learned Faber observes, that "when the innocence of our first parents was forfeited, the evil propensities of a corrupt nature soon began to display themselves. A careless neglect of the divine ordinance, on the part of one of the sons of Adam, and a devout observance of them by the other, procured for Abel a mark of God's favour, which was denied to Cain. Jealousy and envy immediately occupied the soul of the rejected

sacrificer; hatred and malice followed close behind; and murder, even the murder of a brother, was the result of these baneful and diabolical passions."*

Nor have the evils of disobedience ceased to overshadow the nations of the earth, from that time to the present; and the dissimilarity which exists between our globe and the regions of the blessed, may furnish an undeniable exemplification how far the abuse of free-agency has been, and may be carried. So that if it were not for the supreme goodness of the mighty Lord of hosts, it is evident, that the frequency of human apostacy would carry its enormous evils to the very verge of general desolation. At the same time, then, that we cannot but admit the manifest and flagrant abuses of free-agency, which *too* generally exist, we learn how truly desirable it is that God should occasionally arrest the progress of those evils, which mankind are prone to draw on themselves. But in all his dispensations, He proceeds on the basis of unerring wisdom, leaving us in numerous in-

* Horæ Mosaicæ, page 87, vol. i. second edition.

stances to the self-inflicted correction of our own unhallowed and disquieted career, or arresting with his paternal sceptre such tides of iniquity as call for his correcting influence in the moral government of his works. There are two ideas, in particular, which should never be absent from our meditations on this most interesting topic ; the one relating to Omnipotence, and the other to the creation of man. In the one, we behold that not any being whatever could place a single fetter on the arm of the Almighty ; and in the other we discern, that our Creator hath not entailed on our nature any thing inconsistent with its very constitution, in which He was pleased originally to implant a spiritual similitude of his own unfettered mind.

If, therefore, in any of your conceptions, God may appear either chained or restricted himself, or chaining his creatures under some cruel fate ; be confident that in you alone the delusion prevails, and that you cannot change the active benevolence of his essentially free and illimitable nature, by reason of the false or prejudiced medium, through which you may vainly presume to

arrive at the discernment of his sublime perfections.

Having advanced so much in the spirit of amicable admonition, let us now proceed to explore the happy standard of intellectual liberty in the regions of eternal light and truth: first, however, referring, to the following compendium.

A TREATISE

ON

FREE-AGENCY.

DEFINITION I.

Of the term Energy.

WHEN any being is said to be capable of exerting its power in different ways, the various ways in which that power may act, we designate its energies. Thus, for instance, when we speak of either the self-existent or omniscient energy of God, we contemplate an omnipotent being whose existence or omniscience is each sustained by a power inherent in himself. And so on, as to any other manner of exerting the given power.

Without entering into a disquisition, whether the term, as here applied, be abstract or concrete, &c.; it may be sufficient to observe that, whenever we institute any inquiry respecting a divine energy separately considered, we simply view the divine Being himself exerting, as if exclusively, that energy alone:—not that

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God is at all conceived to be restricted in any sense of the word, but that we adopt this method for the sake of acquiring (if possible) distinct and adequate ideas of the respective peculiarities of the divine energies.

DEFINITION II.

On the classification of the Divine Energies.

The energies of God appear to be twofold; 1st. Those of eternal and incessant operation, such as his self-existent, omniscient, and discerning energies, &c.; and, 2ndly. Those that are not of eternal and incessant operation, as his creative and providential energies, &c.

The former class are so denominated, because they could not be considered quiescent for a single moment throughout eternity;—whereas the latter class, though equally co-eval and co-eternal, yet, as not being eternally excited into actual operation, or as being what would not admit of such an eternal developement, are accordingly contemplated in the above acceptation.

DEFINITION III.

On the antecedent and creation Periods.

The creation not being eternal, there must have been a period altogether antecedent thereto. This we accordingly designate the antecedent

period; whereas we term the other the creation period.

It is admitted that there was a time when the creation was called into existence by the Creator. Now, whether from that, or any other given time, we take a mental excursion retrogressively, as well as progressively, in either direction we might travel *ad infinitum* through duration, finding it impossible to conceive or arrive at an ultimate limit in either course. What, then, must be our consideration of the subject,—when these two careers *ad infinitum* (taken together) would never arrive at anything at all commensurable with eternity? The question is here merely proposed to obviate any misconception which may arise; as, while speaking of the two grand periods stated in this definition, we presume not to assign any measure whatever to an infinite or immeasurable duration.

DEFINITION IV.

Of the most perfect Righteousness and Benevolence.

Whatever is most perfectly righteous and benevolent, gives to all what is respectively due according to the most perfect exposition of righteousness and benevolence, that is, according to the exposition of the eternal wisdom, righteousness, and benevolence of God.

PART THE FIRST.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

SUMMARY.

Not any of the divine perfections, denominated by the term attributes, should be supposed void of energy or an energetic capability. We therefore designate the divine attributes or perfections, as if they were those divine energies, whereof they may appear to be merely the concomitant effects. Nor do we hereby assume the existence of so many distinct potentialities or beings, but merely the various energies (or *modos operandi*) of one and the same divine being.

DISCUSSION.

In reasonings on this subject, much stress hath been laid on what is termed the foreknowledge of God; insomuch that numbers appear to infer, he must necessarily have decreed all he foresees. And to this as a cause, (for it cannot be otherwise understood,) they seem to attribute all events past, present, and future.

Now to meet such reasoners on their own principles, we undertake the respective consideration of the divine attributes in a manner that may be deemed, perhaps, not the most eligible.

But whatever disadvantages may arise from such a restriction, we prefer the very ground on which our opponents may imagine themselves the most secure. We shall, accordingly, in combination with our search for other desirable objects, investigate the relation which prescience bears to human events. Nor is it presumed that we shall inevitably succeed; but let the decision, rather, be left to competent judges after a full and candid examination of our system. And while departing, in some measure, from the beaten track of discussion; if ever so faint a light be thrown, through the most confined vista, on any subject hitherto involved in obscurity, our exertions will not be totally useless or uncalled for; "to justify the ways of God to man," being the greatest incentive to the present attempt.

If then we cannot soar to such mental heights as may be thought analogous to the meridian splendour of solar illumination; let our course be confined to a more humble sphere, like some feebly arrayed satellite, content to reflect with fidelity even one instructive ray of that light which descends from above.

How rational is that affirmation of Milton, in his *Paradise Lost*, wherein he states that events would not have proved less certain, if it were possible for them to have been unforeknown! Foreknowledge, in fact, cannot of itself, or as an

immediate cause, be the source of any thing except what is altogether peculiar to the divine mind. And the like may be deduced, as to all other attributes of the same eternally and incessantly energetic class. But at the very threshold of our inquiry, numerous objections start into view; for, in speaking of certain divine attributes, some learned men consider them, at least to all appearance, as if the being, to whom they are applied, exerted no energy in these respects. They seem, for instance, to contemplate the attributes of omniscience and self-existence, as if in God they proved no more puissant than mere abstract ideas in their minds. But, on the contrary, when *we* speak of either, we invariably discern that a divine power is evidently implied. God certainly possesses a power by which he is omniscient; as also a power by which he is self-existent; else what becomes of omnipotence itself?

Here, it may be objected, that “we seem to divide the Deity into so many distinct potentialities or energies, and then suppose that these potentialities act separately; and that we appear negligent of a further consideration, that God is omniscient antecedently to the exertion of his energies.”

As to the former part of this objection, we

may observe that God is not incongruously viewed in various ways, whether we contemplate him respecting what he is in himself, or what he is in reference to his works.

Still it is the self-same being that is the object of our meditation; to whom if we were not to ascribe a plurality of energies, I should like to be informed how we could ever entertain any notion of a plurality of divine attributes, except we were rash enough to resolve them into our own abstract ideas. It is admitted that omnipotence presents us with one comprehensive and combined view of all the attributes. But in order to enter into the consideration of omnipotence itself, can we rightly exclude any one of those powers or energies that constitute altogether an omnipotent being? The self-existent energy cannot be the same as the creative energy; for if these two energies were eternally and unalterably as if they were but one energy, then the effects of either (if not supposed to be the same) would be precisely similar, and the creature would thus be absurdly inferred as eternal, &c. as the Creator himself. And similar absurdities would flow from the same indiscriminate view of the other divine attributes. There must consequently be a plurality of divine energies, or (in other words) God possesses in himself such an illimitable power, as in its various deve-

lovements, or *modis operandi*, to evince most manifestly the assumed variety.

It must be admitted, that the omniscience of God is antecedent to the exertion of some of his energies ; that is, it must be antecedent, not to the capability of exertion, but to the actual exertion of any of his non-eternally operating energies, such as his creative energy, &c. But to assume that he is omniscient previously to the actual exertion of any of his energies whatever, is totally inadmissible, as representing him most erroneously as if he were, on an eternal principle, a passive, inactive, or non-energetic being, and only energetic on certain occasions. His omniscience, therefore, cannot be antecedent to, but merely co-eval with, any of his eternally operating energies ; both cause and effect, in this point of view, being co-eval and co-eternal. And hence it is easy to understand how an omnipotent being can eternally exert that energy by which he is an all-wise being ; not that the exertion of that energy and its concomitant effect omniscience are to be supposed antecedent the one to the other, but purely co-eval and co-eternal.

When, moreover, we speak of divine attributes according to our abstract ideas, we are not to imagine that any one of the divine perfections so denominated is void of energy or an energetic

capability. For brevity of expression, therefore, as well as facility in communicating our ideas, we designate omniscience and self-existence as if they were those divine energies whereof they may appear to be merely co-eval and co-eternal effects. And as to any other divine attribute, we shall treat it in a similar manner, or as if it were the energy itself whereof it may be esteemed the concomitant effect.

The energies of God seem resolvable into two classes, those that are of eternal and incessant exertion, and those that are merely exerted as occasion may require in the divine estimation. Nor ought it to be insinuated that we hereby assume the existence of so many distinct potentialities or beings, while we simply ascribe congruous effects to the vast and indubitable energies respectively of one and the same divine being.

BASIS.

It being admitted as demonstrable that there is a Creator who called the universe into existence; and that he is self-existent, eternal, omnipotent, &c.; we proceed on this assumed or conceded foundation, to consider some of the results in the following series of deductions.

No. 1.

*Any eternally-operating energy (or *modus operandi*) of God, continued unalterably the same in operation throughout the entire antecedent period.*

Previously to the existence of any creature, there could not have been any object whatever, except the divine Being himself, on or in which any eternally-operating energy of God, could have operated. The object, therefore, remaining unchanged, (or any of the given energies, having only one object to act upon, and that an immutable being,) it is conclusive, that any eternally-operating energy (or *modus operandi*) of God, continued unalterably the same in operation throughout the entire antecedent period.

No. 2.

*Any eternally-operating energy (or *modus operandi*) of God, could not be the cause of any thing created, or of any operation thereof; if it would require an eternity of operation to produce its effects.*

For under this supposition, its effects must either co-exist and be co-eternal with, or otherwise must follow (as they could not precede) that eternity of operation. In either of which cases, it could not be the cause of any thing created, or of any operation thereof;—its effects in the former instance being eternal; or in the latter case, being such as could never exist, as it is not possible for any effect whatever to prove subsequent to an eternity of operation.

No. 3.

Any eternally-operating energy (or modus operandi) of God, could not be the cause of any thing created, if it would require (howsoever minute or enlarged) only a finite period of operation to produce its effects.

For if in idea, we move retrogressively from the common boundary of the antecedent and creation periods, in reference to an eternal duration, it is manifest, that we can never go so far back as to arrive at any beginning in the antecedent period. And the like is equally deducible, if we set out retrogressively from some point within the antecedent period, assumed at some finite distance from the common

boundary of the antecedent and creation periods.

As then, from either of those assumed points, our retrogression may continue *ad infinitum*, there is not any finite period whatever, but may be so described from either of those points. Wherefore, respecting any assumed finite period of operation that may have terminated at the creation period,—whereas a finite period, respectively equal thereto, may have also terminated at the other assumed point within the antecedent period; and whereas any given eternally-operating energy (or *modus operandi*,) of God, ever continued (by No. 1,) unalterably the same in operation, throughout the entire antecedent period; so, if in the one given finite period it could have produced any given effects, it is equally conclusive, it must have produced as many similar effects in the other assumed finite period, which is altogether within the antecedent period, and which is equal thereto. So that whatever effects any eternally-operating energy of Omnipotence, had not actually generated altogether within the antecedent period, it could not have produced at the creation period, (on the given hypothesis); it being in either of the assumed finite equal periods, precisely and unalterably the same in operation. Hence it ultimately follows, that not any thing created, on

the given supposition, could have been produced by any eternally-operating energy (or *modus operandi*) of God.

OBSERVATIONS.

As all finite periods bear no proportion to eternity, and are hence comparatively evanescent, it is totally immaterial at what given point the retrogression *ad infinitum* may be commenced.

No. 4.

Any eternally-operating energy (or modus operandi) of God, could not be the cause of any thing created.

That any kind of operation must produce its effects, either in a finite or an infinite period, is evident from the utter impossibility there exists of arriving at any mean between finite and infinite; the latter being altogether incommensurable in any way whatever. Hence, if the time be finite, as in No. 3, or if infinite, as in No. 2, it follows therefrom, that any of the given energies in either instance, could not be the cause of any thing created. And there being no other alternative, as to the period of operation, it is ultimately conclusive, that any eternally-oper-

rating energy (or *modus operandi*) of God, could not be the cause of any thing created.

OBSERVATIONS.

Omniscience being an eternally and incessantly operating energy of God;—it follows (from No. 4,) that it could not be the cause of any thing created, although having foreseen all creatures that may ever exist at any period. Hence we ascertain, that this energy although foreseeing, is just the same as if it did not foreknow, for aught its foresight can do, as to the actual production of any creature. The creation, in fact, came into being by the exertion of a divine energy, that was never before exerted. And whatever the energy of divine wisdom might effect in suggesting the order, beauty, or symmetry of the creation; still, not even one creature could have existed, if God went no farther than the mere suggestions of that energy. We accordingly learn, that neither the energy of Omniscience, nor that of divine wisdom, could produce what the former foresaw, and the latter contemplated, in all possible relations. Thus all ideas are obliterated which may have erroneously fancied that those divine energies possessed any inherent necessity whatever, why beings foreseen by the former, and relatively contemplated by the latter, should thence, and thence only,

as an unavoidable effect thereof, spring into existence.

That the beings foreseen shall afterwards certainly exist, proceeds solely from that divine foresight being all-perfect; at the same time that the mere consideration of prescience could not be the actual cause of their afterwards coming into existence.

But we need not stop here: we may also extend our inferences to the actions of the creatures themselves. For instance, take away facts, (if possible,) and you thereby remove the foreknowledge of them: but, take away foreknowledge, (if possible,) and you cannot be thence said to destroy all ideas about the existence of facts. In short, foreknowledge itself, though antecedent to the foreknown facts, is just the same in application, as if it were simply a knowledge of past events. Nor is there more reason to ascribe a causal influence to the former, than to the latter; it being evident, that the foreknown events themselves, (by anticipation,) are the ground of foreknowledge, as much as past events (by retrospection) are the ground of any subsequent knowledge of them.

As, then, we can suppose events to take place independently of any subsequent knowledge of them—the said events being the ground of said subsequent knowledge of them; it seems equally

admissible to suppose, that events may also take place independently of any previous knowledge of them—the said foreknown events being the ground, also, of the said foreknowledge of them.

The basis, certainly, of any thing being taken away, the superstructure consequently falls ; whereas, the superstructure may be removed, without removing the base it rests upon.

Having advanced so much in reference principally to the energies of Omniscience and divine wisdom, on which our adversaries chiefly build in opposition to free agency, we may now deduce the following corollaries by the aid of analogy.

COROLLARY I.

To call the creation into existence, as it required the exertion of a divine energy that was never before exerted by the Creator ; it seems analagous to require the exertion also of some such energy to govern a creation so derived ; that is, as the creative energy is not of eternally incessant operation, the providential energy, likewise, may not belong to that eternally and incessantly operating class. Hence, in this point of view, as not any or all of the divine energies of that class, could be the immediate cause of any thing created, or of any operation thereof, it would follow, that so far as that class alone

may be concerned, the intellectual world is free.

COROLLARY II.

As the non-eternally operating energies of God may be quiescent, except as occasion may require them to be excited into exertion in the divine estimation; so it is possible, that the Creator may not exert his power, except occasionally, according to any energy of that class, whereby as an immediate cause, he could operate on intellectual beings, even while the entire intellectual world may pursue respectively its course of operation: such effects, accordingly, not being generated by the Creator himself at a time when he does not exert his power according to any of the energies of that class, taken as an immediate cause, whereby he could produce such effects. Hence, ultimately, as to the non-eternally operating energies of God, taken as an immediate cause, it is possible that the intellectual creation may be free.

COROLLARY III.

From the two foregoing corollaries, taken together, it is deducible that, if there be no other impediment to free agency, than all the divine energies viewed as an immediate cause, it is

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possible that the intellectual world may be free.

COROLLARY IV.

As (by Cor. 1,) any or all of God's eternally-operating energies, could not be the cause of any thing created, and seem not to be the cause of any operation of created being; it would hence follow, that any immediate effects, of any or all of that class of energies, are co-existent therewith; and that both cause and effect, in all such cases, are co-eval and co-eternal.

OBSERVATIONS.

Though God's eternally and incessantly-operating energies, when taken unconnectedly with the other class of divine energies, appear simply and altogether to be the cause only of what is peculiar to the divine mind; yet, since they may be supposed to possess (as it were) a divine incentive towards bringing the other class of energies into exertion, they may be considered in this light as a remote cause of what they could not immediately produce. This leads us, therefore, into a further consideration of the subject, before we can arrive at the desired conclusion, or final object of our search. And, as to the above four corollaries, which partly depend on analogy, we can easily remove whatever objec-

tions may be here urged against them, by leaving them insulated, or as if totally unconnected with our following deductions; while reserving their testimony simply for a place in Appendix No. 1, where their relative validity cannot be rationally questioned.

No. 5.

The morally distinguishing energy of God, is derived from his eternal discernment of whatever is wise or unwise, right or wrong, in all events, without exception.

For as God eternally discerns all events without exception, and whatever wisdom or folly, right or wrong, respectively appertain thereto in all possible relations; so, this divine discernment was as perfect before the creation existed, (or when only God himself existed,) as it has been ever since, or ever can be. Hence we deduce, that the distinction between wisdom and folly, right and wrong, as being eternally discerned by the divine mind, is accordingly eternal. Hereupon arises in this eternal distinction between wisdom and folly, &c. a ground or reason for attributing a morally-distinguishing energy to God.

No. 6.

The eternal energy of divine wisdom and righteousness, is derived from God's eternal discernment, that all his measures will freely prove in full accordance with his all-perfect wisdom.

For as God eternally discerns what he himself will do under all possible circumstances, and that he will freely act according to the highest wisdom in all his measures, and that all his measures, consequently, will be freely and fully on the side of his all-perfect wisdom ; so, from this instance of his eternal discernment, arises a ground or reason for attributing to him the eternal energy of divine wisdom and righteousness.

No. 7.

The eternal energy of divine wisdom and righteousness, is not incompatible with a benevolent energy being ascribable to God.

For, as God eternally discerns the proper objects of his divine favour, and as (by No. 6) he is eternally wise and righteous, so, in his discern-

ment and election of those proper objects, being not at variance with his everlasting wisdom and righteousness, it appears, that these last-mentioned attributes are of such a nature as not to be incompatible with such an election; or an election implying mercy or benevolence, as being the effect of divine favour.

No. 8.

None are excluded from being among the elect, but those whom the energy of divine wisdom and righteousness, cannot (in conformity with the divine perfections) recognise among that happy number.

Whatever it is that may constitute the elect proper objects of divine favour or benevolence, certain it is, that there is something to distinguish them from the other part of the human race; and that such a distinguishing feature, or characteristic, &c. is discerned by the divine mind, in free and perfect accordance with eternal wisdom and righteousness. Any portion of the human race, therefore, that may not eventually happen to be among the elect, will not be found among that happy number, purely because it would be a violation of God's eternal energy of

wisdom and righteousness, (See No. 6,) for incongruous objects to be enrolled therein.

No. 9.

In God, there is no existing cause why all the moral or intellectual world, might not eventually be among the ever-blessed in the regions of immortality. And hence we ascribe to him the energy of universal and unbounded benevolence.

The elect being in a state of congruity with the divine cause of election, the incongruity therewith of the non-elect must be explored, in a cause that is diametrically opposite to, or at variance with, that divine cause; and hence the said incongruity of the non-elect must be explored, in a cause that is extrinsic to the divine mind. It is accordingly deducible, that there is not any cause whatever existing in the divine mind, from which the said incongruity of the non-elect proceeds.

God, then, being eternally righteous and benevolent, respecting the aforesaid congruity of one portion of the human race, and not having in himself any cause of the said incongruity of the other part of mankind—it follows, that in

God there is no existing cause, why all mankind might not partake of the aforesaid congruity, and accordingly be among the ever-blessed eventually in the regions of immortality.

A similar conclusion may likewise be obtained respecting all the other members of the moral or intellectual world.

It being also (by No. 7) not incompatible with divine wisdom and righteousness, to attribute a benevolent energy to God, it ultimately follows, that he possesses such an energy to an universal and unbounded extent.

OBSERVATIONS.

That such an energy is inherent in the divine nature, is equally conclusive, whether we consider the mental world, in reference to the unavoidable evils, as well as the joys of this probationary and preparatory state of existence. To corroborate which, though anticipating in a measure some of our deductions, let us here transcribe a few of the inferences at which Dr. Thomas Brown arrived, in his 95th Lecture on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. "God," said he, "who has poured on us so much enjoyment, of which it is virtuous to partake, in the whole system of nature, and in the frame of our mind, is manifestly benevolent in calling us to enjoy; and though less manifestly, he is not less

truly benevolent in the evils which he has given to our virtue to bear ; the common wants, by the influence of which the whole multitudes of our race are formed into a society, active in the reciprocation of mutual services, and the greater occasional sufferings, or voluntary perils, which excite the compassion or veneration of others, and cherish, in the heroic sufferer himself, a spirit of gentle or sublime virtue, without the consciousness of which, the moral scene would scarcely be an object of delightful interest, even to human regard.

“ If the system of things has thus been framed by a God of benevolence, it is under the moral government of a benevolent God, who has shown too clearly, by the universal feelings which he has given to all his moral creatures, his love of virtue, and his disapprobation of vice, to leave any doubt as to the nature of his own high estimate of human actions.”

No. 10.

The moral or intellectual creation was originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect.

As an absolutely-perfect guide, must be a being whose wisdom is all-perfect ; so man, as

wanting that characteristic, could not have in himself a perfect guide, in the full and strict sense of the expression. Consequently, if left entirely to his own direction, as he could not then act superior to his own imperfect wisdom, his course would be consonant thereto. Hence, if the Creator had never given man any other guide than the wisdom of the creature, He would have left man in such a situation, that he could never have acted conformably to a perfect guide. And the like, also, is strictly deducible as to any other part of the intellectual creation; all-perfect wisdom no where existing except eternally in the divine mind. The entire intellectual creation, therefore, if left altogether to its own wisdom, could never have had an absolutely perfect guide, and consequently could never have acted conformably to a perfect plan.

Now it is deducible, both from reason and revelation, that it was made by the Omnipotent all-perfect First Cause; and that He could not have made it for no purpose; as also that He would not have made it for a comparatively unwise purpose. As, therefore, it would have been comparatively unwise to have made an intellectual creation susceptible of obeying only an imperfect wisdom, even while a perfect wisdom exists; it is accordingly conclusive, that He made it originally susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect.

OBSERVATIONS.

An objection may here seem to arise, grounded on experience—as the greater part of mankind appear to have been left in great mental darkness. For a reply, you may consult the second part of this treatise; and particularly its second section.

No. 11.

A divine express revelation, or divine inspiration, or both, being indispensable; the First Cause supremely governs his intellectual creation.

For (by No. 10,) as the intellectual creation was originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect; so, consequently, the requisitions of that wisdom must be made known in some way or other, whether by a divine express revelation, or by divine inspiration, or both; it being impossible for any to act in conformity to whatever proves altogether unknown to them. Hence the necessity of divine legislation, and therefore of a divine government; the first cause consequently being the supreme Governor of his intellectual creation.

No. 12.

The measures of the divine Legislator and Governor of the universe, may vary, notwithstanding the immutability of his divine nature.

According as the various members of the intellectual creation change their situation, in relation to their Creator, by obedience or disobedience ; so, they being more or less the objects of his righteousness or benevolence, the divine measures respecting them could not always be the same in such cases ; and (strange as it may appear to some) the divine measures could not always be the same in such cases, purely because the Creator is immutable ; that is, his measures vary, in proportion as his immutable righteousness or benevolence demands ; the measures of immutable righteousness or benevolence being certainly not the same to the obedient as to the disobedient, no, not even to the same individual that proves alternately obedient and disobedient ; hence, (in perfect concurrence with immutable and omniscient righteousness or benevolence,) the same people may be upheld while obedient, punished while disobedient, and finally cast off when (to use the language of scripture) “ their iniquity is full.” And the like also, may be inferred, as to individuals. The measures, there-

fore, of the divine Legislator and Governor of the Universe, may vary, notwithstanding the immutability of his divine nature.

No. 13.

Of all the moral evils that have existed, or that could exist, in the intellectual creation, not one could be otherwise than the effect, whether immediately or remotely, of disobedience to the requisitions of the divine wisdom.

If all intellectual beings proved invariably obedient to the requisitions of divine wisdom; then, as never deviating therefrom freely constitutes a source of happiness to the Creator, they would all be invariably happy; for whatever constitutes divine felicity, must also be a fountain of joy to all incessantly under its influence. Till, therefore, the divine wisdom prove disobeyed by some being or other, (taking our view from the earliest era of the creation,) not even one moral evil could possibly spring into birth; or prior to such an act of disobedience it could not be possible for any moral evil whatever to arise in such a happy state as a sinless world would present. Hence, ultimately, of all the moral evils that have existed, or that could exist, in the intellectual creation, not one could be otherwise than the effect, whether immediately or

remotely, of disobedience to the requisitions of the divine wisdom.

OBSERVATIONS.

Where any effect may arise in direct opposition to its cause, such an effect we accordingly consider entirely incongruous thereto: and, for any moral evil accompanying such an effect, we acquit the assigned incongruous cause of any culpability whatever, under the conviction that, of two diametrical opposites, if the one be morally evil, the other must be morally good.

No. 14.

The Creator is not the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever that has appeared, or that may appear, in the intellectual creation.

As (by No. 13) of all the moral evils of the intellectual creation, not one could be otherwise than, whether immediately or remotely, the effect of disobedience to the divine wisdom; and (by No. 10) as all intelligent beings were originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect; so all moral evils whatever that have arisen, or that may arise, in the intellectual world, are each in opposition to what the Creator approves of, and consequently in opposition to anything that he would prove

the congruous cause of being at any time produced.

If, therefore, any of the measures of his divine wisdom not only fail to produce a good effect on some of his rebellious creatures, but (if possible) tend to harden them still more in hostility; who is to blame? God for being always transcendently good in his measures? or those of his creatures who obstinately rebel against him? The question rationally resolves itself. To contemplate, however, a remarkable illustration, we learn that those very sublime measures of divine wisdom which would have overawed and completely subdued other hearts, even tended to harden Pharaoh's heart to a surprising extent. Here, then, where two diametrically opposite effects may be assumed as flowing from the same cause; if one of these opposite effects be congruous, the other consequently must be incongruous. The effect, therefore, produced on the self-diffident though divinely commissioned and obedient Moses, being unquestionably and incontrovertibly congruous to its divine cause; it is conclusive that the effect produced on Pharaoh was entirely incongruous. And, in like manner, in all other cases the incongruity of moral evil to any thing like a divine cause, could be similarly elucidated: so that, finally, we shall be constrained to infer that the omnisciently benevolent

Father of the Universe is not the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever that has appeared, or that may appear, in the intellectual creation.

No. 15.

In all cases of moral evil, man is intellectually free, and is culpable and accountable, according to circumstances, in proportion to his measure of unrighteousness and impiety.

1st. As (by No. 14) the Creator is not the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever that has occurred, or that may occur, in the intellectual world; it is conclusive that the congruous cause, or source of culpability, of every moral evil (without even one exception) must exist solely among the finite beings of the universe.

2ndly. That every intelligent finite being (by No. 10) was originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect, implies that God approved originally of every sincere attempt at conformity to the requisitions thereof; with which side of the question essentially and immutably concurring, his divine perfections, though completely free and unshackled, will ever renounce whatsoever is in opposition to that all perfect wisdom. Hence,

in all cases wherein that divine wisdom is opposed, that is, (by No. 13) in all cases of moral evil, God and man are on diametrically opposite sides. Man, therefore, in all such cases, being congruously uninfluenced by God, is intellectually free, as to the Creator himself, in every instance of moral evil.

3rdly. As (by No. 9) there is not any existing cause in God why all the moral or intellectual world might not eventually be among the ever-blessed in the regions of immortality; it is conclusive that the Omnipotent placed no barrier in the way of that universal acquisition.

Hence, though our bodies may sustain injuries, and our thoughts be shaded with affliction; though cruelty or oppression might inflict their tortures, or constrain us, contrary to our inclinations, to be the instruments of evil to others; yet our minds cannot be forcibly or irresistibly subjugated by any created being howsoever powerful. After every species of violence exerted against them, they will still experience the freedom of thought, clearly evincing the intellectual freedom of man, as to the opposing force of any finite being whatever.

Man, therefore, being intellectually free in reference to all finite beings; as also with respect to God himself (as above deduced) in all cases of moral evil; it further follows that man is cul-

pable and accountable, according to circumstances, in proportion to his measure of unrighteousness and impiety.

SCHOLIUM.

The same may be inferred, as to angelic beings, wherever moral evil may arise or have arisen.

No. 16.

There is nothing in the divine nature incompatible with the accountable free-agency of the intellectual world. And the intellectual creation, as originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect, is to be viewed as it was when called into existence, and not after any portion of it fell from its original rectitude by the abuse of free-agency.

FORMER CASE.

In all cases of moral evil, the mental world (by No. 15 and Scholium) being intellectually free; and (by No. 9) no cause whatever existing in God why all the moral or intellectual creation might not eventually be among the ever-blessed in the regions of immortality; as also (by No. 14) the Creator not being the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever; and all the mental

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world being accountable only in reference to the perpetration of moral evil ; it is accordingly conclusive that there is nothing in the divine nature incompatible with the accountable free-agency of the intellectual world.

LATTER CASE.

It is manifest that any portion of the mental creation that fell from its primeval rectitude by the abuse of its free-agency, must be viewed in a far different light from what it was as freely and originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect. And the effect of that violation, respecting either human or angelic apostacy, could not possibly have obliterated the original design of the Creator. In short, his pre-existent design cannot be shaken by any posterior event or deduction ; which pre-existent design must have been freely conformable to his divine wisdom, righteousness and benevolence, and hence could have embraced nothing but happiness and perfection both with respect to himself and his mental works. Such is God viewed, *à priori*, or as he is essentially in himself.

But after the abuse of free-agency had disregarded his paternal benevolence, and the fallen creature had involved himself in a different situation from that in which God had placed him ;

the immutable righteousness and benevolence of the Creator (see No. 12) were led to vary their measures from time to time according to the all-wise requisitions of the case respectively. And though the measures of divine providence thereupon, suited to the respective circumstances of the case, have an all-wise reference to posterior relations, yet the original (*à priori*) omnisciently righteous and benevolent design of the vast First Cause, remains unaltered and unchangeable.

The intellectual creation, therefore, as (by No. 10) originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect, is to be estimated as it was when called into existence, and not after any portion of it fell from its original rectitude by the abuse of its free-agency.

END OF PART THE FIRST.

APPENDIX, No. I.

DEFINITION V.

Of the terms indivisible and indivisibility.

IN any of our ideas respecting an indivisible being, or his indivisibility, we do not include the notion of corporeal magnitude in any sense whatever, but simply view it as an attribute resulting from the boundlessness of the Creator; it being impossible for a boundless being to be divisible or resolvable into parts.

DEFINITION VI.

Of the terms eternally indivisible and indivisibly omnipresent.

Eternally boundless and eternally indivisible are synonymous terms; as also boundlessly omnipresent and indivisibly omnipresent.

But the terms indivisible and indivisibly, are respectively adopted, that the Deity may not be considered as if distributed throughout duration

or his works ; or as if (in strict propriety of expression) existing in finite periods of duration, or occupying various localities. In short, no finite or divisible duration or locality, can be philosophically attributed to *him* : and hence we employ these terms as distinguished from certain popular notions respecting his duration and omnipresence.

DEFINITION VII.

Respecting the Trinity.

The Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are the three persons of the eternal Trinity. Nor shall we attempt to determine whether the two latter-mentioned only may be more properly considered as inseparable emanations of the former. It is sufficient for us to know that, by reason of an eternal and indissoluble union, each of these three persons equally participates in all the divine perfections ; and, from this ground of perfect equality, we shall denominate the entire three persons as inseparable emanations of the divine nature. And here let us not presume to form any similitude whatever, as these inseparable emanations are purely spiritual.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

In reference to the Trinity.

In a treatise where the divine energies are contemplated, the Trinity may be justly expected to claim some comment. And although it must ever prove vastly elevated above all human conception, it yields us great consolation to reflect that its cause can be advocated on rational grounds. The nature of the divine union, it is true, must ever remain incomprehensible to finite capacities: but as reason discerns that there can be only one self-existent and eternally-indivisible Being, it may not perhaps be unadvisable to evince the compatibility of such an opinion with the doctrine of the Trinity. Revelation itself maintains that only one self-existent and indivisible (or eternally undivided) fountain of being exists, whereof the three inseparable persons or emanations are co-eval and co-eternal.

Our first object, then, is to place this doctrine on its only legitimate foundation, that is, on a scriptural basis. And, notwithstanding objections made by adversaries of the Christian system, we have reason to consider the Word and the Holy Ghost to be of eternal duration, even

on the authority of the first verse in the Hebrew Bible, which admits of being translated thus ; "In the beginning the triune God created the heavens and the earth." And since the entire creation was the work thereof, that triune God must have been pre-existent to everything created, and hence must be altogether uncreated as to any of the persons, or inseparable emanations thereof, and therefore eternal.

A still more accurate translation of this passage is given in the Dissertation on the Mosaic Account, where also it will appear that we have not taken *too* enlarged a view of "the heavens and the earth," as both combined fully comprehend the whole creation. For, exclusive of the reasons there advanced, it cannot but occur to every reflecting mind, that to have made any omission in such a revelation, would seem as if the Creator claimed only a part of his works. However briefly, then, the universe in general might be alluded to, (as not requiring to be more particularly mentioned in a record relating chiefly to our globe,) there could be no conceivable motive for not including the entire, even under the most concise mode of expression that could be adopted.

SECTION I.

The Doctrine of the Trinity in Unity may be fully supported by the evidence of sacred scripture.

The eternal Trinity in Unity (as we have just intimated) seems not obscurely revealed in the first verse of the Hebrew Bible, where the word אֱלֹהִים Elohim, a noun in the plural number, is used as a nominative case to בָּרָא bara, a verb in the singular number; and that, too, in a language wherein nouns have three numbers.

At all events we may thence infer that a divine unity in plurality (however we may estimate this plural number itself) is thus remarkably evidenced.

In verse 26 (Genesis, chap. i.) it is still more fully developed where אֱלֹהִים Elohim is the nominative case to the singular verb יֹמֵר yōmer, at the same time that אֱלֹהִים Elohim is represented, saying, "let *us* complete man in *our* image;" נַחֲשֶׁה nahaseh, ("let us complete," or we shall complete,) a plural verb being here used. The word בְּצַלְמֵנוּ Betzalmainoo, compounded of צֶלֶם tselem (image) and נוּ noo (our) with the prefixed בּ be (in) and signifying "in *our* image," is also plural. (See Disser. parag. 21, on the verb gnasah.) In Genesis, chap. iii. ver. 22, יְהוָה

אלהים Jehovah Elohim, though likewise the nominative to that singular verb יאמר yōmer, “said, behold! the man is become as *one* of *us*.” The pronoun ממני mimmennoo, indeed, may signify either “from *him*” or “from *us* :” but here it cannot be taken in the singular number, as it would be totally ungrammatical and void of sense to say, “behold! the man is become as one from him.” Here, then, is another instance of the plurality, as well as unity, of אלהים Elohim.

It is further observable, that although the word אלהים Elohim, when used to designate the divine plurality, is generally the nominative case to a singular verb; yet it is not invariably so. For instance, in Genesis, chap. xxxi. ver. 53, אלהי Elohay (which is the regiminal form of אלהים Elohim) is the nominative case to ישפשוץ yishephpetoo, a verb in the plural number. And here there cannot be the slightest evasion or subterfuge, for the term in this passage is called the אלהי Elohay (or triune God) of Abraham. Various instances of this kind occur in the Hebrew Bible, insomuch as to excite our unfeigned admiration of providence. Without doubt, it seems most wisely ordained that this remarkable noun should have been used in common with plural, as well as singular verbs, to obviate (by anticipation) certain objections that have since been advanced without that mature consideration which

the subject required. "Let those" (says Parkhurst) "who have any doubt whether אלהים Elohim, when meaning the true God, Jehovah, be *plural* or not, consult the following passages, where they will find it joined with adjectives, verbs, and pronouns plural.

"Gen. i. 26; iii. 22; xi. 7; xx. 13; xxxi. 7, 53; xxxv. 7; Deut. iv. 7; v. 23; Josh. xxiv. 19; 1 Sam. iv. 8; 2 Sam. vii. 23; Ps. lviii. 12; Isa. vi. 8; Jer. x. 10; xxiii. 36.

"See also Prov. ix. 10; xxx. 3; Ps. cxlix. 2; Eccl. v. 7; xii. 1; Job v. 1; Isa. vi. 3; liv. 5; lxii. 5; Hos. xi. 12; or xii. 1; Mal. i. 6; Dan. v. 18, 20; vii. 18, 22."

(Though we have referred to Parkhurst as excellent authority respecting the meaning of Hebrew words generally, yet the Masoretic system of pronunciation is here preferred and adopted.)

This plural noun, therefore, being in general, though not always, used as the nominative case to a singular verb, while denoting the true God, evidently indicates a united plurality of divine persons; and, while taken in connexion with other scriptural passages respecting the Word and the Paraclete, cannot fail to restrict that plurality to three persons. Hence the divine Trinity in Unity can be fully supported by the sacred scriptures. (See Disser. parag. 12, on the word Elohim.)

SECTION II.

Both Reason and Revelation may be so contemplated as not to be incongruous to each other in their respective views of the divine nature ; and our deductions (in Part the First) are not incompatible with the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The energies of God (as we have intimated in Part the First) may be respectively classed under two denominations, viz. those that are of eternally incessant operation, and those that are not so.

Now, supposing the divine Word and the Holy Ghost to exist by a divine energy of the former class ; it would hence follow that they are indissolubly co-existent and co-eternal with the self-existent Father. And whatever difficulty there may be to prevent our being able to comprehend the manner of that divine and indissoluble union ; yet there is nothing in our view at all at variance with the fact itself. That cause and effect, moreover, in such cases, may be co-eval and co-eternal, see Cor. 4 to No. 4 of Part the First ; which corollary has been reserved exclusively for this place in our disquisition. And although it partly depends on analogy for its support, it is here perfectly conclusive, where

no valid argument can be advanced against the possibility on which we rest for a basis.

What rational being, in short, could be so inconsiderate as to deny that an eternally operating energy of God may produce co-eval and co-eternal effects? The self-existent energy is of eternally incessant operation, and its immediate effects cannot be conceived less than eternal; and so of the omniscient energy, and its immediate effect omniscience. What, then, is to prevent that divine energy whereby the Word and the Holy Ghost exist in union with the Father, from being precisely similar in relation to its immediate effects; both cause and effect being accordingly co-eval and co-eternal.

Thus reason, at least, denies not an inference which may be deduced from revelation, viz. that the Word and the Holy Ghost exist eternally in union with their associate cause, the self-existent Father, by a divine energy which is of eternally incessant operation.

Now, there being but one divine nature; and that divine nature being eternally immutable; it follows that it is also unchangeable in relation to the persons or inseparable emanations thereof. By reason, also, of the eternal union of these persons, or inseparable emanations, we recognise in them but one Being, the ever-blessed Jehovah, the living God.

Seeing, therefore, that this doctrine is not at variance with the eternal immutability of the divine nature, it does not clash with the deductions we have drawn as to the energies of an essentially immutable Creator. Neither do our inferences interfere in the slightest degree with the said doctrine, but humbly contribute their concurrent voice in favour of her claims.

Though we have considered the Word and the Holy Ghost as existing by a divine energy, which is of eternally incessant operation—it is not thence to be inferred, that they do not equally participate in all the other divine energies or perfections: for there is not as much as one divine energy peculiar to any of the Three Persons, as is evidently implied in their eternally infrangible union.

When, moreover, for want of a better in our language, we apply the term *triune* to God, we design not to express by it any thing whatever bordering on a corporeal or dissoluble union; it being intended, in the sense wherein we adopt it, invariably to designate by that term, the spiritual and eternally uninterrupted union of Three Persons in one divine nature.

As to the Messiah, in him we contemplate a Being both divine and human; in whom, however, there is simply a spiritual union of these two different natures, and not any thing like an

amalgamation or commixture; the Second Person of the eternal Trinity being spiritually united with "the man Christ Jesus," to constitute the glorious Redeemer of the world.

SECTION III.

A remarkable passage in St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians (chap. xv. ver. 28.) expounded, so as not to clash with the indissoluble union of the eternal Trinity.

We are not to suppose the union of the Trinity in any respect dissoluble, though St. Paul saith, "when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." For who is he "that put all things under him?" This may probably be ascertained from a preceding verse; "for he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet." Who must reign?—Christ the Messiah. "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death." This evidently relates to the new state of nature, that is promised after the dissolution of the present frame or form of the universe, when death itself shall cease, and immortality possess full and undivided dominion. At that promised period, perhaps the office of Mediator is necessarily to cease; there being henceforth no object

of mediation. Christ then, appears to be the person that put all things under him; and as this manifestly relates to an act of omnipotence, so it is Christ, not as "the Son of man," (or in his human nature,) but Christ as in his pre-existent state, or as the Word, that shall "put all enemies under his feet." When, therefore, the mediatorial kingdom shall or may cease, it is not impossible (if it please God) that the union existing between the Word and "the Son of man," may also cease, when that object for which the union took place shall have been altogether accomplished. And, as this union took place *in time*, for objects particularly specified in Revelation, it is not necessarily indissoluble; (although, if it please God, it may never cease;) whereas, the union of the Trinity, (that is, of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost,) as being eternal, is necessarily such as can never be dissolved. If then the present exposition be justified by Scripture, the passage under consideration may be explained as follows: "then shall the Son (that is, the Son of man,) also himself be subject unto him (the Word,) that put all things under him; that God (the triune God, or God in three persons, or inseparable emanations,) may be all in all."

SECTION IV.

A conjecture, exclusive of other considerations, respecting the necessity of the union of the human with the divine nature in Christ.

The corporeal person of man, is all that can be an object of sensation with us. It accordingly requires both reason and reflexion, to enable us to infer that such a being is not altogether corporeal, but rather an intelligent being; and that a spirit within him, called the soul, is the fountain of all his bodily as well as mental exertions.

Lo, then, how humble a part, or (as it were) mere accident of human nature can be an object of sensation to us, while the really essential part is visually invisible even to man himself! How visually invisible, therefore, must the boundless Spirit of God be to his creatures! As a consequence whereof, he appears to have thought proper (according to the free suggestions of his divine wisdom) to employ heralds or ambassadors from time to time manifested through some corporeal medium of communication. And hence, perhaps, exclusive of other considerations, we may with great humility, venture to resolve the union of "the Son of man" with the divine Word, (as the promised Messiah,) into something bordering upon a necessity of that

denomination. Even in the eye of reason, it cannot appear an absolute impossibility that such a necessity should exist, as the vast self-existent and infinite Being, although indivisibly omnipresent, must ever remain invisible to mortal sight.

God certainly, if he thought proper, might have sent merely angelic messengers on his various embassies to the human race. Yet, who could rashly suppose that any subordinate being, though intrusted with so exalted an office, could possibly accomplish as much as if that ambassador were actually in union with the very power he represented? Now this is the case with him whom St. Paul denominates "the man Christ Jesus," or Christ simply viewed in relation to his human nature. He is not only the heraldic representative of God, but being in union with the divine nature, he comes in the power of Jehovah himself. When, therefore, his truly sublime, moral, and spiritual empire is so much resisted by perverse free agents, what could a mere angel accomplish towards the salvation of mankind? In this most desirable union, accordingly, we behold a reasonable necessity which beams from the glorious effulgence of divine wisdom itself, for which we cannot praise *too* highly the author of "every good and every perfect gift."

The chief use intended to be made of this apparently justifiable conjecture, is to caution abstract reasoners from entertaining certain prejudices against revelation, that are in open defiance to what the rational necessity of the case seems to require.

SECTION V.

On the immateriality of the Soul, &c.

Whether the soul be thought material or immaterial, the free-agency of man could be established independently of any decision on that head. It would be therefore superfluous with our present attempt to combine any metaphysical disquisition on that subject, proving the soul to be simple and uncompounded, not only as respects consciousness in all its relations, but also in reference to all its ideas, each whereof must be entire and incapable of fractional parts; any thing like the fraction of a mere idea being inconceivable and absurd.

As however, in the foregoing section, we have assumed the spiritual or immaterial nature of the soul, in connexion with revelation, so from sacred scripture, we may here select a few remarkable passages to that effect.

The martyr Stephen, (see Acts vii. 59,) as he was about to expire, said, " Lord Jesus, receive

my spirit." Now, if he were merely corporeal, he would not have commended his spirit into the safe-keeping of his Lord and Master; he would simply have said, receive me to thyself. His calling on Christ, then, to receive his spirit, manifestly implied his desire that, although his body would be consigned to the grave, (perhaps till the general resurrection,) his spirit in the interim, should be received into the mansions of blessedness; thus evincing the separation of the spirit from the body at the period of death, and accordingly, the existence of the one as well as of the other. And the authority of this martyr cannot be questioned in the slightest degree, as he revealed this fact while he was under the immediate influence of the Holy Ghost.

On a memorable occasion, (see Acts xxiii. 6—8,) "When Paul perceived that the one part were Sadducees and the other Pharisees, he cried out in the council, Men and brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question.

"And when he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees; and the multitude was divided. For the Sadducees say there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess

both." When St. Paul therefore so affirmed himself to be a Pharisee, his belief in the spiritual or immaterial world, as opposed to Sadducean materialism, is here completely apparent.

Nor hath our Saviour himself been silent on the subject: hath he not said, "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak;" meaning thereby, that the spirit or soul of man is willing to endure greater watchfulness, and to accomplish far more than the weakness of his body may admit of in the present state? Or, when he stated that "a spirit hath not flesh and bones," did he not intimate, that a spirit purely in itself is not at all corporeal? Or, when he revealed that "God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth;" was it not unquestionably implied (exclusive of other considerations) that the mental or spiritual world alone can worship God; and that consequently, the more sublime part of man (that which only can hold converse with its Creator) is truly spiritual or immaterial?

Now, if we combine this last adduced testimony of our Saviour, "that God is a Spirit," with a passage in the first chapter of Genesis, (to which we have already referred,) we shall ascertain how soon the immateriality of the soul is

revealed in Scripture, (ver. 26.) "God said, let us complete man in our own image, after our likeness;" that is, after the likeness of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, whose nature (being divine) is immaterial. As God is illimitable, parts and passions are not properly ascribable to him: of Him, therefore, there cannot be any corporeal image whatever. Consequently, the image and likeness here recorded, must be purely intellectual, and relate altogether to that spirit which constitutes the soul of man.

Hence, also, we may derive (if requisite) an additional reason in favour of that union which afterwards took place (at the Christian era) between the divine Word and "the son of man;" the latter having a spirit within him, created after the divine image, and thence suited (under all the circumstances of his coming) even for a most intimate union with the divine nature.

The immortality of the soul, moreover, is likewise deducible from this early record of revelation, as necessarily flowing from its immateriality and divine similitude.

Sufficient for our purpose having been advanced, it would be needless to adduce a multitude of other scriptural passages to the same effect.

OBSERVATIONS.

Whoever may desire to be furnished with some of the best arguments from reason in favour of the immortality of the soul, should consult the 96th, 97th, and 98th Lectures of Dr. Thomas Brown, on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

PART THE SECOND.

SECTION I.

On human conduct, respecting which Christ recognises the free-agency of man.

RESPECTING moral conduct, true reason, that lover of impartiality, would teach man not to pardon in himself whatever faults, vices, or crimes he would condemn in another. Nor can we suppose any rational being, in the commencement of an evil career, to be void of so much discernment.

Certainly, the frequent perpetration of evil may so darken a transgressor's mind, as to render him blind, more or less, to his awful condition : but in *this* he is equally culpable as if he were actually conscious of all his improprieties, since to have hurled himself into such a deep gulph of mental darkness and depravity is so extremely reprehensible.

As to free-agency, it is not here intended to be confined to cases of moral evil. For, according to circumstances, man being accountable respecting the perpetration of moral evil, implies that he possesses such a power (whether derived or otherwise) as would have enabled him to avoid

such culpability ; free-agents having thence a power to do good (whether derived or otherwise) as well as to act on the opposite side of the question. In short, if man had no more than a power to be always wrong, I cannot discern how he could ever be justly accountable for not doing what he never could do.

As, however, where man acts rightly he proves conformable to the divine will ; he could not from this alone be necessarily inferred a free-agent. Demonstration, therefore, in this complexion of the subject, must be deduced from cases of moral evil ; which, when obtained, leads us to conclude that as man is culpable for doing evil, or (in other words) for not doing good when he had it in his power ; so, as having a power to do good (whether derived or otherwise) he is a free-agent also in this point of view.

Christians, indeed, are truly said to derive through Christ whatever power of doing good they may possess : yet that interferes not with free-agency, as they are free to embrace and free to use the gifts of their Creator ; which freedom is not less than if they embraced and used gifts merely derived from their fellowmen. In either instance something is offered which may either be embraced or rejected, used or not used, which implies a power of freely choosing, &c. And, in the opinion of Christ himself, the free-agency

of man seemed remarkably confirmed, when he represented Abraham as saying, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

For why should they not be persuaded, if they were not free agents? It is true, they might be overawed for a time, as both Jews and Romans were when they beheld the miraculous manifestations that accompanied the crucifixion of our Saviour. But how soon would such impressions wear away, as in the case of the obstinate and rebellious house of Israel.

SECTION II.

On Providence, in reference to the gifts or talents respectively committed to the care of the human race; and for the abuse of which only, man is accountable.

In opposition to No. 10, Part I., it may be demanded how every intelligent finite being could have been originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the "wisdom that is perfect;" if we duly consider the state of the gentile world?

This necessarily leads us to reflect on the state wherein the creation appeared after being called into existence. Divine revelation informs us

that "God saw everything that he hath made, and behold it was very good." Consequently the mental world, according to its original constitution, as being *then* in the divine estimation "very good," must have been susceptible of acting in conformity to the requisitions of divine wisdom, or the omniscient Creator would not have *then* given it such a character, if it could not act except at variance with, or in opposition to, such requisitions; especially as he gave part of it a very different character about one hundred and twenty years before the flood, saying, "My spirit shall not always strive with man; for that he also is flesh," being now (as it were) totally blind to the sublime interests of that intellectual part of his nature which was created in the divine image; so wholly lost was mankind at this era in carnal and sensual depravity. Placing, therefore, these two very opposite accounts given by God himself of part of his own creation, in juxtaposition with each other; we cannot but admit that they produce irrefragable proofs how man (by the abuse of free-agency) had involved himself, through the lapse of ages, in a situation diametrically opposite to the condition wherein God had originally placed him. And it is unreasonable ever to lose sight of this memorable distinction, a distinction pointed out by the Creator himself. In truth, the proper time to estimate

the purity and greatness of Jehovah's mental works, is when they originally began to exist, and before they had forfeited any of their pristine privileges or perfections by disobedience and ingratitude to their all-wise benefactor. God, then, performed his part as the omniscient Founder of the Universe. But how did some of the angelic host exert their constitutionally-free powers? Elate with pride and ambition, with ingratitude and rebellion, they abused the gracious, generous, and sublime gift of free-agency, and accordingly fell. How, also, did man act? While attending to the creature more than the Creator, and giving way to the seduction of the chief of those fallen angels, he, too, became a fallen creature, and by transgression brought death into the world, with its attendant train of consequences; such mischief man entailed on himself by the awful abuse of his free-agency. And as any of the streams that flow from a fountain, must partake of the nature of the spring whence it issues; so the progeny of Adam to remotest generations evince, at least, the partial corruption of their human source.

“In process of time” (see Genesis iv. 3—7)
“it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground, an offering unto the Lord. And Abel, he also brought” an offering, but that offering was “of the firstlings of his flock, and

of the fat thereof. And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering; but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect. And Cain was very wroth, and his countenance fell. And the Lord said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door." This extract, without any comment, seems sufficiently to explain itself, the latter part whereof intimates the just cause of Cain's rejection. So much appears while simply taking this passage according to its *prima facie* evidence. And if we enter into a more particular consideration of the subject, we shall find our first impression of the divine righteousness greatly and benignly corroborated.

A learned writer represents the original (Hebrew) of the last verse of this quotation, as susceptible of being translated and explained as follows:—

“A sin-offering lieth at thy door: an animal proper to be offered as an atonement for sin is now *couching* at the door of thy fold.”

From this it appears justifiable to infer that Cain received a divine revelation, as well as Abel, on this memorable occasion. “A sin offering lieth at thy door,” O Cain, such as thy brother hath offered as typical of the great atone-

ment to be effected on the Cross in the fulness of time for the sins of the whole world. Go, thou, and do likewise; "and if thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?" Cain, then, while acting in impious disobedience to God, profanely turned his back upon the means of grace; and mark the result of the gross abuse of his free-agency, he even became the murderer of his righteous brother.

As to Doctor Kennicot's exposition of הבי גמ הוה Hebi gam hoo, or (as others pronounce it) Hebia gam hooa, (Gen. iv. 4,) it appears totally inadmissible: for whether we admit the πλείονα θυσίαν of the Apostle Paul, to be better translated by the term "*greater*," or by the term "more excellent," it does not necessarily follow that the term πλείονα implies that two offerings were made at the same time by Abel, but that it refers to the superiority of Abel's atoning sacrifice over Cain's unatoning offering of the fruit of the ground. That passage also in the Epistle to the Hebrews, viz. "God testifying with his gifts," δώροις, does not require two offerings on the part of Abel at the precise time referred to; as, doubtless, Abel may have made on various occasions a similar atoning sacrifice, and hence have given rise to the designation "gifts," as applicable to a succession of atoning sacrifices from time to time.

It should likewise be remembered that His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin, in his celebrated work on the Atonement, hath clearly indicated that, although the term מנחה mincha in general signifies merely a fructiferous offering, it was also used to designate an atoning sacrifice for sin where blood was actually shed. (See No. 62, Vol. II. from page 168 to 178 inclusive.)

Having shown, then, that Cain and his offering were rejected for his impious disobedience and deistic infidelity; whither next shall we direct our investigation? To follow this subject in regular order, from that early period to the present time, would far exceed the limits of this Treatise. Let us, accordingly, confine our view to such instances as are more obviously connected with the object of our search.

We must confess "that God in times past suffered all" the gentile "nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheless, he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." (Acts xiv. 17.)

Hence we ascertain that the goodness of God and his providence were not without witness even in the heathen world; and that the gentiles not having any other guide than what is called natural religion, did sometimes observe "the things contained in the law," and that thus they evinced

“the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another.”

We are likewise assured, by the same Apostle, that “there is no respect of persons with God,” and that “as many as have sinned without the law” expressly revealed through Moses, “shall also perish without the law” so revealed; as having another law, derived from what is designated natural religion, to guide them; while “as many as have sinned in the law” expressly revealed through Moses, “shall be judged by the law” so handed down.

We therefore learn that under two even different dispensations “the things contained in the law” might at least occasionally be observed; and that the gentile world, as well as the Jewish, was guilty for not acting conformably to the light each respectively had, and by which “the things contained in the law” might have been at least occasionally observed by either, howsoever they differed in other respects. Hence, “all the world,” Gentile as well as Jewish, “may become guilty before God.” Guilty for what? for violating the law, whether pointed out by what is called natural religion, or by an express revelation from heaven through Moses. “The times of this ignorance, God winked at,” saith St.

Paul. What ignorance? The ignorance of the Mosaic dispensation, in which the Gentiles lived whilst they were left to the guidance of what is denominated natural religion. "But now" He "commandeth all men every where to repent: because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. And since "in righteousness" he will of course judge the world according to the free suggestions of his infallible wisdom. Omnisciently righteous, therefore, will be the sentence passed upon all respectively to the light that was vouchsafed. Those, in short, to whom ten talents may have been intrusted, shall have to account for ten; while those who have been only intrusted with either five or one, shall have merely to account for five or one respectively; so far are the circumstances wherein man is placed from being omitted in the divine estimation of our respective stewardships.*

SECTION III.

The knowledge of the Supreme Being, which heathens possessed, having been violated and rendered abortive by their various superstitions, furnishes no valid argument against free-agency.

* The exposition of Dr. Kennicot, above alluded to, is given in his Dissertation on the oblations of Cain and Abel.

We do not find that even idolaters were altogether void of knowledge respecting the supreme Being; a knowledge that may have been derived from the revelation that was originally given to man at the creation, and (after the deluge) to Noah and his family, and their successors. This information, handed down from age to age, became greatly obscured and confused, by various additions and admixtures of human impositions, so as at length to prove almost (if not altogether) eclipsed or obliterated from the minds of the gentile nations. In this, then, as in many other respects, God may well be said to have "left not himself without witness," even among *them*.

St. Paul tells us, "that the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that when they *knew* God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, &c." (See paragraph 20, of the Dissertation on the Mosaic Account.)

We are also informed, that "when the people of Lystra " saw what Paul had done, they lifted up their voices, saying in the speech of Lycaonia, The gods are come down to us in the likeness of men."

Now, if they supposed that the men whom they

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beheld (that is, Paul and Barnabas,) were in reality their gods, it is tolerably evident, they would not have said that the gods had assumed the likeness of men.

And in accordance with this exposition, we may cite the testimony of a heathen himself, who hath stated as follows :

“ The commencement of the consideration,” (saith Simplicius) “ is first to know what (Theos) the name of God indicates ; and let it be remembered that they who first applied it, so called those” (stars) “ that revolve in the heavens, from their celerity, (para to theein,) that is, the rapidity and velocity of their movements ; but afterwards, in the course of time, they also conferred the name on the incorporeal and intellectual causes of the beings that exist, and extended its application so far as the one original cause of all things. So that the name manifests the original of the creation, even the first and supreme intellectual cause.”

In another place the same author observes, that “ it becomes him who ascends to originals,” (in reference to the doctrine of causes,) “ to seek whether it be possible for any thing to be more excellent than the assumed beginning ; and when it may prove discovered, to seek from that again, till we come to the most elevated conceptions, than which we can no longer entertain ideas of greater veneration, and not to stop the ascent.

For it is not to be dreaded, lest we may vainly indulge in some cogitations that exceed and transcend those first originals; as it is not possible that our conceptions should take such an excessive bound, as to be *equal* to the dignity of those first originals; I say not, indeed, to surpass, in as much as this" (humbly and merely approximating) "ascent to *God*, is alone the best, and as far as possible, the most irreprehensible."

If the reader desire it, he may thus peruse that writer's own words:

Former extract. "Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεώς ἐστιν, εἶδεν πρῶτον, τί σημαίνει τὸ του Θεοῦ ὄνομα· καὶ ἴστέον, ὅτι οἱ πρῶτον θέντες αὐτὸ, τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ" (ἀστέρας) "περιπολοῦντας, παρὰ τὸ θέειν, τουτέστι, τρέχειν καὶ ὀξέως κινεῖσθαι, οὕτως ὠνόμασαν· χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ νοητὰς τῶν ὄντων αἰτίας ἀνήγαγον τὸ ὄνομα, καὶ μέχρι τῆς μιᾶς τῶν πάντων ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας· ὥστε δηλοῦν τὸ ὄνομα ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, καὶ αἰτίαν νοητὴν πρωτίστην καὶ κυριωτάτην."

Latter extract. "Χρὴ τὸν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀναβαίνοντα ζητεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, εἶναι τι κρεῖττον τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀρχῆς· καὶ ἐνρηθῇ, πάλιν ἐπέκεινον ζητεῖν· ἕως ἂν εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας ἐννοίας ἔλθωμεν, ὧν οὐκέτι σεμνοτέρας ἔχομεν· καὶ μὴ σῆσαι τὴν ἀνάβασιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλαβητέον μὴ κενεμβατῶμεν, μείζονά τινα καὶ ὑπερβαίνοντα τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐννοοῦντες· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν τηλικούτον πῆδημα πηδῆσαι τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐννοίας, ὡς περισωθῆναι τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν, οὐλαγω

καὶ ὑπερπῆναι· μία γὰρ αὕτη πρὸς θεὸν ἀνάτασις ἀρίστη, καὶ ὡς δυνατόν ἄπταιστος.”

Both the above extracts are taken from the Commentary of Simplicius on Epictetus (Ed. Lug. clolccxl.) the former from page 223, the latter from 231—2.

In the former, I have taken the liberty to introduce the word ἀστέρας, which may have been perhaps, typographically omitted. But, although the passage seems to require such an addition according to grammatical precision, it is simply included in a parenthesis, and in such a manner as not to appear a constituent part of the quotation itself.

Before we take a review of the opinions of other heathens, it may be well to consider the word θεός, in reference to other sources whence it is said to be deduced.

Cluverius derives it from the Celtic word Thoyth, or Thouth, or Thoth—from which we evidently have our English term *thought*. (See page 182—3. Ed. Lug. clolccxxxi.)

According to Scapula, it has been derived, by some ἀπο τοῦ θεασθαι, *quod omnia intuetur et cernat*; by others from θαυμάζω, *admiror*; and by others from δέος, *metus, quod sit formidabilis, &c.*

Now, if we combine all the above-cited derivations under one comprehensive view of the divine nature, the term θεός will accordingly de-

signate a being of supreme energy, intellect, and discernment, who ought to be feared, and duly revered with becoming wonder by all intelligent creatures. In which sublime contemplation of the Supreme Being, we shall presently acknowledge the heathen world manifestly participated, notwithstanding its truly deplorable superstitions, and awful deviations from the light it possessed.

To give many Greek quotations in a work of this kind being extremely inconvenient, let us derive our remaining authorities from Dr. Gillies' History of Greece, where ample reference is made to ancient sources of authentic information.

And first, as to Pythagoras, we are informed (chap. xi.) that "his hearers sometimes amounted to two thousand of the principal citizens of Crotona; and the magistrates of that republic erected, soon after his arrival among them, an elegant and spacious edifice, which was appropriated to the virtuous lessons of this admired stranger, who pleased their taste and gratified their fancy, while he condemned their manners, and reproached their vices. Equally rapid and astonishing, and not more astonishing than advantageous, if we may credit the general voice of antiquity, was the reformation produced at Crotona in persons of every age, and of either sex, by this singular man.

"The women laid aside their ornaments, and

resumed their modesty ; the youth preferred their duty to their pleasures ; the old improved their understanding, and almost neglected to improve their fortunes.

“ In a few years, three hundred men, all Pythagoreans, held the sovereignty of Crotona : the influence of the new sect extended with rapidity over Locri, Rhegium, Catana, and other cities of Italy and Sicily. The disciples of Pythagoras were diffused over ancient Greece and the isles of the *Ægean* sea ; and it seemed as if the sage of Samos, whose nobler ambition declined and disdained any particular office of power and dignity, had conceived the sublime idea of forming a school, or rather an association of men, who might govern the world, while they were themselves governed by virtue.

“ Pythagoras was deeply persuaded that the happiness of nations depends chiefly on the government under which they live ; and the experience of his own times, and of his own island in particular, might teach him the dangerous tendency of democratic turbulence on the one hand, and jealous tyranny on the other. He preferred therefore to all governments, a moderate aristocracy, which seems, without exception, to have been the well-founded opinion of the greatest men of antiquity, since, under the administration of a senate, the republics of Greece, of Rome, and of Carthage, attained their highest prosperity and splendour.

“To explain at large the system of Pythagoras, would be to write a treatise of sublime, yet practical morality, since his conclusions are strictly founded on the nature of man. Besides the propensities common to us with inferior natures, and besides the selfish and artificial passions of avarice and ambition, he found in the human breast the seeds of nobler faculties, fitted to yield an incomparably more durable, more perfect, and more certain gratification.

“The chief happiness of the mind must be sought in itself, in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral pleasure. Our thoughts are ever, and intimately present with us ; and although the bustle of external objects, and the tumult of passion may sometimes divert their current, they can never dry up their source.

“The reflexions on our own conduct will be continually occurring to our fancy, whatever pains we may take to exclude them ; nor can voluptuous enjoyment, or ambitious activity, ever so totally occupy the mind of a Persian satrap, or a Grecian demagogue, but that their principal happiness or misery in the whole course of life, must chiefly depend upon their hopes and fears about futurity.

“The Pythagoreans were strictly enjoined, as their earliest and latest work, to review the actions of the past, and, if time permitted, of

many preceding days. In the morning, they repaired alone to the temples, to solitary mountains and forests, and after there conversing with themselves, joined in the conversation of their friends, with whom they assembled in small companies, to an early and frugal meal, discussed different subjects of philosophy or politics, regulated their conduct for the ensuing day, and by the mutual strength and encouragement acquired in this select society, prepared for the tumultuous bustle of the world, and the contentions of active life. The evening was spent as the morning, with this difference, that they then indulged in the moderate use of flesh and wine, from which they rigidly abstained during the day; and the whole concluded with that self-examination, which was the capital precept of the Pythagorean school."

In chap. xiii. we learn that "Philosophy, which in Greece alone deserves the peculiar attention of the historian, arose about the beginning of the sixth century before Christ, and in a hundred and fifty years, attained the highest degree of perfection, and sunk into the lowest degeneracy and corruption, to which the use or abuse of the human intellect could raise or plunge it.

"Lesser Asia, to which Europe and America owe the inestimable benefits of their religion and

letters, produced and nourished the tender plant of philosophy ; and the flourishing Greek colonies on that delightful coast, communicated to their mother country this precious offspring of their soil. Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Cleobulus of Lindus in the Isle of Rhodes, and the other wise men, as they were emphatically styled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and assistance to their countrymen in particular emergencies, but restrained their vices by wholesome laws, improved their manners by useful lessons of morality, and extended their knowledge by important and difficult discoveries.

“ But it is particularly worthy of observation, that at the same time Democritus assailed the celestial mansions, and unveiled with a daring hand the feeble majesty of Grecian superstition, Anaxagoras of Clazomene, revealed a new and infinitely more august spectacle, by first announcing to the heathen world a self-existent, all-perfect mind, as the great cause and author of the material world. Thales and Pythagoras, with such of their disciples as faithfully adhered to their tenets, had indeed admitted spirit as a constituent principle of the universe ; but they had so intimately blended mind and matter, that these dissimilar substances seemed to make an

indissoluble compound, as the soul and body constitute but one man.

“According to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, the creating and sovereign intelligence was to be carefully distinguished from the soul of the world, which he seems to have regarded merely as a poetical expression for the laws which the Deity had impressed on his works. The great Ruler of the universe did not animate, but impel matter; he could not be included within its limited and perishing terms; his nature was pure and spiritual, and totally incapable of pollution by any corporeal admixture.

“The discovery and diffusion of this luminous and sublime principle, which was naturally followed by an investigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and the deducing from thence the great duties of morality, might have produced a general and happy revolution in Greece, under the zealous and persevering labours of Socrates and his followers, if the tendency of this divine philosophy had not been counteracted, not only by the gross prejudices of the vulgar, but by the more dangerous refinements of incredulous Sophists.

“In several republics of Greece, the Sophists enjoyed a free career to display their talents, practise their artifices, and to promote their fame

and fortune. But in Athens their frauds were detected, and their characters unmasked by Socrates, whose philosophy forms an important era in the history of the human mind.

“ From the perfections of the extreme intelligence, he deduced his just government of the universe, which implied the immortality of the soul. But the great object of his research was to discover the general laws by which, even in this life, the superintending providence had variously dispensed to men good and evil, happiness and misery. These laws he regarded as the promulgated will of the God, with which, when clearly ascertained, it became our duty invariably to comply; since nothing but the most short-sighted folly could risk incurring the divine displeasure, in order to avoid pain or poverty, sickness or death; far less to acquire perishing gratifications, which leave a sting behind them. Reasoning on such principles, and taking experience only for his guide, he deduced with admirable perspicuity, the interests and duties of nations and individuals, in all the complicated relations of society. The actions of men furnished the materials, their instruction formed the object, their happiness was the end of his discourse.

“ Wherever his lessons might be most generally useful, there he was always to be found,

frequenting, at an early hour, the Academy, Lyceum, and other public Gymnasias; punctually attending the Forum at mid-day, the hour of full assembly; and in the evening, joining, without the affectation of austerity, in the convivial entertainments of his friends, or accompanying them in the delightful walks which adorned the banks of the Ilyssus."

Yet this truly great man was condemned by the tyrants of Greece to drink hemlock, after "a life of seventy years, spent in the service of mankind, uniformly blameless, and terminated by a voluntary death, in obedience to the unjust laws of his country."

Mark the venerable hero at the approaching period of mortal dissolution, and, on the brink of an eternal world, hear him thus imparting his consolations! (Chap. xxiv.) "It becomes you also, my friends, to be of good comfort with regard to death; since no evil in life or death, can befall virtuous men, whose true interest is ever the concern of heaven. For my part, I am persuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and therefore am not offended with my judges. I entreat you all to behave towards my sons, when they attain the years of reason, as I have done to you, not ceasing to blame and accuse them, when they prefer wealth, or pleasure, or any other frivolous object, to the inesti-

mable worth of virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, while in fact it is of little value, reproach them severely, Athenians! as I have done you: by so doing, you will behave justly to me and to my sons. It is now time for us to part. I go to die, you to live; but which is best, none but the divinity knows.

“In what country, O Crito! can I escape death?—where shall I fly to elude this irrevocable doom, passed on all human kind?

“Would you be less grieved, O Apollodorus! were I deserving of death?

“How unjustly soever we are treated, it can never be our interest to practise injustice, much less to retort the injuries of our parents, or our country; or to teach by our example disobedience to the laws.

“Nothing new, O Crito! but what I have always told you. By consulting your own happiness, you will act the best part with regard to my children, to me, and to all mankind, although you bind not yourselves by any new promise. But if you forsake the rules of virtue, which we have just endeavoured to explain, you will benefit neither my children, nor any with whom you live, although you should now swear to the contrary.”

Thus died Socrates, who “maintained, that though it was better for a wise man to die than to live, because there was reason to believe that

he would be happier in a future, than in the present state of existence, yet it could never be allowable for him to perish by his own hand, or even to lay down life without a sufficient motive, such as that which influenced himself, a respectful submission to the laws of his country."

"The current of popular passions appears nowhere more uniform than in the history of Athens. The factitious resentment excited against Socrates by such improbable calumnies, as even those who were the readiest to receive and to disseminate, could never seriously believe, extended itself with rapidity to his numerous friends and adherents. But fortunately for the interest of letters and humanity, the endemic contagion was confined within the Athenian frontiers.

"Plato, Antisthenes, Æschines, Critobulus, and other Athenians, wisely eluded a storm which they had not strength to resist.

"Some took refuge in Thebes with their fellow-disciples, Simmeas, Cebes, and Phædonidas; others found protection in Megara from Euclid and Terpsion.

"This persecution of philosophy, however, was accidental and transient. Mingled sentiments of pity, shame, and resentment, soon gave a new direction to the popular fury, which raged with more destructive, yet far juster cruelty, against the accusers and judges of Socrates.

“ Many were driven into exile ; many were put to death ; several perished in despair by their own hands. The illustrious sage was honoured by signal monuments of public admiration ; his fame, like the hardy oak, derived vigour from years ; and increased from age to age, till the superstition of the Athenians at length worshipped, as a god, him whom their injustice condemned as a criminal.

“ The persecution, the death, and the honours of Socrates, all conspired to animate the affection, and to increase the zeal of his disciples. Their number had been great in his lifetime : it became greater after his death ; since those who followed, and those who rejected his doctrines, alike styled themselves Socratic philosophers. His name was thus adopted and profaned by many sects, who, while they differed widely from each other, universally changed, exaggerated, or perverted the tenets of their common master. Among the genuine followers of Socrates, Xenophon, as will appear hereafter, unquestionably merits the first place. Plato comes next, yet separated by a long interval. In the same class may be ranked Cebes the Theban, Æschines, Crito, and Simon, Athenians.

“ The table of Cebes, which has been transmitted to modern times, contains a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with

accuracy of judgment, and illuminated by the splendour of sentiment. Three remaining dialogues of Æschines breathe the same sublime spirit, and abound in irresistible persuasions to virtue:—

“ That happiness is attained, not by gratifying, but by moderating the passions; that he alone is rich and powerful, whose faculties exceed his desires; that virtue is true wisdom, and being attended with the only secure happiness which can be enjoyed in the present life, must, according to the unalterable laws of Providence, be crowned with immortal felicity hereafter.

“ Let us look where we will around us, (chap. xxxiii.) we shall every where, said Plato, perceive a passing procession: the objects which compose the material world, arise, change, perish, and are succeeded by others, which undergo the same revolutions. One body moves another, which impels a third, and so forwards in succession; but the first cause of motion resides not in any of them. This cause acts not fortuitously; the regular motions of the heavenly bodies, (by these he meant the fixed stars, the motions of the planets he ascribed to another cause,) the beautiful order of the seasons, the admirable structure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author. It is difficult by searching to find out the nature of the Divinity,

and impossible by words to describe it; yet the works which he has done, attest his power, his wisdom, and his goodness, to be greater than human imagination can conceive. In the self-existent cause, these attributes must unite. He is therefore unchangeable, since no alteration can increase his perfections, and it would be absurd to suppose him ever inclined to diminish them."

Let us here pause to make a few reflections. So far as this extract relates to the divine attributes, it is admirably sublime. Plato, however, entertained some very visionary ideas, of which the following sentence may furnish a specimen. "Impelled by his goodness, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all possible existence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the universe from that rude indigested matter, which existing from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of motion." Is not this wild in the extreme?—Yet, it is such an aberration of a luminous intellect, that Bishop Berkeley seems to have adopted the suggestion wherewith it commences, as the foundation of his truly speculative archetypes of ideas. And long as the vista of antiquity may be through which we explore the theoretic source, we cannot but recognise the Platonic fountain whence the latter philosopher derived the most bewildering draught he ever imbibed.

In chap. xl. we are informed, that "the moral virtues cannot, according to Aristotle, subsist without some mixture of the intellectual; but the latter may subsist alone and independent; and according to both Aristotle and Plato, the purest and most permanent felicity of which man is susceptible, results from the exercise of his rational powers upon subjects of abstract speculation. The labours of the statesman or general, the exertions of the legislator or patriot, all refer to some end or purpose, the attainment of which may be prevented by fortune, or frustrated by the weakness or wickedness of man. The practice of justice, generosity, temperance, and fortitude, requires many conditions, and supposes a variety of situations, which it is not always in our power to command. The just or generous man, must have objects to whom he may distribute his justice or generosity; he must possess the means by which to exercise those virtues, which all participate of frail mortality; since, though directed by prudence, they are impelled by passion, and result from the exigencies of our present corporeal state. But the energies of contemplative wisdom are pure and simple, like the intellectual source from which they spring. Not subservient to remote purposes or contingent ends, they are immediately agreeable on their own account; and on every side, round

and complete in themselves. If the proper exercise of every member or faculty enlivens the sense of our existence, and thereby yields us a perception of pleasure, how wonderfully delightful must be the exercise of the intellect, which renders us sensible of the divine principle within us ! To live according to nature, is to live according to the noblest part of our nature, which, doubtless, is the mind. To live thus, is the life of a god ; for, human as we are, we ought not, according to the vulgar exhortation, to regard only human things ; but though mortal, strive to put on immortality, assured that, as the mind chiefly forms the man, he who most cultivates his mind, is the best disposed in himself, and the most agreeable to the gods.

“ It is commonly observed, that Aristotle attained the same authority over the opinions of men, which his pupil Alexander acquired over their persons : but the empire of Alexander was established in his own lifetime, and perished with himself. That of Aristotle did not (properly) commence till more than a thousand years after his decease, and continued several centuries. The Peripatetic School subsisted indeed, without interruption, at Athens ; but the Lyceum never attained there any pre-eminence above the Portico and Academy. When philosophy was transplanted to a more splendid theatre in Rome,

men of speculation and science generally preferred Plato to Aristotle; while many of the most celebrated characters of the republic enlisted themselves under the banners of Zeno or Epicurus. With the fall of Roman liberty, philosophy, as well as literature and the fine arts, slowly declined; and under the emperors, particularly in the second and third centuries of the Christian era, the most extravagant of Plato's speculations were the doctrines best adapted to the condition of the times, and to the dark and shadowy minds of Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and other contemplative visionaries, distinguished by the appellation of Eclectics, or later Platonists, who possessed the wildness without the fancy, and the subtilty without the genius, of Plato.

“ During the succeeding centuries, the doctrines of Aristotle slowly gained the ascendant; but, as had happened to Plato in an earlier period, the most frivolous part of Aristotle's philosophy was the highest in esteem during the darkness of the middle ages.

“ As to the system of Epicurus and Pyrrho, they were so reprehensible and baneful to the best interests of mankind, we studiously relinquish the most cursory view of their respective opinions: and from the extracts already given of the wisest heathen philosophers, we may form

some estimate whether the gentile world had not, with such instructors, opportunities of knowing their Creator to a considerable extent. "So that they are without excuse; (as saith the Apostle;) because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful," &c.

So much may be correctly advanced in justification of divine Providence, whose bounties and blessings have been experienced in all lands, Jewish, Heathen, and Christian. But how glorious must be our enlarged prospect while we contemplate the future, in accordance with that most gracious prophecy, which reveals nothing less than a complete universal development of our Creator's benevolence to man; foretelling, in short, the arrival of that most desirable epoch, when "the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." Yet as to the state itself, in which the Gentiles were suffered to remain till the Christian era, surely that can never be urged as an argument against free-agency; seeing that mankind (taking this objection in its most extensive import) were left fully in the possession of that inalienable intellectual privilege.*

* As to the word virtue, in the view of the above-mentioned philosophers, its meaning was almost unlimited, and related to the strengthening of both mind and body. All the religious,

Of Zeno's system nothing has been here advanced, as (however pompous, elevated, or aspiring) it was founded on an extravagantly wild and erroneous view of human nature.

SECTION IV.

Certain proofs that the measures of divine Providence are not absolute or irrespective.

“Behold,” saith our Saviour (Matth. xxiii. 34—36.) “I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes: and some of them ye shall kill and crucify, and some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city; that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Verily I say unto you, all these things shall come upon this generation.” From Scripture we may infer that, when the iniquity of any nation hath arrived at frightful and excessive maturity, its fall is most justly at hand. So the ruin of the Jewish people, that may have been considered as progressively increasing its awful magnitude for ages, swelled at length (as it were) into an overwhelming moral, intellectual, and corporeal endowments of man, as improved by repeated exercise, were evidently included in its most extensive signification.

deluge, the commencement of which might be dated from the first "righteous blood shed upon the earth." So that to them, in a measure, at length arrived the ultimate effects of the righteous blood shed in ages past, as well as in present or recent periods of murder and persecution.

Yet, if they had not filled up "the measure of the iniquity of their fathers," we have our Saviour's own authority to assure us that such effects would not have taken place. (Matth. xxiii. 37, 38.) "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings!"

Then would the prophets have had to foretell respecting thee a far different succession of results; then would my Providence have required far different measures. Under the shield of approving heaven, the once "faithful city" would not have "become an harlot," and her towers would remain firm and unshaken amid the tides of war. "How often would I have gathered thy children together, (saith the Lord, the Redeemer,) and ye would not!"—so "behold," the fatal consequence of your flagrant abominations, and the awful abuse of your constitutionally free-agency, "your house is left unto you desolate;" as it shall doubtless prove, when completely

overthrown by the Romans. Such was the remarkable tenor of that prophecy ; and its subsequent fulfilment was equally memorable.

Any change of measures, however, in the divine government, proceeds not from any mutability in God, but purely from the free-agents of the creation changing their moral or religious situation as to divine countenance or disapprobation. Thus Adam, though a highly-gifted and distinguished work of the Creator, was punished for disobedience. Cain was obliged to retire "from the presence" or favour of the Lord, "and to dwell an outcast in the land of Nod ;" being under divine condemnation for the murder of his brother. Or, to be more general in deducing illustrations from former times, the descendants of Jacob, who at first possessed "the best land of Egypt, the land of Goshen," were afterwards, as they receded from the living God, progressively reduced, lower and lower, into the most abject state of oppression and bondage. When also "the cry of the children of Israel" had reached the Lord, and He had delivered them out of the hand of their cruel and most unrighteous persecutors, nevertheless, how many thousands of them fell in the wilderness, while they wandered there "forty years, until all the generation that had done evil in the sight of the Lord was consumed." (Num. xxxii. 13.) So

signal a proof of God's impartial righteousness was thus given in punishing even the children of Israel, according as they had rebelled against him.

Look also to Babylon ; behold *there* the captive descendants of Israel ! Learn what the inspired Ezekiel inculcates, while preaching *there* to his countrymen in bondage ; (Ezekiel xxxix. 23.) " the heathen shall know that the house of Israel went into captivity for their iniquity."

God certainly, is sometimes revealed as working for his " name's sake ;" in all which cases, we are simply to infer that the Israelites, by frequent rebellion against their heavenly Protector, evinced their unworthiness of his gracious support ; yet we are not to conclude that, while operating for his " name's sake," He wrought in favour of beings who were not more the proper objects of his divine righteousness and benevolence, than those whom He opposed. Little, indeed, as the children of Israel deserved in numerous instances of divine interposition in their behalf, they were nevertheless not so base as those whom Jehovah resisted on such occasions. But, exclusive of the evidences of God's immutable righteousness, deduced from the repeated and galling adversity of Israel, the final overthrow of the Jewish nation, (to which we have already alluded,) furnishes a most impressive exemplification.

Wherefore, without uselessly multiplying quotations to the same effect, we have reason to rest satisfied that the measures of divine Providence are not absolute or irrespective.

SECTION V.

Though God is perfectly free and unshackled in his divine government, his choice of the Elect is not indiscriminate.

The first fourteen verses of the first chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians have, in my opinion, been misrepresented by certain writers, so far as relates to "the good pleasure of his (God's) will," (κατά τὴν ἐνδοκίαν τοῦ Θελήματος αὐτοῦ.)

To me, it seems clearly to indicate a most perfect freedom on the part of God, in *that*, as in all other instances of his divine providence or government. It appears to proclaim that God is not acting under any necessity; and that whatever he does, as in this instance, is in strict accordance with "the good pleasure of his will," and not the result of any species of fatality. Some annotators have departed from the spirit and force of this portion of revelation, and have even misapplied it; having affirmed that the Creator's choice of the elect is altogether arbitrary and irrespective, and not at all guided by

circumstances, or what might be humbly presumed the wisdom of the case. Yet that such passages as the one under present consideration, could have no such application, may be deduced from the very character of the elect, who are said to constitute "a people zealous of good works, conformed to the image of the" well-beloved "Son" of God, conformed to the image of him, who went about doing good, and who uniformly proved obedient to the divine will. In such passages, therefore, the free and unshackled system of the divine operations appears evidently revealed. And whereas, such a knowledge is thus imparted, it is unreasonable in any commentator to attempt to deprive it of its real import, and particularly for such a purpose as to render the choice of the wisest of all beings, as if it were altogether void of the slightest discrimination. In fact, it is utterly impossible that an infinitely wise Being could be indiscriminate in any of his measures respecting selection; for where He is indiscriminate, there is no selection whatever, as in his sending rain on the evil and the good, and permitting the sun to shine on the just and the unjust.

Though God, then, may be no respecter of persons, whether of high or low degree, it cannot be thence inferred correctly, that his omniscience is a *sine discriminé rerum*. On the contrary, his

discriminating power transcends all others as much as the heavens surpass the earth.

SECTION VI.

Though God is the Author and Finisher of our faith, his choice of the Elect is not indiscriminate.

In like manner, the 13th verse of the 2d chapter of St. Paul's epistle to the Philippians has been as much misapplied as the subject of the preceding section. So much for taking it in an insulated aspect: but, if we view it in connexion with the foregoing verse, we shall probably arrive at its true solution. Both together run thus: "Wherefore, my beloved, (saith the Apostle,) as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling: for," (when ye do so, as is evidently implied,) "it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Now, if they disobeyed the apostolic injunction to "work out their own salvation with fear and trembling," could it for a moment be supposed, that God would work in them both to will and to do what proved in conformity to his good pleasure? (ὕπὲρ τῆς ἐυδοκίας)—such an exposition being manifestly concordant with the sig-

nification of ὑπέρ, when it governs a genitive case.

The Apostle, then, seems to urge the necessity of working while it is called to-day, before that night cometh wherein no man can work; whereas if, (as some say,) man had nothing to do, and that God does all while man does nothing, the Apostle's command or advice to "work out their own salvation with fear and trembling," would be in opposition even to the very conclusion he himself draws, as necessarily deducible from their adherence to his *exordium*.

Where also would there be room for fear and trembling; if, whether man worked or not, God did all for him? So long, therefore, as it is on record that St. Paul adviseth man to "work out his own salvation with fear and trembling," or with just apprehensions for every deviation from the glorious path of Christian duty, so long it is evident, he does not draw his inference without duly attending to his premises.

God, indeed, may well be called the Author and Finisher of our faith; for it is He who confers the light of the intellectual as well as that of the material world. But, if any should obstinately close their eyes against either light, how could they be considered as enjoying the illumination of either? They must first open their eyes, before they can learn the way in which

they should go ; and while God may be considered our divine Instructor, (whether by his holy word, or any of his messengers, &c.) man must be a learner, before he can hope to proceed in the paths of true wisdom ; and his contrition, humility, penitence, and faith, seem to furnish the proper soil for heavenly cultivation. So far is God from being arbitrary or irrespective in the choice of the elect, that “a contrite heart will he not despise. He resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble ;” and has been pleased to say, on a memorable occasion, “Well done, thou good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things ; enter thou into the joy of thy Lord.” And when was it that he said to the thief on the cross, “to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise ?” Not surely *when* he reviled him, for both the malefactors reviled him at first, (see Mark xv. 32.) but *after* he had begun seriously to revolve his case, (see Luke xxiii. 39—43.) and, ceasing to be an adversary of the unjustly-condemned, even to advocate (so far as he was able) and to uphold the very cause he had himself rashly rebuked, “Saying, dost thou not fear God, seeing thou art in the same condemnation ? And we indeed justly ; for we receive the due reward of our deeds : but this man hath done nothing amiss. And he said unto Jesus, Lord

remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom. And Jesus said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." Now if the penitent thief had been permitted to come down from the cross, and to continue to live on earth, and afterwards had returned to his former abominations, and had finally died impenitent and unreformed—query, could he go to Paradise, or to any region of the blessed? And if not, who can undertake to affirm, that his having gone there with our Saviour, was altogether arbitrary and irrespective? And if even this extreme case be not of that indiscriminating character, we may justly presume the *sine discrimine rerum* to be totally inadmissible, and void of any real affinity with the Christian dispensation.

SECTION VII.

Election proved to be purely conditional, on the authority of St. Paul.

"And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also

called ; and whom he called, them he also justified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." (Romans viii. 28—30.)

To find out those that are the called according to his (God's) purpose, as mentioned in verse 28, we need only refer to verse 29, to be assured that in the selection the Creator is guided by his omniscience. For it is not arbitrarily and unconnectedly affirmed, that God has pre-ordained such and such persons individually to be conformed to the image of his son ; but, it is first laid down by the Apostle, that "whom God *foreknew*, them he predestinated," &c. the former being represented as antecedent to the latter ; and the latter being stated as if it were purely a consequence of the former. This then resolves the divine motive (of this predestination) into the divine omniscience. Now, respecting those whom God foreknew, are we to suppose that he foreknew only their names, their country, their place of abode, or the party to whom they might prove attached, &c. ? This indeed, would be a limitation of a very incongruous description.

For on the various hypotheses that are built or erected by man on foreknowledge, every fact, every occurrence, every circumstance, howsoever enlarged or minute, without even a solitary exception, must prove foreknown to God. Well, then, those whom he foreknew, must be

those of whom he foreknew every thing respecting their future thoughts, motives, actions, &c. without even one exception: and as this foreknowledge is stated to be the antecedent of election, and the latter is represented as a consequence of the former, what therefore is there in the premises to militate against our conclusion, that election is purely conditional, and not absolute or irrespective; seeing that it is derived not from a partial or arbitrary view of the case, but from a full and perfect knowledge of all the circumstances pertaining thereto? Who has any grounds for leaving out any one of the particulars included in foreknowledge? And if no valid reason can be assigned for omitting even one of the included particulars, the premises, therefore, unavoidably contain what may justly give a *conditional* feature to divine election, and *no other*, because it is an election resulting from a knowledge of *all* the circumstances of the case respectively.

As to the former part of verse 28, in which it is stated that "all things work together for good to them that love God;" this seems to indicate plainly, not any thing like an exemption from suffering, (for our Saviour said to his disciples "in the world ye shall have tribulation,") but from it we may learn how these lovers of God pass through the ordeal of their probationary

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state on earth, so as (after death) to enter into the joys of their Lord in heaven.

Verse 30. "Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called." St. Paul, throughout this passage, simply keeps in view the elect; but he could not here intend to say, that none other are or were called but the elect, as Christ hath said (Matthew xx. 16.) "for many be called, but few chosen." The chosen, then, being merely another name for the elect, we accordingly learn, that those that are called are not confined to the elect. The Apostle, however, in the passage under consideration, speaks only of the called according to God's purpose, that is, as we have ascertained, the called, according to the discernment of his omniscience: but in this, he means not to oppose the testimony of Christ just mentioned, respecting many being called but few chosen.

If any be desirous to learn why this is the fact, let them read in St. Matthew (xxv. 31—46.) how much our conduct to our fellow-men will operate at the final judgment-seat of Christ, with respect to our being included among, or excluded from, the happy assembly of the elect. Combining then all these scriptural authorities under the solemn sanction of the Fountain-head itself of our religion, who can presume to say that di-

vine election, resulting from the full and perfect discernment of omniscience, could possibly be unconditional or irrespective?

SECTION VIII.

On Election being conditional, as regards the Jews and Edomites.

That portion of St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, comprehending the 28th, 29th, and 30th verses of the 8th chapter, being delusively considered by some as one of the strongest pillars of the doctrine of unconditional election; and that very pillar (as in section vii.) on scriptural authority itself, being taken away from such an edifice, it would not be difficult to remove the rest by the same train of scriptural elucidation, till there would not be one genuine prop left to support the entire structure of absolute decrees.

For instance, let us consider how we may resolve a passage in the 9th chapter of the epistle to the Romans. In it we are informed that "the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, &c." Now the doctrine of election here being, of course, not different from the doctrine of election laid down in the

foregoing chapter, the solution of it must be the same in both these successive chapters. To the foregoing section, therefore, let the candid enquirer be referred for a scriptural exposition of this doctrine: whence ultimately we shall be led to conclude, that the reason why God in his choice of the elect, is not influenced by mere works, no more than he is by mere inoperative faith, may proceed from the combination of both cause and effect being indispensably required, as the only valid basis of divine election. If works accordingly, spring from causes or motives solely and exclusively human, they cannot be well pleasing to that God who, (as in No. 10, Part I.) originally rendered the intellectual creation susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect.

Works then to be divinely approved of, must be derived from a right or true principle of vital or fruit-bearing faith in God, speaking in general terms respecting all dispensations and ages. In truth, both cause and effect must here be congruous: and as the desired effect here derives its character from the cause or motive which gives it birth; so, for the effect to be of heavenly derivation and application, (whether immediately or remotely,) the cause must partake of heavenly origin in some respect or other. But in such cases, cause and effect are not to be considered

as separate or distinct, but in union with each other. Hence none can truly affirm that works, separatively considered, or faith without works, could either of them be a scriptural or rational foundation for divine election. But both going together, are properly esteemed objects of approbation with the divine Legislator of the universe.

As an objection, it may here be urged, that God lays down all his measures on perfectly free and unshackled principles ; all (*à priori*) springing from his eternal omniscience. It cannot be said that his acts of legislation depend upon any thing external or extrinsic to the divine mind. We are not to suppose the Creator, as if depending on the creature in any respect, in reference to the formation of his laws ; and hence his commandments are absolute.

To all this it may be replied that, according to St. Paul, the Creator freely acts on the basis of his foreknowledge, (see section vii.) in which all posterior relations must be included. That, therefore, all the results should be contemplated, even from the first, would imply no more than God looking before-hand to the practicability of his omniscient measures ; though the measures themselves may possibly have been formed independently of all but divine considerations. "That the purpose of God," then, "according to elec-

tion might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth," &c. (taken in this point of view,) may appear to evince on what a perfectly free and independent basis the Creator legislates, but certainly can never imply that the results of his omniscient measures are not included in divine foreknowledge. So that even while admitting all the independence imaginable in the divine measures, their results or effects (whether possible or practicable) can never be overlooked by divine prescience, especially while contemplating their practical utility. Thus, speaking generally, when the Creator freely vouchsafes to favour his creatures with any guide, he cannot but discern a great difference between those who follow, and those who do not follow that providential director. And accordingly, we find that the elect are of the former class; while the others, as turning their backs upon divine Providence, could not be expected to constitute any portion of the divine heritage.

If we take the present subject of disquisition in connexion with the preceding and following verse, we shall find in the entire passage, a prophecy relating to the posterity of Jacob and Esau, as may appear by consulting Bishop Newton's Third Dissertation on the Prophecies, the conclusion of which I shall here transcribe:—

“Of the history of the Edomites,” (saith that

truly eminent writer,) "we know little more than as it is connected with that of the Jews; and where is the name or nation now?—They were swallowed up and lost, partly among the Nabathæan Arabs, and partly among the Jews; and the very name was abolished and disused about the end of the first century after Christ. Thus were they rewarded for insulting and oppressing their brethren the Jews; and hereby other prophecies were fulfilled, which are in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Joel, Amos, and Obadiah. And at this day, we see the Jews subsisting as a distinct people, while Edom is no more: for agreeably to the words of Obadiah, "For thy violence against thy brother Jacob, shame shall cover thee; and thou shalt be cut off for ever;" and again, "there shall not be any remaining of the house of Esau, for the Lord hath spoken it."

And all this came upon the Edomites, (the descendants of Esau,) "for oppressing their brethren the Jews" in all manner of unrighteousness and ungodly ways. How very far then from irrespective were the judgments that arrested them, when the cup of their iniquity was full, and how justly signal their fall!

There is another remarkable verse in the same chapter of the epistle to the Romans, viz. "as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." Where is it written?—In the first

chapter of Malachi, verses 2, 3, 4. "I have loved you, saith the Lord; yet ye say, wherein hast thou loved us? Was not Esau Jacob's brother? saith the Lord; yet I loved Jacob and I hated Esau, and laid his mountains and his heritage waste for the dragons of the wilderness. Whereas Edom saith, We are impoverished, but we will return and build the desolate places: thus saith the Lord of hosts, They shall build, but I will throw down; and they shall call them the border of wickedness, and the people against whom the Lord hath indignation for ever."

Now this was written less than four hundred years before the Christian era, and evidently refers to the history of the Edomites up to that time. The "mountains and heritage" also, here mentioned, were not laid waste in the age of Jacob and Esau; so that these names of the founders of the Jewish and Edomitish nations, are evidently used to designate their respective posterity. Where God then is said to hate the one, and to love the other, it is in their descendants that this hatred and this love respectively prove developed; and the hatred evinced towards one of these nations, proceeded from the flagrant iniquity of that outrageous and ungodly people.

Who therefore can presume to ascribe this hatred to any irrespective or irrelative cause?

SECTION IX.

On Election being conditional, as regards the Vessels of honour.

“Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” (Romans ix. 21.) This is evidently one of the figurative modes of expression with which the language of scripture abounds. To see then how far the analogy applies, let us first consider whether the power of the potter here set forth, could be analogous to an act of creation. An act of creation is the calling of beings into existence, which previously had no existence whatever in any sense of the word. The power of any human potter, therefore, over the same pre-existing lump, (which he did not, and could not create,) is not analogous to an act of creation. Hence, the only justifiable analogy that could exist, resolves it into something relating to divine Providence, where God is figuratively represented as, out of mankind, selecting one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour; or (in other words) electing some as proper objects of his divine righteousness and benevolence, and rejecting others as not being proper objects thereof. This, in short, resolves the entire analogy of the case into election, an

election also which is purely conditional, as may be seen in section vii.

In concurrence with this, the three following verses are susceptible of being viewed as follows: "What if God," (saith the Apostle,) "willing to show his wrath," or just displeasure at the enormities of men, "and," at the same time, "to make his power" of forbearance "known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath, fitted" by their own ungodly career, "to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy which he had afore prepared unto glory? the vessels of mercy" being simply those that obey the calling, or those that are chosen out of the many that are called, according to our Saviour's testimony, for whom a seat is prepared in the regions of celestial bliss; "even us" (as continues the Apostle) "whom he hath called," according to his purpose of conditional election, (see section vii.) "not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles;" of such an uncontracted and general tendency is the mercy of God, vouchsafed as it is among all nations, climes, and languages.

Respecting this figurative mode of expression, let us select an instance from Isaiah. "Now, O Lord," (saith that prophet) "thou art our Father," our Creator; "we are the clay," thy creatures, "and thou our Potter," the providen-

tial Disposer of our respective destinations, (that is, as regards God's purpose of conditional election,) "we are all the work of thy hand;" we are all thy creatures. "Be not wroth very sore, O Lord, neither remember iniquity for ever: behold, see, we beseech thee, we are all thy people." But what did that avail them, while their "iniquities, like the wind, have taken" them "away? Thy holy cities are a wilderness," (continues the prophet,) "Zion is a wilderness, Jerusalem a desolation. Our holy and our beautiful house, where our fathers praised thee, is burned up with fire; and all our pleasant things are laid waste."

Such the effects of hard-hearted impenitence and disobedience; the former piety of their fathers, the glory of Jerusalem, the sanctity even of the Lord's temple, are all unavailing when even the favoured of heaven outrageously transgress and rebel against the good providence of God.

In St. Paul's 2d epistle to Timothy, it is said, "The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal—The Lord knoweth them that are his," by an act of his knowledge discerning them, and appointing them heirs of salvation, by conditional election, as in section vii. And, as one of the conditions, what is "every one that nameth the name of Christ" to do? The Apostle states that

every individual of that denomination is to "depart from iniquity." "But in a great house" (saith he) "there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man, therefore, purge himself from these," (that is, from being among those that are contaminated with the filthiness of the flesh,) "he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work." Here then, man is left to choose whether he will have himself so purged and so cleansed, conformably to the means and requisitions of divine Providence; and *thence* it is that God discerns him to be whether among the vessels of honour or dishonour, whether among those that are purified and consecrated to the Creator's use, or among those that, defiled with the filthiness of the flesh, are a dishonour even to themselves.

"Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands?" Here again we find that (the clay being in existence previously to its being fashioned) the analogy of the case refers not to an act of creation, but of Providence, and may be duly solved as the verse wherewith we commenced this section.

In the book of Proverbs, it is said, "The

Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." This, also, cannot refer to an act of creation, for we are informed that "God saw every thing that he hath made, and, behold, it was very good." As, therefore, God did not create anything but what was "very good;" his making or causing the subsequently wicked portion of the human race to be reserved for the day of evil, refers to his providence as the righteous judge of all the earth.

As all similar cases can be similarly solved, it appears unnecessary to multiply quotations on this subject of investigation.

SECTION X.

When any of the divine measures are said to harden any individual, such an effect (being entirely incongruous to the assigned cause) proceeds in reality from that individual himself violating his constitutionally free-agency.

As to the Lord hardening Pharaoh's heart, we might even admit the most literal exposition of that greatly-misapplied fact, and still maintain that such a fact, so far from militating against the free-agency of man, tends most clearly to establish it. For how comes it that the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, even against his own requisitions, and the very people he designed to

liberate? Why did not the Omnipotent rather subdue the heart of that potentate? The answer obviously is, because that monarch was a free agent; and, by the abuse of his free-agency, caused the divine measures, pursued towards him, to produce on himself the most incongruous effects. It thence ultimately appeared as if God raised him up for no other purpose than to show in him (or over him) his power, and that his name might be declared throughout the earth.

“The Lord said unto Moses,” (Exodus vii. 3, 4,) “I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you, that I may lay my hand upon Egypt, and bring forth mine armies, and my people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great judgments.”

It would hence seem that if Pharaoh and his nation had duly attended to the Lord’s ambassadors, there would have been no necessity for laying his hand upon Egypt, or for bringing forth his armies by great judgments; particularly as, in all the divine dispensations, taken in a collective and comprehensive view, miracles have been rarely resorted to. And we cannot but conclude, from the divine perfections, that God does nothing in vain. When, therefore, the Lord is represented as saying, “I will harden

Pharaoh's heart," he simply foretells the incongruous effect which the divine measures will produce on him : and if requisite, this exposition is corroborated by the last verse of the eighth chapter of Exodus, wherein it is stated that " Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also, neither would he let the people go." The appropriate cause, then, of his heart being incongruously hardened by the divine measures, proceeded from himself, who, as we have just seen, is recorded to have " hardened his heart at this time also."

That this Egyptian ruler, accordingly, appeared in effect as if raised up for no other purpose than for the manifestation of God's power over his rebellious obstinacy, may be congruously traced to that free-agent himself, who thus abused his freedom of choice in so outrageous a manner.

" Therefore" (saith the Apostle) " hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth ;" being merciful according to the free suggestions of his omniscience, and conducting his sublime measures in accordance with the same infallible standard ; even preferring to harden the wicked, as in the case of Pharaoh, rather than relinquish his providential sceptre, which is never brandished except to overcome evil with good, while frequently bringing about

the best results from the most unpromising materials.

That sinful, flagitious, and ungrateful mortals may (if possible) become more hardened than before, by divine visitations, could furnish no reason why the Lord should withdraw himself, like the fabled God of the Epicureans, from all connexion whatever with the affairs of men. Jehovah, therefore, pursues his career; and, if in that omnisciently sublime career, it cannot be avoided, will even incongruously harden and finally overthrow the unsubdued and intractable race of iniquity, as a just punishment for their having abused their constitutionally free-agency in such a flagrant and ungodly manner. And in this sense only can we appropriately explain the passage under consideration; especially if we take it in connexion with another scriptural text, which unfolds "that God willeth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should turn from his wickedness and live."

When, therefore, any of the divine measures are said to harden any individual, such an effect (being entirely incongruous to the assigned cause) proceeds in reality from that individual himself violating his constitutionally free-agency.

SECTION XI.

The same means of grace may produce effects on some, which are diametrically opposite to effects they may produce on others ; one species whereof, being in reality incongruous to the assigned cause, may be duly traced to other causes.

Of our Saviour it is on record (Matthew xi. 20—24) that “ then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not. Woe unto thee, Chorazin ! woe unto thee, Bethsaida ! for if the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment, than for you. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell : for if the mighty works, which have been done in thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I say unto you, That it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee.” The divine displeasure, therefore, is very great, when heavenly interposition produces on some no good effect, whereas the same

divine manifestations would have produced a far different effect on others. The effects, therefore, being different, and even diametrically opposite to each other; and the mighty works of Christ being here assumed to be the same; we are necessarily led to consider how the same mighty works could produce such opposite effects.

As the acknowledged and divinely censured difference is not to be found in the alleged cause, we must seek it in some other cause or causes. And this may lead us to all similar causes in all cases where incongruous effects arise from any of the measures of divine Providence, by which we shall ultimately ascertain that the cause or causes of these incongruous effects are not to be found in the cause to which these effects are incongruous; but that they result from the stubborn pride, (for instance,) or rebellion, or ingratitude, or impiety, or iniquity of the impenitent sinner on whom the divine mercies, or mighty works, produce such incongruous effects. Admitting, then, the literal exposition of such effects incongruously flowing from a divine cause; however culpable may prove the sad abuse of man's freedom, yet the freedom of the agent, so far as relates to the Creator, is manifest, especially as Revelation informs us that such an abuse of freedom is extremely displeasing to God, and

consequently in opposition to the wisdom of the divine will.

From the passage here quoted, some extraordinary objections having arisen, it may be thought advisable to consider the portion of credit that is justly due to them. The Supralapsarians are thence said to argue, "That the means of grace are not bestowed on those of whom it was foreseen that they would have made a good use of them; or denied to those, who, as was foreseen, would have made an ill use of them: the contrary of this being plainly asserted in those words of our Saviour." (See Bishop Burnet on the 17th Article.)

In the first place, it is observable that the former part of this assumption partly carries its own refutation on the very face of it; for will it be said that the means of grace are never bestowed on any two persons whatever of whom it was foreseen that they would make a right use of them? And if such an assertion be totally inadmissible; then, in direct opposition to the above assumption, we can truly affirm "that the means of grace are bestowed on those of whom it was foreseen that they would have made a good use of them."

How, then, stands the case where two opposite conclusions are presented to our view? The truth is, that in some instances the former,

and in other instances, the latter inference is admissible.

Speaking from fact, it may be presumed that the means of grace unhappily have not the desired effect in some instances; whereas, in other instances, they have the desired effect. The real state of the case, therefore, has not been fully, or fairly, or correctly stated in the above assumption; it being, in reality, simply this—the means of grace are benignly offered to a greater number of free-agents than it was foreseen would make a right use of them. But will any one thence infer that election is not confined to those who make a right use of them? The means of grace simply, taken in an insulated aspect, are not the cause of election; for if such were the fact, all persons indiscriminately on whom the means of grace are conferred, would be among the elect, even those of whom our Saviour said, that in the day of judgment, it would be more tolerable for the land of Sodom than for them. The means of grace, therefore, accompanied with incongruous effects, are not the cause of election; but, on the contrary, the means of grace, accompanied with effects correspondent to such a cause, are the cause of election. The whole difference, in short, consists in the difference between the use and the abuse of the means of grace. In this we do not

attempt to derogate, in the slightest degree, from the means of grace : without them nothing could be accomplished. Yet, by the authority of St. Paul, we find it altogether indispensable to draw a marked line of distinction between the use and the abuse of the means of grace ; especially as that Apostle resolves the divine election into the foreknowledge or omniscience of God himself ; whereas the Supralapsarians, in opposition to St. Paul's testimony in the Eighth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, appear desirous to ascribe it to a different source.

With respect to such means of grace having been withheld (for instance) from the people of Sodom, as the mighty works or miracles of our Saviour, a plain and obvious reason presents itself ; such miracles having been reserved by God for the Christian dispensation. If the people of that city had not outrageously abused the gifts of God, even to a full cup of iniquity, it may be presumed that they would not have been so signally destroyed by the awful tempest of divine indignation. Although, then, (as our Saviour said to the still more hardened Jews,) his mighty works might have reformed the people of Sodom ; yet no valid reason can be assigned why God should have vouchsafed to such a rebellious and abominable generation, the very miracles that were reserved for a subsequent

period and a subsequent dispensation ; and which, if they had appeared at an earlier era of the world, would have anticipated the era that was assigned to them by the unerring voice of divine prophecy itself. We ought, therefore, in my humble opinion, to be content with the limitations with which our Saviour has been pleased to encircle this fact ; intimating, as he does, what different effects his miracles might produce on different persons, and apprising the Jews of their truly awful condition in rejecting such manifestations of divine power as would have reformed even the abominable and outrageous transgressors of the awfully iniquitous Sodom.

It should also be recollected that miracles have been rarely resorted to, except on the memorable occasion of the deliverance of the Israelites from Egyptian bondage, and the more general deliverance of mankind at the coming of the Messiah, and the establishment of the Christian religion. To interfere with the course of nature, seems to require important and very expanded reasons, which can only be duly appreciated by an omniscient mind.

To interfere also with the order of his own works as seldom as possible, appears to be a reasonable concomitant of divine wisdom. The case, then, of either Tyre, or Sidon, or Sodom, did not appear to suggest a sufficiently impor-

tant and expanded reason for the performance of such miracles as were wrought in the fulness of time, or at the commencement of the glorious era of man's redemption. And that this was the case, is accordingly resolvable, not into any absolute or irrespective cause, but into the free and unfettered suggestions of an omniscient mind, that would congruously claim such a manifestation of omnipotence on such an occasion, and on no other. And to evince how strongly, consistently with his omniscience, He feels for the race of man, his divine condescension proceeded so far as to be represented under one of the strongest figures of speech that could be adopted in such a case. It is even said, that "it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." Now surely this, so far from being irrespective or absolute, could not possibly refer to any being but man himself. The Creator had no cause to repent on his own account: his sublime and unshackled perfections forbid such an incongruous idea. It, therefore, solely related to the awful circumstances in which man had involved himself. And thus, and in similar instances, divine revelation furnishes the most remarkable proof that Jehovah's omniscient mind condescends occasionally to think solely and altogether in relation to the circumstances of his creature man. Does not

this, then, seem to strike at the very root or basis of absolute and unconditional decrees, which basis is said (contrary to scripture) to consist in thinking and decreeing wholly and entirely without any relation whatever to the circumstances, &c. of man?

It may be inconsiderately advanced by some, that the miracles of our Saviour appear to have produced effects on no very extended scale; to which it may be replied, that they have been, at least, one of the strongest external evidences of Christianity up to the present, and will be so to the end of time. And so far from their effects being on a narrow scale, what shall we consider them in relation to that period when, as divine prophecy informs us, "the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea?"

In short, when their effects come to be fully developed, so far from being of a confined or contracted tendency, they will eventually prove not less than universal.

I cannot conclude this section, without remarking the extreme justice that manifestly beams in our Saviour's memorable decision. Did he not say to the obstinate and hard-hearted Jews who resisted even the mighty evidence of his miraculous power, "It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, at the day of judg-

ment, than for you?" And did he not also say to Capernaum, "It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee?" thus giving the sad inhabitants of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom, at the day of judgment, the full benefit of their not having been placed in such favourable circumstances as the iniquitous people to whom He addressed this truly sublime decision.

But let it be remarked that this mode of exposition is in accordance with that laid down by the Supralapsarians themselves: for when our Saviour saith, "If the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes;" if this mode of expression be taken not figuratively, but rigidly and literally, then, according to the laws of homogeneous interpretation, that "it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, at the day of judgment," &c. must be taken in the same rigid and literal sense in which it has been just assumed. Wherefore, meeting the Supralapsarians even on their own ground, behold the result!

So far from God being arbitrary or irrespective, at the day of judgment, He will take all the circumstances of the case, even of the most rebellious, into due consideration, and thence manifest how sublimely He will be guided at that

final adjustment of all things by the discernment of his omniscience, as well as by the very same unbounded source of discernment, he proves actuated in his choice of the elect.

SECTION XII.

The dogma, "whatever is, is right," taken as a general proposition is not true.

In giving his followers directions how to pray, our Saviour has enjoined them to implore their heavenly Father, saying, among various legitimate objects of petition, "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." As then, from the unity, immutability, and perfections of the divine nature, it would be most unjustifiable (except on impious Manichæan principles,) to infer that God had one will for heaven, and another will for earth, we thence perceive that the divine will is *too* often outrageously opposed by earthly rebellion; so far are all results here from being in accordance with the divine will. Our Saviour in truth seems to unfold, that the measure of the divine will as to earth, is precisely the measure thereof as to heaven, as implied in our being directed to pray to our celestial Father, "thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." To ascertain, then, the measure of the divine will proposed by our Saviour, or to form some just

notions of it, we need only refer to an intimation given us by the same Instructor, where he affirms—"among them that are born of women, there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist; notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." If then the least in the kingdom of heaven be greater than John the Baptist, the august forerunner of the Messiah, then the least in the kingdom of heaven must be glorious indeed, as being represented greater than that prophet, of whom it was said, there was not a greater among the sons of men. As therefore that prophet was obedient to the divine will, even unto death, we are led to infer, that an uninterrupted obedience thereto must accompany even the least in the kingdom of heaven, by reason of a divinely-revealed superiority over the highest degree of greatness among the sons of men. We have therefore ultimately reason to infer, what is obviously opposed to the poetical dogma, "whatever is, is right;" for so far from that being the fact on earth in numerous instances, we plainly discern so many occurrences which are in awful opposition to the divine will, that the fallacy of that dogma, as a general proposition, is palpably evident.

Here I am prepared for a difference of opinion respecting the interpretation of the sacred text

last adduced; but the slightest reflection will evince, that the "kingdom of heaven" there mentioned, cannot congruously designate the Christian church on earth: for if so, we should in that case be led into one of the most absurd inferences that could be deduced, namely, that John the Baptist was less than the least or lowest member of the Christian church.

Our Saviour, then, having affirmed completely the reverse, that is, having affirmed that among the sons of men there was not a greater than John the Baptist, clearly indicates the absurdity of such a conflicting mode of exposition.

Seeing then that the divine will is the same both with respect to heaven and earth, that it is perfectly obeyed in the former region, that it is not so obeyed in the latter, and that we are directed to pray that it may yet be fulfilled in earth, as it is in heaven; can we say that God in his choice of the elect is arbitrary and irrespective, since we have reason to believe, that no spirit could remain in that blessed state that would entertain the slightest hostility to the divine will?

This then evinces the truly spiritual nature of the elect in heaven, and consequently (as we are to pray that the divine will may be "done," or "obeyed in earth as it is in heaven,") this also shows of what description the elect on earth

ought to be. They ought to approach, as much as possible, to the obedience of the elect in heaven; and hence they ought to prove "a people zealous of good works," a people that walk not after the sins of the flesh, but after the spirit; in short, they ought to prove a people that worship the Lord in sincerity and truth, abhorring and avoiding every thing which is at variance with his divine omniscient will; especially as St. Paul, (see section vii.) resolves election into the foreknowledge, in its fullest extent and discernment, or into the omniscience of God himself.

SECTION XIII.

On Election being conditional, as regards the Seventeenth Article of the Established Church of England and Ireland.

"Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his counsel," that is, by his eternal wisdom, "secret to us," except so far as he has revealed it in the holy Scriptures, or by inspiration, "to deliver from curse and damnation, those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ unto everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour," they being among

the elect, according to the doctrine of conditional election. (See Sections vii. and ix.)

“Wherefore they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God’s purpose” of conditional election, “by his Spirit working in due season,” calling them by the spirit of divine revelation, or by his ministers or Gospel heralds, or by any other means of divine grace; and the call being such moreover as to be duly (or “in due season,”) obeyed by them without gainsaying or absurd procrastination. “They through grace obey the calling;” the grace of God not having been offered to them in vain; this evidently marking a memorable distinction between those who freely obey, and those who do not obey the calling. “They be justified freely;” every thing on the part of God being free and unshackled, and independent of every consideration except the free and unfettered suggestions of his eternal omniscience. “They be made sons of God by adoption; they be made like the image of his only-begotten Son Jesus Christ,” but not till after “they obey the calling,” else those (or some of those) who reject the calling would be placed in the same circumstances with those who obey it. “Ὅτι οὕς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισε συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνης τοῦ Ὑιοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς.” (Romans viii. 29.)

Now if the former part of this verse ran thus, “Καὶ προώρισε” εἰς τὸ εἶναι “συμμόρφους τῆς ἐκόνος τοῦ Υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ;”—*then*, perhaps, it might be more plausibly assumed that they were predestinated, in the strict sense of the expression, by an arbitrary and irrespective selection, “to be conformed to the image of his son.” But the original (Greek) contains no such mode of expression, nor does it sanction such an exposition: it simply states, that “those whom he foreknew, he also predestinated;” to wit, the “conformed of the image of his Son.” How they come to be so conformed is not decided by the text, but is left perfectly free as free-agency itself. “They” (that is, the elect,) “walk religiously in good works, and at length by God’s” omniscient “mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity.”

“As the godly consideration of predestination, and our election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons,” &c. “so for curious and carnal persons, lacking the spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God’s predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or intowretchedness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.” Now, if these “curious and carnal persons, lacking the spirit of Christ,” were placed in such circumstances by

God, as to bar out every possibility of their being saved at any period of their lives, how could their contemplation of "God's predestination" be considered "a most dangerous downfall," seeing that they already prove in as bad and deplorable a condition as can possibly be imagined? This Article then seems to say, that the gates of divine benevolence are not in this life closed against even "curious and carnal persons, lacking the spirit of Christ." It seems to caution all such from dwelling on "the sentence of God's predestination," lest it should drive them into desperation; thence intimating, that they need not despair, if they prove not resolved on their own ruin. It also intimates, that when this subject has such an awful and incongruous effect, it is not God's work, but altogether that of the adversary, the devil himself, thrusting them "into desperation, or into wretchedness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation."

In short, this manifestly proves that the Article possesses even *prima facie* evidence, that it embraces no other than conditional election, especially if we include in our prospect its concluding passage.

"Furthermore, we must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth in holy scripture," generally and not partially, or in an insulated or contracted point of view; "and

in our doings, that will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared unto us in the word of God."

So much appears sufficient for my present purpose. Those who may prove desirous to take a review of the chief opinions entertained on this subject, may consult Bishop Burnet's work on this, as well as on the 10th, 11th, and 12th Articles of our Church.

Let us at length hasten to our Appendix No. II, that we may not exceed *too* far the limits of our undertaking, which is simply an attempt to prove that there is nothing in the divine nature incompatible with the free-agency of the intellectual world.

END OF PART THE SECOND.

K

APPENDIX, No. II.

A DISCUSSION is supposed to have taken place in the College of Angrogna, which once stood in a sublime Alpine amphitheatre, situated in one of the vales of Piedmont: and authentic writers represent such disquisitions as not of rare occurrence among the inhabitants of those memorable vallies. It is also on record that, after being considerably reinstated in its primitive simplicity by Claude the Diocesan of Turin, in the ninth century, their Episcopal Church long continued in that comparatively pure state; till, at length, when centuries had rolled away, the destruction of their college obliged them to have recourse to Geneva and Lausanne for theological acquirements. Hence a new era arose; and the subsequent ministers of that communion, returned from Switzerland blessed with her bounty, but unfortunately *too* much tinctured with her absolute predestinarian system. In order, therefore, to vindicate the more orthodox opinions of Claude's successors, the scene of the following disputation in verse, is laid previously to the

above-mentioned demolition of their collegiate edifice, and their connexion with those towns that border on the waves of Lake Leman.

Of the champions of Fate, or unconditional decrees, three more prominently enter the list; but they are eventually considered triumphantly defeated by Benigné, Pirani, and Theophilus, who advocate the cause of free-agency on the part of the Vallenses. So much for the probability of an event to which the voice of the historic muse seems to yield her concurrent testimony, without being forced to deviate from the strictest line of credibility.

As to the various arguments adduced on both sides, they must be suffered to speak for themselves in their poetical form.

TAKEN FROM A MANUSCRIPT POEM
OF THE AUTHOR.

WHERE Erudition, heav'n-sustain'd recluse,
Mid slumb'ring Europe kept his mind awake;
Or from afar in ardent hope sojourn'd
To try the prowess of Vallensic lore;
There, in Angrogna's sacred halls, of old
The soul of Freedom never ceas'd to reign.
Viewing omniscience wreath'd in love's attire,
And not in bigotry's unsightly garb,
With Christian friendship Harmony herself
Breath'd consolation o'er her Alpine world.
Oft, mid her progeny benignly bless'd,
The wond'ring atmosphere her sceptre smote,—
Till, on a day pre-eminently fam'd,
Her gen'rous offspring won the victor's crown.

First, on foreknowledge, in th' arena rose
Clotho's intrepid champion,—long to guide
That memorable metaphysic theme

Thro' all the windings of profound research ;
Whose sentiments (how varied, deep, abstruse!)
May thus in brief compendium be condens'd :—

“ Doth not Jehovah all results foresee ?
And if foreseen with brightness unobscur'd,
As perfect intuition loudly claims ;
What can prevent the current of events
From flowing absolutely as foreknown ?
Contingency in action intimates
Dubious fulfilment, and as doubtful makes
Faithful foreknowledge which, nor less nor more,
But, as it is, the prescient object sees.
Hence imperfection from contingent views
Would here be manifest, and thoughts perplex'd
Attributed where no confusion dwells.
Omniscient Deity's sublime decrees
Thence seem to claim perfection absolute,
And from fortuity, or aught unfix'd,
With undiminish'd resolution steer.
All, in one vast unbroken chain, appear
Most absolutely order'd from the first ;
And that without relation to desert,
Or any diff'rence in the race of men.”

So said the champion, Fataliste surnam'd ;
Whose arguments Benigné thus repell'd :—

“ Against the theme of absolute decrees,
The liberty we feel in thought and deed,
In my opinion, yields a mighty test
Superior to ten thousand abstract hints.
Yet, to revolve celestial reason's voice,
Let us now follow whither truth invites.

“ All must confess that devils do not act
Beneath the influence of God himself :
Hence they are free, so far as here relates.
And, of these agents free, the great Supreme
By his omniscience all intents foresees.
He, then, not only, in prospective, views
His own productions, and concurrent course
Of creatures acting under his control ;
But also of those fiends that self-debas'd
Pervert free-agency with endless ill.
How wond'rous, therefore, heav'nly wisdom
beams !

Which if less wond'rous could not e'er suffice
To be esteem'd an attribute divine.

“ Now, since th' effulgence of that sacred light

Which gilds omniscience, cannot be the cause
Of aught rebellious demons, uncompell'd,
Of evil generate ; so, in itself
Not being causal here, well may it seem
With equal value causal hence alone
In our Creator's mind, where, similar
To self-existence, it for ever reigns
Essentially peculiar to its Lord.
Nor, of these two omnipotential fires,
(Incessantly effective without change,
By unoriginated energy
As equally productive when but God
Solely existed, as since man appear'd,)
Could one be less appropriately deem'd,
Than th' other, only His. The boundless flame
Of self-existence, therefore, which ne'er sleeps,
Being exclusively by God possess'd ;
So, too, its co-etaneous attribute—
(Co-eval equally in ev'ry sense,
And operating as eternally
Without cessation, limit, or degree,)—
Omniscience truly knows no energy
Except in God its never-slumb'ring seat.

In these two attributes, and all besides
Incessant everlastingly, we trace
What in themselves could never generate
A single act, conception, or design,
Out of the luminous eternal mind.

“ If, then, in God we seek the sacred source
Of aught his mighty effluence produc'd ;
From other wonders of omnipotence
The causal fountain manifestly flows.
And hence in energies whose lightnings prove
Not necessarily endless, we explore,
As in creative excellence, the spring
Of creatures by a single word produc'd,
Or call'd into existence by a look
Of that omnific eye which spurns all bounds.
Behold, then, in one word, or mighty nod,
How much could be effected, when the Lord
Shook into being from a single glance
The wond'rous universe and all her host !
Nor think it strange for six terrestrial days,
(The grand digesting period of his works,)
If such a glance from Elohim shot forth
As turbid Chaos from his throne expell'd.

“ But, first, t’ ascend to that malignant time
When wand’ring angels left their bless’d abodes,
Foolish free-agents that, like restless man,
Thirsting for lawless independence fell !
Surely in this their tempter was not God
Inducing them to war against himself.
What more sublime could Deity effect
Than to maintain his sceptre unimpair’d
O’er a creation sinless and unstain’d ?
Could his immutability prefer
A change at all from such a perfect state,
But least of all a change from good to bad ?
Evil with good (the Scriptures testify)
He often overcomes : but this indeed
The order of his kingdom would invert,
If he for sin could sinless worth exchange ;
For such a sin, too, as in angels fall’n
Need never hope for pardon or reprieve.
That in their choice so much delusion reign’d,
Is not the question : probably it flow’d
From none being’ absolutely excellent
Save the all-wise Original of all.
Forewarn’d, no doubt, those seraphs that rebell’d

Knew that in Him alone perfection dwells
To absolute infallible extent ;
And that from Him and freedom most sublime,
(Or liberty not lawless but restrain'd
Within the circle of His perfect love,)
Whoever madly stray'd, must stray for ev'r ;
Such the perdition of self-gender'd pride.

“ God, then, essentially the source of good,
Tho' perfectly foreseeing future ills,
Could never change his nature or become
The origin of evil first or last ;
For what he was, Jehovah must remain
Immutably omniscient, just and pure.

“ Doubtless in Him, we readily admit,
Dwells no confusion : but to thence infer
He ne'er beholds obscurities or clouds
In human action ; 'tis the same in fact
As if no mist surrounded earth's affairs,
Since, if it did, that mist must prove foreknown,
As well as the bright periods of mankind.
Wherefore whate'er's foreseen, (whether decreed,
Contingent, or indifferent, or clear,
Or most involv'd in metaphysic lore,)

To facts existence never can deny,
Altho' obscurity must prove beheld
Wreath'd by foreknowledge in its proper shades.

“ 'Tis true, as purely the Supreme regards,
Darkness and light to Him are both alike.
But if thus view'd, all argument retires
Respecting aught obscure in human life.
To either side th' hypothesis denied,
From either party inference removes ;
And if it leave me nothing to reply,
It gives th' opponent nothing to advance.
The question, therefore, to the pow'r relates
That simply can foreknow ; and which, if true,
And perfect as perfection could unfold,
Must see the faintest shadow of events ;
Nor in contracted sphere view only part,
However lucid that same part appears ;
Particularly as to Him pertains
Both light and darkness to behold alike.
Nay, more ; the prescient faculty excels
In piercing thro' the mazes that invest
Contingent circumstances ; or that laughs
Ev'n at free-agents, if they e'er suppose

Celestial wisdom can be overreach'd.
And if our God be said to know no more
Than what himself or his bright host achieve
Under his sole dominion ; great as all
His mercies shine, 'tis vain to circumscribe
A boundless attribute with any line.

“ Omniscience, then, foreseeing free results
Deduc'd from agency unshackled, proves
That such bare knowledge, as before implied,
Discloses all the secrets of the world
To God alone, and solely in his mind
Deposits the contents, (as much his own
As his peculiar self-existent force,)
Which there for ever only He can read,
And, as he wills, by other kinds of pow'r
Communicate, distribute, or fulfil.

“ 'Tis evident, in all their flights profound
Species of energy that never rest
No more than those concomitants produce
Which, boundless in duration, solely reign
In self-existent being, nor could prove
Termless in limits, infinite in bounds :
So that, from attributes whose voice resounds
With everlasting, unremitting force,

The onus of causality remov'd
Respecting finite beings free to act,—
(As hell's rebellious ever-sinful host ;)
Reason soon learns how absolute decrees,
Built on a false foundation, come to nought.
In fact, such measures never could exist ;
As nought but pow'rs eternally at work
Could generate them,—pow'rs which only prove
How the Creator in himself abides.
All other rays, then, of omnipotence
Freely develop'd as occasion claims,
(Nor to sustain his own unclouded mind,
But merely as to finite things relate,
And thence unfolded not for God, but man,
Or angels, or archangels round his throne,)
The happiness alone of creatures seek.
Doubtless in this our Maker legislates
Not for himself or reason absolute,
But for his finite works, suiting his laws
To creatures not infallible, ' tho' free
To stand or fall, created as at first.'

“ How could he act tow'rds man as tow'rds
himself,
Thus placing finite in the same grand scale

With infinite? Or think'st thou He will give
His glory to another? Or exact
From mortal what eternity alone
Could e'er accomplish? Absolute decrees
From absolute perfection might expect
Perfect fulfilment. But from feeble man
What could they hope for, if to him prescrib'd?
Nay, ere he fell, how perfect in his kind
Soe'er he prov'd, or good, as God proclaim'd,
Yet still, could laws beyond our nature seem
From heav'nly wisdom for our guide deduc'd?
And hence primeval prohibition said,
Thou shalt not eat of the forbidden fruit;
Such how benignly suited to our race
Far above all abstraction e'er devis'd!

“ Nor did that lessen our omniscient guide
By giving us such laws as best accord
With our capacity and truth divine.
Still in that wisdom all perfection beams,
For which the intellectual world was made
Therewith concurring with incessant care
To pass from present to hereafter joy.
And since for less th' all-perfect ne'er design'd.

So many spirits as pervade his works ;
(His works how happy where his wisdom rules !)
'Tis clear that God the happiness of all
Wills and promotes without tyrannic sway.

“ But if his mercies, by free-agents spurn'd
So far from gend'ring the desir'd result,
Tend rather to produce on erring man
An opposite effect ; from what proceeds,
Correctly speaking, all its kindred ills ?
Is God the author of the miseries
That flow from disobedience to his will ?
Or could a Pharaoh his Creator chide
For being merciful, withholding plagues,
Or bearing long with his rebellious pride,
Because the Lord, so far from soft'ning down
His untam'd obstinacy, makes his heart
(If possible) more harden'd than before ?
If suitable effects from causes flow'd
In this as in unnumber'd instances ;—
God could have never harden'd Pharaoh's heart—
Benevolence divine could ne'er produce
Ends so incongruous to grace vouchsaf'd,
Except where black ingratitude rebels

Against that Power who designs the best.

“ This, then, conceded ; O how far remov'd
From our Creator must those statutes prove,
Consigning to perdition his own works
Without the slightest possibility
Of being' enabled to avert the curse !
The very notion thrills thro' ev'ry pore,
Clearly confessing how the awful thought
Blasphemes, dishonours, and insults our God.

“ 'Tis vain to speak of mercies long enjoy'd,
If from eternal punishment a part
Cannot by possibility be sav'd :
For what avails the momentary bliss
Of heav'nly bounty in this transient state,
Unless to make hereafter misery
More poignant after lenity conferr'd,
If from the frightful gulph of endless woe
By absolute inexorable laws
A part of mankind never could escape ?
Or how could folly more absurd appear,
Than, from the blessings of his present love
And fatherly beneficence to man,
To argue, by perversion most insane,

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That He, who now in mercy so transcends,
Should yet be deem'd the source inflexible
Of everlasting tortures, which no force
Could possibly avert? This surely breathes
Not the regenerating influence
Of Him who wills not ev'n one sinner's death,
But rather from our adversary comes,
That roaring lion who would all devour
'Mid the corrosion of immortal fires.

“ Valid conclusions, therefore, well concede
That mercy here and bounty most benign
Appear to promise far superior joys
To all but traitors who betray themselves.
None other prove rejected, none condemn'd
But obstinate, outrageous, unsubdued
Abusers of the gifts of love divine.
And these with justice, and with mercy too,
(Mercy to all except unhallow'd fiends,)
Are properly cast off, as all the ends
Of government, in either heav'n or earth,
Would soon be lost, if treason could prevail.”

So said Benigné ; and conviction seem'd
Pervading ev'ry mien. But Fataliste,

Tho' stunn'd, would not relinquish his fond theme,
From long-indulg'd acquaintance how endear'd !
Nor can we wonder at affection's faults,
Unless where obstinacy never yields
To opposition whether right or wrong.
As in ourselves we view th' erroneous past,
And candidly acknowledge former slips,
How disappointed should contrition feel,
If merciless our adversaries prove.
Nor would we deem it rational or just
Of mental liberty to be depriv'd,
Tho' frequent error may our thoughts invest.
Thus all at least in this resolve concur,
Which makes it strange how any could maintain
That all mankind no freedom can enjoy.
Or who of trials ever should complain,
If nought occurs but what from God proceeds ?
At any fact 'tis impious to repine,
If from Jehovah ev'ry ill descends.
Hence, when the friends of absolute decrees
Murmur and wail in discontented mood,
Unfolding intellectual liberty
As fluently as freedom's advocates ;

We cannot but remark how wide a space
'Twixt theory and practice oft expands.

Say what new arguments are now advanc'd
To banish aught but universal chains.
Nor can reflection much admire to find
Man plac'd in fetters by a heathen fate,
(Christian it never was, nor can be call'd,) .
Since of infinity this monster dares
Ev'n to disrobe th' Omnipotent himself.
Yet now with brevity their force display,
The sooner out of slavery to rise.

Their sum and substance, therefore, well condens'd,
An allegory find in all we read
Whether of Satan or his rebel host ;
Thence placing the machinery profane
Of diabolic agency within
Our own sad breasts, here deem'd its only source,
Wherein its drama breathes as fate ordains.
Else, if in being, Satan merely acts
A part subordinate to heav'n's decrees
Beneath the vast generic energy
Of the first cause whence all results proceed.

Such, briefly stated, are th' advances made,
As Fate's confed'rate advocates adopt
Endless expedients, wheresoe'er procur'd,
To shake the pedestal of truth divine.

After short pause, Pirani thus replies:—

“ In these objections novelty of thought,
Or something most original, I ken.
And who could think that aught in reason's garb
Thro' such vain theories would take its flight?
But to demonstrate that a dev'l exists,
From Revelation thus I draw my proofs.

“ Did not the tempter in the wilderness
For forty days the Son of God assail?
And on this subject, view'd in all its points,
There are but two alternatives to choose—
Whether externally, or from within,
Th' insinuating poison had its rise.
If, then, that tempter allegoric prov'd,
In Christ himself th' allurements must have sprung.
But in a being that had ne'er transgress'd,
Coming in sinless manhood to fulfil
His heav'nly Father's will,—how could the stain
Ev'n of one sinful thought in Him arise?

Too pure was he, who came to save mankind,
To tempt himself or aught in human form,
But least of all to tempt the living God.
Nor would the Father tempt th' eternal Word
Against their own divinity to war.
Or how could Christ fall prostrate to himself,
To pay the act of adoration sought,
If he the tempter's wily snare obey'd?
Or how, when telling Satan to be gone,
Behind himself could he himself repair?
Thence, such a train of inference absurd
Triumphantly avoiding, reason proves
The foul temptation from himself ne'er flow'd,
But from the demon signally o'erthrown.

“ And did not Jesus thus the Jews rebuke—
Ye of your father are,—by whom possess'd
His hellish will in all your thoughts abounds?
His lusts ye do, evincing how deserv'd
Is such a governor by his fell race.
Of him, indeed, who from the very first
A murderer became, ye all may boast.
Truth's ever hostile to his evil mind
Where no bless'd ray exists, but all opaque

And fathomlessly false in treason's gloom.
When lies he utters, he his proper form
Assumes,—a liar always, and the sire
Of odious falsehood's most malignant brood.

“ Who, then, can doubt th' existence of the
fiend,—

Contrasted, as he is, with God himself?
And lo! how Christ to Satan here ascribes
A tendency alone to be the spring
Of ev'ry evil work,—the father sole,
Or origin, of all impure designs!
But what Messiah of himself reveals,
Now ponder, and impartially review.
I, saith our Master, am the world's great light:
Who follows me, shall ne'er in darkness walk,
But in the light of everlasting day.
I am the way, the truth, and life indeed,
The friend and Saviour of the human race.

“ Can aught in opposition be conceiv'd
More endlessly at variance, more remote,
Or more impossible to be deriv'd
From the same fountain-head? Could falsehood,
truth,

Could light and darkness both together reign
Where truth and light unclouded, undecreas'd,
Eternally abide in heav'n's Supreme?

“True; nightly darkness seems a gen’ral doom:
Yet where’s its fountain? Is it in the skies
Where no obscurity can ever dim
Th’ unceasing lustre of celestial day?
Or could th’ illuminating spirit there
Become its source,—thus by a negative
Dispelling positive existence thence,
And blotting out itself to give it birth?
His works, in truth, that negative produce,
(If such be rightly nam’d,) by rolling oft
Th’ impenetrable veil of night intense
As o’er annihilated nature’s mien;
Demonstrating how all the world retires
From human vision,—unapparent, lost,
As if expung’d in some tartarean void,
Whene’er depriv’d of providential beams.

“Howls the loud tempest? Flieth the light-
ning’s shaft?
Rolls the deep thunder from his dark recess?
Trembleth th’ astounded air? or o’er mankind

Moans the mad surge of exhalations vast?
Expires the shepherd mid his scatter'd flock?
Boundeth the deer before the raging blast?
Hangs the grim tiger his confounded head?
Or the stunn'd eagle from his height dislodg'd?
Or sternly stands the lion in amaze?
Or less magnanimous th' affrighted wolf
Returning in confusion to his lair?

“ Caught in the low'ring drift, labours aloft
The mountain-gender'd pine, or ancient oak?
Or groans the forest on some cloudy ridge
Wailing its fallen venerable sires
After the lapse of centuries o'erthrown?

“ Swell the full streamlets into rivers rais'd?
Or rivers into deluges profound?
Or foam the madden'd waves invading heav'n,
As clings aghast the battle-nurtur'd brave
Where breakers whirl across the lab'ring prow,
And the sad ship, made vocal with complaints,
Compresses or expands her ev'ry plank?

“ Is the blue concave blotted out of sight?
Or starry firmament as if eras'd?
Rageth the wind in undecided course?

Scowls the black horror of the billowy world?
Complains all nature mid the wild uproar?
Yes : let the universe in mourning weep
The dire calamities that rend our globe.

“ Yet none so dire as man to man conveys,
Destroying for destruction’s sake alone ;—
Nor like those vast vicissitudes that bear
A providential antidote throughout,
Keeping existence from inaction’s plagues,
And by the frightful hurricane itself
Freeing the atmosphere from Death’s domain.
A few, ’tis true, may perish in the strife
Or clash of elements, to save the rest ;—
And ev’n those few to brighter scenes may rise,
If not resolv’d on everlasting death,
Nay more ; the wings of desolation oft
With mighty pinions lay the tyrant low,
When from the people of the living God
Oppression’s cries in penitence ascend.

“ Here, then, sojourning, hail the deepest shades
As suited to the nature of thy state ;—
While thro’ untir’d variety, the Lord’s
Irradiating Spirit darts its beams,

Not more with good all ill to overcome,
Than with his mercies ev'ry mist dispel,
Rending chaotic inroads each revolve,
And out of night conducting ev'ry clime;
Nor more dispos'd on matter to impress
His kind paternal smile, than o'er the mind
In tides of wond'rous effluence to roll,
Till, after all terrestrial darkness ends,
The soul itself may welcome endless day.

“God gives us light, then, and that light we see,
Till something earthly takes it from our view.
Yet as all mankind such privations know,
None need complain, or wish to prove exempt
From gloom nocturnal ; since the faithful sun,
(Faithful alike to all,) so soon returns.
And so in other negatives we trace
The absence, not the presence, of our God,
Who, altho' omnipresent, proves unknown
Except in spirit or his bounties view'd.

“If, then, the spiritual day or night
Of nature were not equally confess'd ;
But to a few elect the former giv'n,
While o'er vast multitudes the latter frown'd

Without the possibility of change ;
Thence would Jehovah's spiritual boons,
Unlike his other blessings, seem to swerve
From his paternal and unbounded love.
Nay further, his immutability
Would thus be shaken to its very base,
An attribute inseparably join'd
With wisdom, justice, mercy, pow'r divine.
Experience tells us his benevolence
Causes the sun to rise, and rain to fall
Without distinction on the race of man.
Are, then, his brighter gifts to be withheld
From an immense condemn'd majority,
Condemn'd without conditions, or the least
Prospective hope of ever being' redeem'd ?

“ The God of nature thence no more appears,
Or nature's God can never prove her judge,
(Father how kind to ev'ry thing that breathes !)
But o'er the great tribunal of the world,
A strange, stern, metaphysic counsellor,
Blind to all justice, would this system place
Damning whole myriads, and forgiving few,
And these as worthless as the host condemn'd.

“Th’ all-wise Creator with disdain rejects
So bold an imputation, and declares
Both God and Mammon man can never serve;
Which, doubtless, man could do, if Elohim
Could be the cause of what from both proceeds.
For from one common fountain if deduc’d,
To follow both, or either emulate,
(Howe’er diverse their intermediate course,)
Would ultimately serve their final cause;
A thought how blasphemous beyond excess!

“Say, could the sin against the Holy Ghost
Here or hereafter ever be forgiv’n?—
No, never. Hence, if God could be its source,
Against himself his rage must ever burn.
Thus from the influence of hell alone
Could such a flagrant horror be deriv’d;
Especially as this enormous crime
Outrageously excels in hate intense,
To foul Be-elzebub ascribing all
Those sacred miracles our Saviour wrought.
Here too, ’tis manifest from holy writ,
How opposite, irreconcilable,
Immutably averse are heav’n and hell,

Their leaders, and their host, and all their works !

“ If Satan cast out Satan, surely he,
Against himself divided, cannot stand :
Else, by some influence divine impell'd,
For one, or th' other side, or both he acts.
If for his own exclusively employ'd,
This hypothetic instrument must war
Against his own inspirer, thence to prove
(O base and bold idea !) how the Lord,
At variance with himself, his foe upholds.
Or in Messiah's service if engag'd,
His self-resistance would himself defeat.
Or if to serve two opposite extremes,
Unbless'd Be-elzebub should prove constrain'd ;
To neither true, alternately he'd veer
From side to side, betraying and betray'd.
Thus would the wise Creator be suppos'd
As inconsistent as the veering wind,
Doing, undoing, and with hostile fiends
Confounding his creation with dismay ;
Which monstrous offspring of absurd conceit
The wildest madness never could surpass.

“Wherefore for light shall senseless man pre-
sume

Darkness to substitute?—or entity
For its privation? Yet, howe’er absurd,
If possible, ’tis tenfold more insane
To link beneath one common final cause
What tends to boundless joy and endless woe;
Or two such opposite careers as lead,
The *one* to life eternal, heav’nly bliss,
The *other* down to everlasting death.”

Thus said the victor, who in triumph mourn’d,
To witness such depravity on earth,
Where, tho’ endow’d with various visual pow’rs,
Infatuated mortals quench their orbs,
Or all but quench them mid unhallow’d thoughts,
Leaving a void within them, or, still worse,
A glimm’ring index of immortal gloom:
Contrast how sad to light amid the bless’d,
Where nothing on the wane their joys disturbs,
But saints made perfect trim their mental lamps
In brilliancy increasing without end!

Hush’d is the contest; yet it only sleeps
To grow more zealous after short repose,

As, by another fatalist resum'd,
Its direr cogitations thus evolve :—

“ Whatever be th' infirmity or strength
Of all Benigné or Pirani urg'd,
One difficulty yet remains unsolv'd,
To which at present we may well advert.
Amid the creatures of th' omnific Lord
How comes it that a devil could exist,
Or such a train of evils as proceed
From hell's rebellious throng?—‘ What more
sublime’

(Our first opponent said,) ‘ could God effect,
Than to maintain his sceptre unimpair'd
O'er a creation sinless and unstain'd?’
Is it thence argued that th' Almighty's will
Could never be accomplish'd? which, if true,
Would limit his illimitable pow'r.
Can God will one thing, and its bane permit?
And, least of all, can his most perfect will
Be overcome, defeated, or surpass'd?—
This surely at the thunderer himself
Hurls a vast bolt superior to his own.
So much awhile, tho' brief, I deem enough

To try our adversaries' abstract force ;
Nor here yet needing great diversity,
Let me now pause to hear th' invok'd response."

Thus having said, the conscious hero bow'd,
And superciliously his seat resum'd.
Hereat Theophilus, with thoughtful mien
Deliberately rising, thus begins :—

“ Well may such reas'ners with compendious
speech

Rest amply satisfied, as all confess
Objection and repulsion often steer
A very different course : the former borne
From whatsoever point it rages best,
And, coming with the onset of the winds
Against the latter, ev'ry surge augments ;—
While, artfully by weather-gage oppos'd,
Th' assaulted has repeatedly to tack.
Nay, more ; the augmentation thus procur'd
By an objecting confluence, so far
Accelerates intrinsic impotence,
That, if remov'd, the uninflated wave
Soon finds its level in the stormless main.
Ocean himself, with desolating strides,

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Seems well-equipp'd t' uproot the very rocks
And dash them at the clouds :—yet whence proceeds

His roaring *impetus*? or how would he
The slightest skiff disturb, if left alone,
Or of the awful hurricane bereft?—
Remove the tempest, and a calm succeeds;
Or let Messiah's voice say—' peace, be still'—
The storm retires confounded, and, behold,
Oceanus himself forgets his ire!

So let that Saviour in his word go forth,
Now over-awing ev'ry blast profane.
Yet, to avoid discussion *too* prolong'd,
Let me refer to proofs already made.

“ On Christ's authority, past all dispute,
Pirani prov'd a devil does exist,
A rebel spirit alien to all good,
The ceaseless enemy of God and man.
Likewise, that no connexion could subsist
'Twixt Zion's king and hell's rebellious bands,
Th' elucidation, which Benigné drew
From wisdom's suffrage, unrefuted stands.
Thus far these facts, establish'd on such heights

As soar above delusion, truth records.
To ponder, therefore, why these facts occur,
Is all that now remains : and long indeed
Th' events have plainly answer'd for themselves,
As God with Belial no communion holds
Since Belial by revolt his birthright lost.
But why was he permitted to rebel ?
Rather demand why God produc'd him free ?
All our reflections to this point converge :
The fact itself free-agency unfolds.

“ Ask, then, why freedom ever liv'd to reign ?
Or, rather, how an intellectual world
Without fair liberty could ev'n exist ?
First in reply, our good Creator seems
Long to develope that it never could :
And thought itself so independent proves,
That all mankind, impatient of restraint,
Evince how nature was not made for chains.
Supposing, therefore, nature and her God
The cause of freedom clearly advocate ;
What next ensues ? Should liberty from both
Be ta'en away, and both be thence enslav'd ?
Or how divinity itself could be,

Doubtless, in all its attributes uncurb'd,
And that illimitably, who could hope,
If plac'd beneath the fetters of grim fate?
In fact, infinity eternal war
Against eternal slavery proclaims.

“ The First Cause, then, subservient to no rule
Except the free suggestions of his mind,
Or his perfection's most unfetter'd reign,
Could not an image of himself implant
In pristine sinless manhood, if 'twere void
Of that which proves essential to the gift.
Man a free-agent consequently is.
And so is ev'ry mental being free,
Free as the work of God, till justly hurl'd
By dire rebellion from its native sphere,
And metamorphos'd in tartarean fires.
If, then, a mental universe must be
Free, if at all created ; who could tell
Omnipotence himself that nothing made
Should ever have existed ; tho' 'tis known
That violated freedom pav'd the way
To hellish thralldom and immortal woe ?
Who to his Maker ever would apply

To be annihilated ? or far less
Of liberty belov'd to be depriv'd ?
Or, if while free we cannot prove content,
What should we be if endlessly condemn'd
To move like planets in a given track,
Over and over the same course to roll,
With mental consciousness in vain possess'd ?

“ Mankind, indeed, from certain motives act,
(Motives, however, by free-agents chos'n),
That lead to facts recurrent as the cause,
Should the free-agents voluntarily prove
Again in similar condition plac'd.
Thus far is granted. Hence some wits conclude,
The sceptre of necessity prevails.
Yet whence this inference ? or how deriv'd ?
Not à priori ; for the fact assum'd
Leads à posteriori to the cause.
If, then, on fact necessity relies ;
As ev'ry day's experience proves us free
At least in thought, and plainly indicates
Omniscience never could the fountain be
Of such extravagance and wild romance
As reigus in mental liberty abus'd ;

Necessity, thus view'd, but ill becomes
The late foundation upon which she builds :
Whereas bless'd freedom à priori beams,
First in eternal Deity confess'd,
And thence to man at his creation giv'n,
Crown'd with that image of the parent source.

“ Wherefore, necessity in moral sense
Should within proper limits prove restrain'd,
Or else be banish'd from the mental world.
Certain it is that her less ancient claims
The properties could ne'er annihilate
Of spirit constitutionally free.
And this, sufficient for our purpose, leads
Next to the cause why freedom proves defil'd.
In God that attribute all-perfect reigns
Supported by his vast and peerless mind.
But as no creature could all-perfect be,
The creature's choice is therefore not secure
From fallibility, and hence may err.

“ 'Tis not that God decreed the fall of man,
But simply that free-agency was left
Of opposite alternatives to choose
Obedience or hostility to heav'n ;

Nor that without the most paternal love
Inviting mankind to adopt the best.

“ In man’s ingratitude the fault then lies,
Preferring mammon to his heav’nly sire :
And in th’ apostate spirit, Satan call’d,
The error of original revolt
Proceeded from free-agency’s abuse.

“ Was the creation never to exist,
Because the creature could not e’er become
As perfect as the self-existent source ?
This would, in fact, with all perfection clash,
And ev’n in competition with that sin
Which never can be pardon’d, might indulge.
Nay, more ; ’twould seem to say the Lord him-
self

Should never have existed ; or, as vain,
Altho’ existing, never should exert
Aught of his boundless energies sublime.
Hence, on this principle, ev’n life itself
Should quench for ever all its glorious rays,
And to a termless universal blank
The vast Creator and his works resolve ;
Or, on this basis of inaction, build

Not ev'n one vestige of eternal might,
Leaving omnipotence in vain possess'd,
Void of dominion in its endless sphere,
Without one creature to proclaim its praise,
Or manifest its kind parental sway.

“ Such are th' absurdities that rise untir'd
Where dark insanity o'er nature scowls,
Casting its baleful shade around the world,
And viewing its great Founder wreath'd in ire.
His shafts, 'tis true, at our rebellions fly,
Yet with a sparing hand, as if resolv'd
To punish only for our future good.
Justice and mercy, too, howe'er diverse
In human speech or reason's feebler voice,
In his omniscient excellence unite,
Mingling for ever with celestial love.
In union, therefore, with our brethren's aid,
And ev'ry charm that animates our hopes,
Fate's direful chains we cannot cease to spurn ;
Pleas'd with our being, and the pow'r Supreme
Who made us intellectually free,
Implanting in us, as at first conferr'd,
That bright effulgence, that transcendent boon,

Which heav'nly condescension erst appell'd
An image of his own unfetter'd mind."

So said Theophilus : and Freedom fair,
To wisdom so congenial, wins the crown ;
O, how unlike that demon, who so oft
For lawless purposes her name assumes !
While, by a sacred influence sustain'd,
She smiles beneath the canopy of heav'n,
For ever on the confines of both worlds
Holding in each communion with the bless'd.
Nor can the advocates of ceaseless chains
Awhile resist the impulse of her tides,
On approbation's free-bred waves impell'd
From Fate's unfathom'd deep of abstract ills,
'Tow'rds the safe shore of reason's happier
realm,

Led by her prowess ev'n against their will,
Evincing how impossible it proves
For man to yield his liberty of thought,
A liberty so dear to all mankind,
That fatalists themselves her shrine frequent,
If not avowedly, at least by facts
Whether in private or in public life.

Thus the Vallenses in those days revolv'd ;
To show a reason of their Christian hope
Always prepar'd ; yet not to human lore
Obsequiously bowing, tho' well pleas'd
To use it as an humble instrument
Subservient to the charms of truth divine.

Nor could impartial scrutiny discern,
Ere Reformation's most illustrious birth,
That fatalism's ungenial aspect glar'd
On those who never a reform requir'd.

The sentiments of Bishop Claude prevail'd
Both in the ninth and tenth centurial age,
At least within the Piedmontian vales.
And whether he from Origen deriv'd
Hints that with more simplicity produc'd
His clearer insight into heav'nly light,
Or from Augustin ; far as freedom goes,
The fact remains completely undisturb'd,
Since from free-agency's enlighten'd course
The *former* never swerv'd, altho' *too* fond
Of viewing Scripture by Platonic rules ;
Whilst of the *latter*, it on record proves
He vanquish'd the Predestinarian monks

Of Adrumetum, with indignant zeal
Repelling such opinions as they hop'd
Falsely t' attribute to his purer creed.

Hence, with such models, Turin's Claude could
ne'er

At sacred liberty be thought to strike,
He who so fearlessly her cause upheld
Amid the tumults of eventful years.
In short, for more than fourteen centuries,
Aught like this fatal system prov'd unknown
To the Vallensic church ; nor found its way,
Till by degrees some students from Lausanne,
Or fam'd Geneva, to Perosa led
Some kindred traces of this stern belief.

Think not the likeness *too* severe, O man,
As with her bounty Switzerland convey'd
Some errors, too ; such acquisitions flow
From friendship and compassion ; while in rage
Not all the terrors of a world could shake
The martyr's firmness on the ling'ring pile.
Nor, in th' affinity how long descried
'Twixt fate and unconditional decrees,
Would candour hope to wound the tender breast

Ev'n of an adversary ; tho', in truth,
Awful Fatality in all her ways
Can never look less slavish or austere,
Whether in Christian or in heathen garb
We view her enmity to Freedom's reign.

A DISSERTATION
ON THE
MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION.

A DISSERTATION,

&c.

“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.”—
Gen. i. 1.

(1.) SUCH is the translation given in our authorized version, which, though sufficient for all ordinary purposes, is not as accurate as the present vindication requires. But, before the writer enters into his own immediate views, he is desirous to commence with the opinions of others, that he may not appear to stand alone, or to rest solely on his own conceptions. In proposing merely to place the subject in its proper light, he may in a great measure proceed in a path that has not been traversed before; but as various authors have certainly verged (if not entered) on the course about to be here adopted and persevered in, he seems to prepare for an excursion,

the desirable nature of which has been thus intimated by the expositors alluded to.

As it is needful to learn the difference between the signification of the words ברא bara and עשה gnasah, due authority shall be given for the adopted meaning of each in its respective place; as also in reference to נתן nathan and other terms. Nor is it less requisite to ascertain to what extent the word "the heavens" ought to be carried. This is the translation in Gen. ii. 1, of the same word, (השמים hashshamayim,) which is simply rendered "the heaven" in Gen. i. 1, and is here preferred as being more correct than the latter. It is likewise of great moment to consider what is comprehended under the terms "in the beginning," and to discover whether they do not indicate a succession of unassigned periods of duration altogether prior to any of the six days mentioned in Gen. i. 1.

The recorded chaos also demands investigation. To accomplish these desirable results, is in part the object of the present undertaking, pursuant to which projected plan we shall begin (as already suggested) with extracts from annotators of considerable celebrity.

(2.) In the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin Bible of Franciscus Vatablus, we read, on Gen. i. 1, "Quod ad ברא attinet, doctus inter Hebræos

dicat propriè significare aliquid è nihilo facere, sive excellentissimum in sua specie;" that is, "the learned among the Jews affirm that what pertains to *ברא* (*bara*), properly signifies to make something which did not exist before, or which is most excellent in its species." "To make something out of nothing," is the more literal, though certainly not the more favourable translation of that writer's meaning.

(3.) Augustin Calmet, on the same passage, has—"Aquila, Dieu crea en gros tout d'un coup, tout ensemble le Ciel et la terre; c'est à dire, la matiere de tout l'univers." "Aquila" states that "God created instantaneously, in an undigested state, the heaven and the earth all together; that is to say, the matter of the entire universe."

Now if its entire elementary structure were even commanded to exist as rapidly as thought itself, still we should have no foundation for inferring that it existed only the very instant which preceded the six days mentioned in Gen. i. On the contrary, we shall arrive at a far different conclusion, when we come to consider the different periods of duration comprehended under the terms "in the beginning." It is therefore altogether unimportant whether the respective orbs of the universe were or were not instant-

neously created in their elementary state, as neither of these suppositions could possibly interfere with the actual elementary duration of any globe whatever, to which alone our attention is here directed.

(4.) In the Biblical Antiquities of John Cunrad Dietericus, we read, “Mundum hunc absolvit cœlum et terra, quod utrumque constituit τὸ Πᾶν, sive universitatem omnium Dei Creatoris creaturarum, continetque omnia universa simplicia mixtave corpora. Hoc Cœli et Terræ amphitheatrum condidit Deus in principio.

“The heaven and the earth comprise this world, because both constitute *the Entire*, or the universe of all the creatures of God the Creator, and comprehend all bodies whatever simple or mixed. This amphitheatre of the heaven and the earth God built in the beginning.”

The word corpora, in this extract, seems to restrict the writer's meaning to the corporeal or material world.

(5.) Hugo Grotius also states what corroborates this exposition, saying, “Cœlos et terram, id est universum hoc quale nunc est. Id enim Hebræi duabus illis vocibus expriment. Unde et Mundus futurus hoc nomine appellatur 2 Petri iii. 13. At sequente versu terra dicitur ipsa

abyssus," (ἀβύσσος) "sive prima moles; Ἰλυσ (vorago) Phœnicibus. The heavens and the earth, that is, the universe such as it now is. For it the Jews express by these two words. Whence even the future world is designated by this appellation in 2 Peter iii. 13. But in the following verse" (that is, in Gen. i. 2) "the earth herself is called" (in the Septuagint version) "the abyss, or original mass; by the Phœnicians Ἰλυσ, a gulf."

As the edition, from which this extract is taken, was published in 1679, and the Exegetical Theology of Friedlibius in 1660, the former writer may have derived part of this quotation from the latter. The passage alluded to, in Friedlibius, is as follows. "Cœlos השמים et terram הארץ h. e. universum hoc. Id enim Ebræi duabus vocibus illis exprimunt. Unde et mundus futurus hoc nomine appellatur, 2 Petri iii. 13.

(6.) On Gen. i. 2, Nicholanus Liranus gives the following annotations.

"I. Terra autem erat inanis, id est invisibilis, quia erat undique aquis co-operta.

II. Et vacua, Quia non erat adhuc plantis, et herbis ornata. Sequitur,

III. Et tenebræ erant super faciem abyssi, id est, super faciem elementorum.

“Abyssus, ἀβύσσος enim Græcè, est vorago Latine : et importat immensam aquarum profunditatem. Importat etiam confusionem quandam, et commixtionem : totum autem, quod est infra circulum lunæ, erat confusum ; quia, licet elementa essent producta in suis formis substantialibus, non tamen adhuc habebant omnes proprietates accidentales debitas, usque in tertiam diem, in qua sunt distincta elementa : et ideo usque tunc aqua ipsa non habuit debitam densitatem, sed quasi vaporaliter elevabatur per totum spacium aëris, et ignis : co-operiebat enim terram, et sic quædam confusio, et commixtio erat in elementis, et ideo hoc vocabitur abyssus.

“ I. But the earth was indistinguishable, that is, invisible, because it was enveloped with waters all around.

“ II. And void, because it was not as yet embellished with arborous and vegetable productions.

“ It follows, III. And darkness was upon the face of the abyss, that is, upon the face of the elements.

“ Abyss, for ἀβύσσος in Greek, is vorago (a gulf) in Latin ; and implies an immense depth of waters : it implies also a certain confusion and commixture. But the entire, which is beneath the circle of the moon, was confused ; because, although the elements were produced in their

own substantial forms, they had not, however, as yet all their due accidental peculiarities" (which though not essential to their existence, afterwards proved developed in their respective operations) "until the third day, in which the elements were rendered distinct. And therefore until *then* water itself had not its due density, but was raised in mists or exhalations through the whole space of air and fire: for it" previously "enveloped the earth, and thus a certain confusion and commixture was" originally "in the elements, and therefore this was called the abyss."

This author seems to suggest, that although the firmament was so arranged on the second day as to admit of the commixture of ascending mists with what he calls the expanse of air and fire, yet it was not till the third day that these exhalations ceased continually to pervade that part of the aërial region, which was situated between the sea and the clouds. He therefore conceived that water itself had not *till then* its due density, or that the originally mundane ocean, (as well as the incumbent continuity of exhalations,) was in a state of mist-like expansion, till after the second day had completely elapsed; and that when the waters were collected, they had *then* their due density, after having been withdrawn from their expanded

mist-like state, by the condensation thereof, which took place on the third day, when the dry land appeared. To make this (if possible) more clearly understood, let us suppose the ocean to be so expanded by evaporation, as to rise in mist or exhalations a considerable height above the highest hills; and supposing that such was its original state, then, in order to be depressed into its present compass, a great condensation of its waters must have occurred, (in obedience to the divine command) on the third day; and hence their density must have been vastly increased, which density Liranus appears to have considered the most appropriate they could possess.

It must be admitted, that the figure by which an attempt was made to solve this stupendous operation, is very inaccurate.

In it our globe (as distinguished from any fluid,) was supposed originally interior and concentric to a sphere of water, and was so moved therein, by the divine command, that a part of the earth emerged from it and thence became dry land. In this exposition, no allowance is made for the space which the present uncovered part originally occupied within the aqueous sphere, under the incorrect supposition that the same sphere in the latter instance, was of the same magnitude it originally possessed while it

included the entire earth. Other inaccuracies also accompany that explanation by the assumed figure. In short, it would have been far more satisfactory, and more in accordance with the statement of Liranius respecting "vaporaliter" and "debitam densitatem," if, in the figure referred to, the aqueous sphere had been represented as originally consisting of a dense mist, with no other centre whatever (at any time) but the centre of the earth common to both. Thence, by the divine command, it may have been either condensed or compressed, so as nearly to coincide (as to its extreme or convex boundary,) in its condensed state with the surface of the earth; there being thenceforward merely this difference, that part of the earth, called the dry land, extends beyond the extreme aqueous boundary, whereas a part is still submerged beneath it, or beneath the sea.

In the Exegetical Theology of Friedlibius, mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, we read as follows, under the head of "inanis et vacua, תהו ובהו. Voces istæ ferè unum et idem significant, nempe terram fuisse informem, incultam, et vacuum, quod nullis adhuc vestita esset plantis, nullis herbis, vel arboribus ornata."

(7.) Origen, de ortu mundi, affirms, "Non dixit dies prima, sed dixit dies una. Quia tem-

pus nondum erat antequam esset mundus. Tempus autem esse incepit ex consequentibus diebus. Secunda namque dies, et tertia dies, et quarta, et reliquæ omnes tempus incipiunt designare. He said not the first day, but he said one day; because time as yet had no existence before the world came into being. But time began to exist from the days that followed" the creation of the earth. "For the second day, and the third day, and the fourth, and all the rest begin to designate time."

Hence, according to the opinion of this writer, the material world was created previously to any of the six days recorded in Gen. i. The clause "ex consequentibus diebus" has been restricted to the creation of the earth, because it relates to no other than terrestrial days, and solely refers to our globe. When, moreover, it is said that "time as yet had no existence before the world came into being,"—we are referred merely to the commencement of terrestrial days, as the following sentence unequivocally declares.

The period, in short, of the earth's chaotic or elementary existence, is not at all taken into consideration, partly because its length of duration in that state is not revealed, and partly because in a state of chaotic darkness, there could be no visible measure of time. By this we are far from assuming, that the period of the

earth's chaotic darkness may not have been fully measured by time in other solar systems. But in our own solar system, there could not have been any visible measure of time whatever, till light was given to it, as on the first terrestrial day, by our sun having been then gifted with a power of dispensing his light-exciting particles, for the first time, to the planets and satellites that revolved around him in their respective orbits.

(8.) If requisite, Origen's exposition could be corroborated by the testimony of the venerable Bede, who, in his Ecclesiastical History, has stated as follows respecting the first age: "*Prima igitur ætate seculi nascentis, prima hujus die, fecit Deus lucem quam appellavit diem. Secunda, firmamentum cœli in medio libravit aquarum; ipsis aquis ac terra, cum cœlo superiore ac virtutibus quæ in eo conditorem laudarent, ante horum sex dierum exordium creatis. In the first age therefore of the rising world, on the first day of it, God made the light which he called day. On the second, he poised the firmament of heaven in the midst of the waters; the waters themselves and the earth, with heaven above, and the angels therein to praise the Founder, having been created before the commencement of these six days.*"

The clause "*firmamentum cœli*" must here be synonymous with what is simply called the firmament in Gen. i. 7, as the "*firmament of heaven*" could not be strictly assigned any such locality as the midst of the waters, or the space which is between the ocean and the clouds.

(9.) Buxtorf, in his *Chaldaic, Talmudic, and Rabbinical Lexicon*, states that "*אֵת* apud Cabalistas sæpè mystecè ponitur, pro principio et fine, ut A et Ω in Apocalypsi: aith with the Cabalists is often mystically put for the first and the last, as Alpha and Omega in the Apocalypse."

Taking that particle, therefore, in such a point of view, when it is applied to any of the works of God, it comprehends the entire from first to last of whatever is expressed by the noun with which it is connected.

(10.) Stockius, in his *Clavis Linguae Sanctæ*, has the following statement with respect to the Hebrew particle *eth*:

"I. Obtinet significationem nominalem, quæ essentiam vel substantiam ipsam ut plurimum patientis exprimet, quasi ipscitatem, illud ipsum dixeris. ברא אלהים אתהשמים ואת הארץ creavit Deus substantiam cœlorum et substantiam terræ. Gen. i. 1. מאת ידוה Ab essentia Domini. i. e. ab ipso Domino. Ios. xi. 20. וירעו הרעים אותם:

Pascunt enim pastores substantiam suam, i. e. se ipsos. Ezech. xxxiv. 8. Conf. Lev. viii. 7. Ios. vii. 15. Ita dicta loca explicat cel. Dn. Danzius. in Interpr. 162. ed. maj. Consentientes habet celeberrimos Judæorum Doctores, nempe Aben Efram in Gen. i. 1. Exod. x. 8. R. D. Kinchium ad rad. נש fol. 13. col. 2. L. 10, et alios quos ibi vide. Eth. I, obtains a noun-like signification, by which it expresses the essence or substance itself, for the most part of a passive being" (or, more generally, of any being considered purely in the abstract,) "as if you would say the being or thing itself, independent of all ideas respecting its susceptibility of energy or modification.

"Bara Elohim aith hashshamayim we aith haaretz. God created the substance of the heavens, and the substance of the earth. Gen. i. 1. Me aith Yehovah. From the essence of the Lord, i. e. from the Lord himself. Ios. xi. 20. Wyyirhoo harohim otham. For the shepherds nourish their own substance, that is, themselves. Ezech. xxxiv. 8. It is confirmed in Lev. viii. 7. Ios. vii. 15.

"Thus the celebrated Dn. Danzius explains the recorded passages in his Interpretation 162, of the larger edition. He has the concurrent testimony of most celebrated Jewish doctors, to wit, Aben Esra on Gen. i. 1. Ex. x. 8. R. D. Kimchius (or Kimchi) respecting the root of aith, fol.

13. col. ii. L. 10, and others, who may be there consulted."

(11.) Bishop Patrick, on Gen. i. 1, has commented as follows: "The Hebrew particle **אֶת** *eth*, put before both heaven and earth, signifies as much as *with*, if Maimonides understood it aright; and makes the sense to be this—He created the heavens, with all things in the heavens, and the earth, with all things in the earth, as his words are in *More Nevochim*, P. ii. cap. 30. Certain it is, these two words, heaven and earth, comprehend the whole visible world."

(12.) Mr. Henry Ainsworth, on the same passage, has the following annotation: "The heavens and the earth, the world and all things that are therein, things visible and invisible. The Hebrew articles *eth* and *ha*, seem to imply so much: *eth* having the first and last letter of the Hebrew alphabet, and so being of general comprehension; and *ha*, of plain demonstration."

Secondly, on the term **אלהים** *Elohim*, the same commentator remarks as follows:—

"The Hebrew doctors have left records of this mystery, though at this day that nation understands it not. 'Come and see the mystery of the word (*Elohim*;) there are three degrees, and

every degree by itself alone' (that is, personally distinct,) 'and yet notwithstanding they are all one, and are not divided' (or divisible,) 'from one another;' saith R. Simeon ben Jochai, in Zoar, upon the sixth section of Leviticus.

"Sometimes this word is used singularly (or in the singular number) "Eloah," for instance, "the Almighty, in Job xii. 4, and in a shorter form, El, Mighty, in Gen. xiv. 18.

"And Eloah hath affinity with Alah he adjured : for by oath and execration men entered into covenant with God," that is, so far as relates to the term *execration*, they bound themselves under a curse in case they violated the respective covenant. "Angels and magistrates are sometimes called Elohim gods, as in Psal. viii. 6; Heb. ii. 7; Psal. lxxxii. 1, 6; but in this work, Jehovah Elohim was the Creator only. Gen. ii. 4; Esa. xlv. 24. And angels were his creatures. Psal. cxlviii. 2, 5; Col. i. 16. The Apostles, writing in Greek, use it always singularly, Theos, God : so in our own and other languages, which cannot attain the grace and propriety of the Hebrew speech."

It should not appear strange to us, that the word Elohim is sometimes applied to magistrates, &c., when we reflect that the term Lord in our language is also applied to the creature. In either case, the context must indicate the respec-

tive application of the same term to God and man, &c. Thus the term the Author, in one passage may signify the Author of the universe ; whereas in another it may simply allude to some human writer. And the like is similarly discernible in reference to any other word thus differently though respectively applied.

(13.) As a further proof how necessary it is to keep this circumstance fully in remembrance, the following extract from the Rev. Thomas Scott's annotations on Gen. i. 1, may in this, as well as in other respects, furnish a striking auxiliary testimony.

“ God created the heaven and the earth, or the whole universe, visible and invisible. The word heaven is sometimes used in scripture for that place, where the divine glory is especially displayed, and where angels and happy spirits have their residence ; at other times for the boundless expanse, in which the sun, moon, and stars are placed ; and at others for the circumambient air, even to the very surface of the earth ; it must therefore be interpreted as the context requires.”

(14.) From Dr. Adam Clarke's annotations on this text, let us transcribe the subsequent valuable comment.

“The word אֶת *eth*, which is generally considered as a *particle*, simply denoting that the word following is in the accusative or oblique case, is often understood by the Rabbins in a much more extensive sense. ‘The particle אֶת *eth*,’ says Aben Ezra, ‘signifies the *substance* of the thing.’ The like definition is given by Kimchi, in his *Book of Roots*. ‘This particle,’ says Mr. Ainsworth, ‘having the first and last letter of the Hebrew alphabet in it, is supposed to comprise the *sum* and *substance* of all things.’ ‘The particle אֶת *eth*,’ (says Buxtorf, *Talmudic Lexicon* sub voce) ‘with the Cabalists, is often mystically put for the *beginning* and the *end*, as Α alpha, and Ω omega, are in the Apocalypse.’”

The two last records, to which Dr. Clarke here refers, are given in paragraphs 9 and 12.

“On this ground these words should be translated—‘God in the beginning created the *substance* of the heavens, and the *substance* of the earth;’ i. e. the *prima materia*, or first elements, out of which the heavens and the earth were successively formed.” (See paragraph 10.) “The Syriac translator understood the word in this sense, and to express this meaning, has used the word אֶת *yoth*, which has this signification, and is very properly translated in Walton’s Polyglott, ‘Esse cœli et esse terræ, the *being* or *substance* of the heaven, and the *being*

or *substance* of the earth.' St. Ephraim Syrus in his comment on this place, uses the same Syriac word, and appears to understand it precisely in the same way. Though the Hebrew word is certainly no more than the notation of a *case* in most places, yet understood here in the sense above, it argues a wonderful philosophic accuracy in the statement of Moses, which brings before us not a finished heaven and earth, as every other translation appears to do, though afterwards the process of their formation is given in detail, but merely the *materials* out of which God built the whole system in the six following days."

The conclusion of this extract is inaccurate, as the system was not built, but merely finished in the given six days; the works perfected in which period, appear to comprise chiefly the bringing the earth out of her chaotic or elementary state, and rendering her a habitable globe, &c.

It is reasonable to conclude, that man was not created, till the earth was rendered a suitable habitation for him. He was accordingly created (ברא *bara*) on the sixth day. For nearly similar reasons, beasts and other animals were not summoned into existence till the fifth and sixth days.

(15.) With respect to the particle את *eth*, to me it occurs that it is not used superfluously in

any instance, being always a very expressive adjunct, most comprehensive in its signification, and never redundant. How much, then, must it be regretted, that in so many instances, it has not been translated into our language, especially in the Mosaic account of the creation, where its presence throws so much light on the subject. The original text is, doubtless, wonderfully accurate, and conveys most powerful evidence of the truly divine source whence it sprang. One of its prominent features, in particular, cannot be recognised in any human production on the same theme, viz. the total absence of the technical or scholastic language of any age. Though Moses was reared up in all the learning of the Egyptians, yet none of their learning is *there* intermixed. In it there is nothing whatever bordering on the Ptolemaic system, whose parent-spring manifestly arose in Egypt at a very early period. Neither is there the slightest disquisition like what we find in the Copernicon, or any other system. No; its author wrote not as man writes; the rays of divine light shine in their own resplendent lustre. Yet, notwithstanding the total absence of the learning of the Egyptians, or of any other people, from this divinely-revealed account of Jehovah's works, its truth can be vindicated even on the most philosophical principles.

(16.) Sanctioned by the foregoing extracts, we feel justified in selecting the terms ‘*prima materia*, or first elements,’ as the ground-work of our amended translation; the particle $\pi\alpha\epsilon\theta$, when taken in connexion with any thing relating to the creation, being well calculated to designate (from the considerations assigned above) the *first elements*, or elementary structure of whatever is expressed by the substantive noun with which it may prove connected. The terms *elementary structure*, are preferred to that of *substance*, for various reasons. The heavens being represented similarly created as the earth, or the same words precisely, and manner of expression, being applied to the creation of both; in whatever way either was produced, we may expect to find the other called into existence under like circumstances. The earth, then, (as represented,) having been created separately, and not in a state of amalgamation with the heavens; the heavenly orbs, also, comprised under the word the *heavens*, appear to have been created separately in their elementary orbicular state as well as the earth; that is, each of the planets, &c. was a globe from the first, and continued in its original elementary state, till it was afterwards completed by the divine Architect. As, therefore, we take the respective heavens to have consisted even originally of so many dis-

tinct though unfinished globes, under the term *an aith*, (which implies them all first and last,) we accordingly consider that the terms *elementary structure*, give the sense of the original more correctly than the word substance; especially as the term substance would not be so suitable a translation of that particle in Gen. i. 21, 25, 27, where it also occurs.

(17.) In these verses moreover, it is connected with the animal creation, whereas in the foregoing instances, it was applied to the suns and planets of the material world. And here, though it may with equal propriety be rendered by the terms *elementary structure*; yet, considering the difference that exists between the animal and solar or planetary world, the context, of course, requires a suitable variation in the manner of applying these terms to things so dissimilar. Thus, in verse 21, we shall have “the triune God created the elementary structure of the larger aquatic animals,” &c.; in verse 25, “the triune God completed the elementary structure of the beasts of the earth,” &c. and in verse 27, “the triune God created the elementary structure of man” (or mankind) “in his own image.” The meaning of this obviously is, that the triune God created the elementary structure, or primeval source of all animals in those that he *then* called

into existence, as the respectively productive fountains whence all their future generations were to flow.

The terms elementary structure, therefore, under this application, simply designate the origin respectively of all the future generations of the animal and (so far as relates to mankind) intellectual world. But these terms could have no such signification whenever applied to the suns and planets of the material world; with respect to which, the application must evidently relate to their having been originally created in a simple state, or a state primevally unmodified, though primevally perfect as to its susceptibility of modification, as well as perfect in every other elementary point of view.

(18.) When we say that all, from first to last, are included under the particle **אֶת** eth; there is no necessity for giving any limitation to the full import of the passage with respect to the solar or planetary world, no more than in reference to the animal creation; for it may be objected that **אֶת** eth implies all the heavenly orbs of the universe, first and last, as that substantive particle contains in it the first and last letters of the Hebrew alphabet.

And, in truth, though some learned writers have restricted “the heavens” mentioned in

Genesis to our solar system, it might perhaps be more advisable to avoid placing limits where Revelation has set no bounds. Nor would it be difficult, on this enlarged prospect of "the heavens," to account for the completion of the entire universe, taken as an integer, in the given six days. For it need not imply that no part thereof was finished till the given six days, but that merely our solar system was perfected in that period; it being simply recorded that the universe was then finished by reason of the last system in it having been completed at that time.

(19.) Nay, more; from this unlimited and most justifiable contemplation of *the heavens*, we may deduce very powerful evidence to prove that the terms "in the beginning," comprehend a period, the duration of which is not revealed in Scripture, so far is it from being a part of the first day. For as we find in Scripture that stars existed before the creation of the earth, and therefore prior to any of the given six days; so these very pre-existent stars being included among *the heavens*, the period in which they were created is consequently included in the period set forth by the terms "in the beginning." The scriptural authority, alluded-to here, is as follows. "Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Who is this that dark-

eneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" (Job xxxviii. 1—7.)

Now as the corner-stone is the first and chief stone laid in a building, so the corner-stone here mentioned, figuratively designates the laying of the chief thing in the foundation or *elementary structure* of the earth; to celebrate which remarkable event, certain stars by the voice of their inhabitants having sung together, we accordingly ascertain that habitable globes had been created previously to the earth. And part of *the heavens* having been thus created prior to the earth; and yet both being represented as created "in the beginning;" it is evident that various and far different periods are therein comprehended. As, moreover, no portion whatever of the first terrestrial day (designated partly by *evening and morning*) could have existed during the earth's primeval chaotic darkness, it is conclusive that

the terms *in the beginning* comprise, not only different successive, but unassigned, periods of duration that had rolled away previously to any of the given six days.

Whence, ultimately, we deduce that all the planets, &c. of our solar system, included among *the heavens*, as also the earth itself, were created previously to any of the given six days.

(20.) Two firmaments being revealed, that of the earth, and that of the heavens, we are naturally led to the following conclusions.

First, supposing not any circumambient substance to be in continuation with the earth's surface, her surface (whether earthy or aqueous) would consequently be surrounded by a vacuum.

Not any substance, therefore, could arise from, or leave her surface, as in such an instance it would have at first to ascend in a vacuum; to accomplish which, there could not be any assignable or conceivable momentum.

For, on the one hand, the entire force of gravitation would operate to prevent the ascent or recession from the earth's surface of as much as one particle of matter; while, on the other hand, there being no counteracting force whatever, it would be accordingly impossible for so much as a single particle of matter to rise into a vacuum which immediately encircled the terrestrial sur-

face. Hence it follows that the earth's atmosphere itself must have been created by God.

As, also, the waters in the clouds, as well as the billows of the deep, are alluded to in the second day's work; so the ascent of mists or exhalations is further implied. The earth, therefore, at that period, must have had an atmosphere; or a circumambient aërial fluid, part whereof is of greater density than the ascending or receding exhalations. For (as we have just inferred) since not one particle of matter could ascend into a vacuum immediately encircling our globe, it is conclusive that any mist or exhalation could not rise above or recede from the earth's surface, except on the principle of a lighter or rarer substance ascending in a denser medium. And the density of our atmosphere not being uniform, but different at different altitudes, any given exhalation must ascend therein, till it reaches an aërial region of the same density as itself.

How strange, then, must it appear, to every reflecting mind, that any thing assuming the name of philosophy should ever have ascribed the sublime frame of the universe to a fortuitous concourse of atoms!

Genuine wisdom truly inculcates that all material orbs, together with their respective atmospheres, must each be completely insulated in the

vast expanse, and that the planets of the various systems could not be carried in vortices round their respective suns. The planetary revolutions, in fact, must be performed in pure space, that is, in space void of matter. Hence, if it could even be hypothetically admitted, and merely on argumentative grounds, that all these orbs eternally existed; still it might be demanded what could possibly have produced our atmosphere? We have seen that not any thing fortuitous could have generated it, and that God alone could have been its framer. The existence of our atmosphere, accordingly, is of itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a God. How justly, therefore, hath the royal psalmist resounded the praises of Jehovah, in tracing his Creator amid the grand operations of nature; affirming with incontrovertible veracity that "the heavens are telling the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work."

Secondly; nothing whatever is recorded with respect to any of the given six days, till "God said," in relation to our solar system, "let there be light," or (among various stupendous accompaniments of the divine command) let the sun be gifted with a power of transmitting light to our globe and to the other planets.

"And God saw the light, that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness.

And God called the light" by a word which signifies "day, and the darkness he called" by a term signifying "night. And there was evening, and there was morning, one day; וַיְהִי עֶרֶב וַיְהִי בֹקֶר יוֹם אֶחָד wa yehi gnerev, wa yehi voker, yom echad." Can any thing more evidently relate in part to the sun's recently conferred power of imparting light, and the various changes of evening and morning, &c. produced by a revolution of the earth, on its axis, in presence of the sun, thus dispensing his light-producing particles for the first time to the planets of our system? The event, in short, may be left to speak for itself in opposition to a merely supposed and apparently unnecessary miracle which some have ventured to ascribe to the production of the first three terrestrial days.

(21.) As this light, also, seems partly to relate to the removal of the earth's chaotic darkness; we may infer that the terrestrial atmosphere was in existence on the first day. How, then, it may be demanded, are we to account for the second day's work? By suggesting such an alteration in the translation as is justified by the original text. Thus, what is translated "God made the firmament," should be more accurately rendered "the triune God completed the firmament." To this persuasion I am led by consi-

derations of great moment. That light could not have illumined the earth on the first day, except through the medium of a terrestrial atmosphere, the combined voice of experience and philosophy sufficiently attests. When the original text, therefore, is susceptible of being rendered in accordance with that corroborating voice, there unquestionably arises no slight inducement to prefer that translation to one that is less rational or satisfactory.

Now *עשה* yahas is the word which is rendered in our English version by the term *made*; and which, being merely an inflection of the verb *עשה* gnasah, should be translated accordingly.

But *עשה* gnasah, according to Buxtorf, may signify “confecit” as well as “fecit;” and the context, as well as the reason of the case, (which we have just considered,) leading us to prefer the former to the latter term, the word “confecit” is thus adopted; which signifies he despatched, finished, made an end of, or completed.

According to Parkhurst, *עשה* gnasah “is a very general word, like *do* and *make* in the English. The following are its principal applications. I. To *make*, out of pre-existent matter, to *form*, *fashion*. Gen. i. 7; vi. 15, 16; Ps. cxix. 73; Job x. 9.”

The first of these references (i. e. Gen. i. 7) respects the fashioning of the firmament “out

of pre-existent matter," or (in other words) relates to the thorough formation or completion of a pre-existent firmament.

On these strong grounds the passage is susceptible of being rendered, not simply as it is translated in our and other versions, but "the triune God completed the elementary structure of the firmament;" and that, too, for the purpose specified in the context, that the terrestrial firmament or atmosphere (or rather a part of it) should be between the then mundane ocean and the clouds.

Yet how can it be said to have been completed to this effect? Perhaps by the density of its lowest region being so increased or disposed by the Power who had previously created it, as to admit of exhalations ascending in it on the principle of a lighter substance ascending in a denser medium.

From this translation we shall not swerve throughout the entire Mosaic account of the creation.

The verb *נָסַח* *gnasah*, then, likewise occurring in some form or other in Gen. i. 16, 25, 26, 31; and in Gen. ii. 2, 3, 4; as also in Exod. xx. 11; let us consider whether it may not be satisfactorily rendered in each instance by the term which we have adopted. Thus in Gen. i. 16, in place of "God made," we should have "the

triune God completed the elementary structure of two great lights," which had been created by him *in the beginning* with all the other orbs comprehended under the term *the heavens*. But it may be objected that he is revealed as having placed them in the firmament of the heavens on the fourth day. To this we reply that יִתַּן *yitain* being an inflection of the verb נָתַן *nathan*; and נָתַן *nathan*, according to Buxtorf, signifying "dedit" or "constituit," as well as "posuit;" and, according to Parkhurst, "he granted or appointed," as well as "he set;" we prefer either of the antecedent terms for reasons similar to those already assigned respecting the verb גָּנָסָה *gnásah*. Hence, instead of "God set them," we should have "the triune God granted or appointed them, in the firmament of the heavens, to give light upon the earth, &c."

In Gen. i. 25, instead of "God made the beast of the earth after his kind," we should have "the triune God completed the elementary structure" (or original fountain) "of the beast of the earth after his kind" or species: which latter translation appears preferable to the former, from the additional consideration that in the preceding verse the beasts, &c. of the earth, are represented as being already in existence conformably to the divine command.

Thus in verse 24, "God said, let the earth

bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind : and it was so," that is, they came into existence as commanded, or (in other words) they were *then* created, though not reduced in so distinct a manner under their different sexes and species as they were afterwards rendered ; for in the following verse (as already discerned) it is revealed that " the triune God completed the elementary structure" (or primeval fountain of all the future generations) " of the beast of the earth after his kind," or species, &c.

In Gen. i. 26, the three persons of the eternal Trinity are represented as having held a consultation respecting the intended formation of man, whom they designed spiritually to render as complete an image of the divine nature as such a creature could be made. Hence, instead of " God said, let us make," we should have " the triune God said, let us complete man in our image," when we shall create him. Hence, in the following verse it is said, " So the triune God (ברא *bara*) created the elementary structure of man" (or the original source of all the future generations of mankind) " in his own image," thus fulfilling the previous determination of the three eternally and inseparably united divine persons to complete man after their intellectual likeness.

In Gen. i. 31, in place of "God saw everything that he had made," we should have "the triune God saw everything, the elementary structure of which he had completed, and behold it was very good."

In Gen. ii. 2, instead of "on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made," &c. we should have "on the seventh day" (or immediately previous to its commencement) "the triune God ended his work which he had completed; and rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had completed."

In the latter part of the next verse, in lieu of "from all his work which God created and made," we should have "from all his work which the triune God had created to make perfect, אשר ברא אלהים לעשות asher bara Elohim lahasoth;" the last word being in the infinitive mood of the kal paradigm of the verb עשה gnasah.

Thus God is represented as resting from all his work which he had created in an elementary state *in the beginning*, with a view to bring it to future perfection; part of which was effected before our solar system's period of completion, and part accomplished in the given six days by the final and complete adjustment of all the orbs of the last finished system of the universe. Now, in translating from one language into an-

other, there are instances in which we cannot do so literally: but this is not one of that description. Accordingly we find, in the margin of our English version, the terms “created to make,” given as a translation of ברא לעשות *bara lahasoth*. And we cannot account for the mode of expression adopted in the English text, except it proceeded from a consciousness in the translator, that “created to make” could not admit of a satisfactory solution.

This, I am prepared to hear, may be alleged as a reason for translating the passage “created and made:” to which we might readily assent, (notwithstanding such a needless redundancy of expression,) if “created to make” could be proved a proper translation of the original with a due regard to the context, &c. But, from what has been advanced, we have cogent reasons to prefer the sense in which we have rendered it.

Nor ought we to omit the Septuagint translation of this passage, which is evidently far more accurate than in other versions, as approximating much nearer to the sense of the original:—“ὡν ἤρξατο ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαι,”—that is, “which God had originally commenced to effect;” or had commenced *in the beginning*, to be afterwards brought to perfection, in the given six days, by the final adjustment of the last-finished system of the universe.

In Gen. ii. 4, in place of "in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens," we should have "in the day that Jehovah the triune God completed earth and heavens." Here, it is observable, that the word שמים shamayim simply being adopted, implies the completion only of a part of השמים hashshamayim; the other part having been perfected before the period of the completion of our solar system. The former term, therefore, that is, שמים shamayim, should be translated into our language without having the definite article prefixed; especially as ביום baiyom evidently indicates no more than the last day of the completion of Jehovah's works.

In Exodus xx. 11, instead of "in six days the Lord made heaven and earth," we should have "in six days Jehovah completed the elementary structure of the heavens and the elementary structure of the earth," or (as we have already ascertained) fully perfected in that period the last finished system of the universe.

To complete this series, Gen. i. 1, is susceptible of being translated as follows:—"In the beginning the triune God created the elementary structure of the heavens and the elementary structure of the earth:" also Gen. i. 4, may be rendered thus; "the triune God saw the elementary structure of the light, that it was good."

To obviate any objection respecting the last passage, let it be observed that *the elementary structure of the light* may properly refer to the seven constituent coloured rays that form each combined solar achromatic ray; admirably fitted as light is, in these its perfect elements, for all its luminous productions, whether contemplated as to the glowing colours in which it wreaths the wonderfully diversified face of nature, or that happy and well proportioned combination which gives to unrefracted light its colourless refulgence.

(22.) Respecting Job xxxviii. 7, a learned writer saith, "this must refer to some intelligent beings who existed before the creation of the visible heavens and earth; and it is supposed that this and the following clause speak of the same beings; that by *the sons of God* and *the morning stars*, the angelic host is meant; as they are supposed to be *first*, though not perhaps chief, in the order of creation."

In reply to this, (which, though not the intention of the writer, may be conceived an objection to what has been inferred by us on this subject,) we have first to observe, that the Hebrew word for stars mentioned in Job xxxviii. 7, is the same as the term adopted in Gen. i. 16, with this difference only, that in the former it is used in the

regiminal form in connexion with בָּקֶר voker the morning, as כֹּכָבֵי בָקֶר kokavay voker the morning stars. The stars, then, in Job xxxviii. 7, being revealed as existing before the creation of the earth, cannot be otherwise viewed in Gen. i. 16, where, at least, they are evidently included.

The memorial of them, accordingly, in the said verse of Genesis, merely intimates that he who appointed the sun and moon as two great lights, "the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night," also appointed the stars which he had previously created, to rule the night, or (in other words) to shine by night on the earth, &c.

Now supposing we take them according to the opinion of the writer alluded to, and thence consider them both to signify "the angelic host," whom he previously calls "intelligent beings who existed before the creation of the visible heavens and earth:" as the Hebrew word for stars is the same in both the given passages, there is no reason for not giving the same translation and meaning to the term in both, as shall presently appear.

If, then, the word "stars" in both be supposed to represent the previously-created angelic host, we should have, in place of heavenly bodies or orbs, heavenly spirits recorded in Gen. i. 16. But what relation could heavenly spirits have

there, as stated in connexion with the sun and moon, and their yielding material light to the earth? In fact, they could have none; and such an incongruous view would involve the passage in absurdity.

But in Job xxxviii. 7, it would appear perfectly congruous that the same word (in connexion also with the creation of the earth) should have a similar signification to what it must have in Gen. i. 16; while (at the same time) it being so explained there, would not involve that passage in any absurdity whatever. For the previously-created heavenly bodies or orbs, as well as the heavenly spirits, may with great propriety be conceived to celebrate the praises of Jehovah in reference to the creation of the earth; especially as the remainder of that truly sublime chapter relates chiefly to the material works of God, such as the sea, the clouds, the frost, the rain, the lightning, and the influence of celestial constellations on our globe.

It thence ultimately follows that *the stars* and *the sons of God*, revealed in Job xxxviii. 7, are not synonymous; but that the former designate heavenly bodies, or material orbs, in the same sense in which they are recorded in Gen. i. 16, by the same Hebrew word.

And indeed the existence of previously-created angels, seeming to imply a necessity for previ-

ously-formed angelic habitations, may naturally induce us to infer that these seraphic mansions are situated in the recorded stars.

(23.) Under the terms "firmament of the heavens," the atmospheres of all the orbs in the universe appear to be included: (except that of the earth, which is mentioned by itself:) and while we contemplate them so comprised under these comprehensive terms, we do not consider them in contact or (as it were) in amalgamation with each other; but, on the contrary, completely insulated each in the vast expanse; so far are we from at all verging on the exploded doctrine of Des Cartes respecting his theory of planetary vortices.

Whether the vast expanse may be viewed as resulting from the boundlessness of the great First Cause, and consequently as boundless space void of matter, I know not any scriptural authority to serve as an index to that effect, if not cognizable in St. Paul's address to the Athenians, where he states, respecting our Creator, "in Him we live, and move, and have our being." (Acts xvii. 28.) On a subject, however, so abstruse, we shall decline any further comment.

With respect to "the firmament of the heavens," no mention is made in the Mosaic account, except on the fourth day, when it was

merely alluded to as previously existing. The past duration, therefore, of that firmament or atmosphere is not revealed. And as to the firmament of the earth, the period of its creation is not assigned; for Gen. i. 6, may be translated in an amended form, so as to indicate that it was not created on the second day. Thus, (there being no article before רָקִיעַ *rakiang* in that verse,) “the triune God said, let firmament be in the midst of the waters,” that is, let a portion of the previously-created firmament be between the ocean and the clouds, (or, in other words, let exhalations ascend in the firmament to generate the clouds;) as if God had said, let air be in the midst of the waters, or let a portion of the previously-created air or atmosphere be between the ocean and the clouds. This, then, taken in connexion with foregoing paragraphs, will ultimately assure us, that the terrestrial atmosphere (as well as the earth itself,) was created prior to any of the given six days.

(24.) As to the time when the elementary state of the heavens in general was completed, there is nothing revealed farther than such intimations as we find, for instance, in Job xxxviii. 1—7; which prove unquestionably, that they must have been perfected long before the given six days, or the period of the completion of our solar

system. In short, the chaos recorded in Gen. i. 2, related exclusively to the earth alone.

From the view we have taken of the Mosaic account, there being nothing on record to evince that the earth, sun, moon, and stars, or any of their atmospheres, were created in any of the given six days; it finally follows, that the past duration of any orb in the universe, or of any atmosphere, is not therein revealed.

Respecting the opinion that the earth was only twelve hours in her chaotic state,—it is altogether so senseless and unfounded, I shall simply give it (without note or comment) my most unqualified dissent.

(25.) The word רקע *rakiang*, translated στερέωμα in the Septuagint, firmamentum in the Vulgate, and firmament in our English version, might (it is said) according to some annotators, be more properly translated ἑκτασις, expansio, expanse.

Yet, after very mature deliberation, the word firmament, in my opinion, seems the more appropriate translation, as expanse implies only mere space. I take the term as not only implying the mere atmospheric expanse, but the atmosphere itself and all it contains, especially as that term is derived from רקע *rakang*, he stretched forth,—thus intimating that when he made

the **רקיע** rakiang or firmament, he caused not a vacuum, (or a non-entity,) but a substantial atmosphere to expand.

The **רקיע** rakiang, also, being called **שמים** shamayim or heavens, throws a considerable light on the meaning of **השמים** hashshamayim, the heavens; the latter term, of course, being taken in a far more extensive sense than the former, and thence implying the entire expanse of all the solar systems in the universe, and all they contain, except the earth. Its proper derivation appears to be from **ה** ha, emphatically the, **אש** ish, fire, and **מים** mayim, waters; under the terms **ה** ha and **אש** ish, all the materially luminous part of the universe being included; and under the term **מים** mayim, waters, all the originally fluid part of its various suns, planets and satellites, being ranged; except that of the earth, which is particularly mentioned by itself, as our globe among mankind is the chief planetary object of the revelation vouchsafed.

(26.) Let us now produce an extract from Bishop Watson's Apology for Christianity, (pages 151—5. London Edition, 1818,) as we shall afterwards have to refer to the refutation it contains. Since also it evinces how much stress hath been laid on the supposed age of the earth, it seems naturally connected with the present

inquiry, which chiefly relates to the past duration of our solar system.

“ Before I put an end to this address,” saith the learned Bishop, “ I cannot help taking notice of an argument by which some philosophers have of late endeavoured to overturn the whole system of revelation ; and it is the more necessary to give an answer to their objection, as it is become a common subject of philosophical conversation, especially amongst those who have visited the Continent.

“ The objection tends to invalidate, as is supposed, the authority of Moses, by showing that the earth is much older than it can be proved to be from his account of the creation, and the scripture chronology. We contend, that six thousand years have not yet elapsed since the creation,” or rather since the completion of it in the given six days of its final adjustment ; “ and these philosophers contend, that they have indubitable proof of the earth being at the least fourteen thousand years old ; and they complain that Moses hangs as a dead weight upon them, and blunts all their zeal for inquiry. *

“ The Canonico Recupero, who, it seems, is engaged in writing the History of Mount *Ætna*, has discovered a stratum of lava which flowed from the mountain, according to his opinion, in

* Here Brydone's Travels are referred to.

the time of the second Punic war, or about two thousand years ago. This stratum is not yet covered with soil sufficient for the production of either corn or vines: it requires then," says the Canon, "two thousand years at least, to convert a stratum of lava into a fertile field. In sinking a pit near Jaci, in the neighbourhood of *Ætna*, they have discovered evident marks of seven distinct lavas one under the other; the surfaces of which are parallel, and most of them covered with a thick bed of rich earth: now, the eruption which formed the lowest of these lavas, (if we may be allowed to reason," says the Canon, "from analogy,) flowed from the mountain at least fourteen thousand years ago."

"It might be briefly answered to this objection, by denying that there is any thing in the history of *Moses* repugnant to this opinion, concerning the great antiquity of the earth; for though the rise and progress of arts and sciences, and the small multiplication of the human species, render it almost to a demonstration probable, that man has not existed longer upon the surface of this earth than according to the Mosaic account; yet that the earth itself was then created out of nothing, when man was placed upon it, is not, according to the sentiments of some philosophers, to be proved from the original text of sacred Scripture; we might, I say, reply with these

philosophers, to this formidable objection of the Canon, by granting it in its full extent. We are under no necessity, however, of adopting their opinion, in order to show the weakness of the Canon's reasoning; for, in the first place, the Canon has not satisfactorily established his main fact, that the lava in question is the identical lava which Diodorus Siculus mentions to have flowed from *Ætna*, in the second Carthaginian war; and, in the second place, it may be observed, that the time necessary for converting lavas into fertile fields must be very different, according to the different consistencies of the lavas, and their different situations with respect to elevation or depression; to their being exposed to winds, rains, and to other circumstances; just as the time in which the heaps of iron slag (which resembles lava) are covered with verdure, is different at different furnaces, according to the nature of the slag, and situation of the furnace; and something of this kind is deducible from the account of the Canon himself; since the crevices of this famous stratum are really full of rich, good soil, and have pretty large trees growing in them.

“But if all this be thought not sufficient to remove the objection, I will produce the Canon an analogy in opposition to his analogy, and which is grounded on more certain facts. *Ætna* and

Vesuvius resemble each other, in the causes which produce their eruptions, and in the nature of their lavas, and in the time necessary to mellow them into soil fit for vegetation ; or if there be any slight difference in this respect, it is probably not greater than what subsists between different lavas of the same mountain. This being admitted, which no philosopher will deny, the Canon's analogy will prove just nothing at all, if we can produce an instance of seven different lavas (with interjacent strata of vegetable earth) which have flowed from Mount Vesuvius, within the space, not of fourteen thousand, but of somewhat less than seventeen hundred years ; for then according to our analogy, a stratum of lava may be covered with vegetable soil in about two hundred and fifty years, instead of requiring two thousand for the purpose. The eruption of Vesuvius, which destroyed Herculaneum and Pompeii, is rendered still more famous by the death of Pliny, recorded by his nephew in his letter to Tacitus : this event happened in the year 79. It is not yet then quite seventeen hundred years since Herculaneum was swallowed up ; but we are informed by unquestionable authority, that ' the matter which covers the ancient town of Herculaneum is not the produce of one eruption only ; for there are evident marks, that the matter of six eruptions has taken its

course over that which lies immediately above the town, and was the cause of its destruction. These strata are either of lava or burnt matter, *with* veins of good soil betwixt them.'”*

(27.) As the past duration of any orb whatever, or of any atmosphere, is not revealed, the Mosaic account opposes not any limitation against our ideas of their antiquity, but leaves us altogether an unrestricted course in this respect.

Justified, therefore, by Revelation itself, we have reason to conclude, that the beginning of the existence of any orb in the material world, or of any atmosphere, is not the same as the commencement of terrestrial days; it being hence not impossible that the earth itself may have existed myriads of years before the commencement of *terrestrial* days; that is, although from the first terrestrial day six thousand years have not since elapsed, yet from the beginning of the earth itself myriads of years may have rolled away. Nay, more; it is not impossible that the chaotic earth may have performed myriads of revolutions round our sun, before our sun was gifted with a power of dispensing his light-producing particles to the planets. So that when a

* Reference is here made to Sir William Hamilton's Remarks upon the Nature of the Soil of Naples and its Neighbourhood, in the Philos. Trans. vol. lxi. p. 7.

Herschel, speaking of the transmission of light from starry nebulæ in the Galaxy, may infer that it travelled so many thousands of years in its progress to our solar system ; it is not needful to oppose him in defence of sacred Scripture ; for had he extended his luminous theories to as many myriads of years, the Mosaic account of the creation would still allow him to proceed.

The sacred historian, while having to convey to mankind a revelation peculiarly (if not altogether) relating to our globe, gives only a very brief account of the creation in general, stating that "the triune God," who "in the beginning created the elementary structure of the heavens, and the elementary structure of the earth," at length vouchsafed material light to our solar system, and thence, (by the first revolution of the earth on her axis in presence of that light,) the commencement of terrestrial days.

Had not Canonico Recupero been so ably refuted, as in the extract given from Bishop Watson's Apology,—we might reply to all such Ætnean speculators that, let them imagine any mountain on the earth to be ever so ancient, (although originally lying beneath the dark billows of the chaotic deep,) they cannot suppose it to be *too* old for scriptural authority ; so great is the latitude they might claim even from the Mosaic account.

“The dry land,” it is true, did not appear above the originally mundane ocean, till the third day ; but that circumstance need not have prevented the mineral substances of the earth from working in her chaotic bowels for myriads of years before that period, or occasionally overflowing with lava some submerged mountain, as *Ætna* ; which event might have then taken place under, as well as afterwards above, the sea.

Hence, ultimately, it is deducible, that neither astronomical nor mineralogical researches could assign to any phenomenon of nature an antiquity, howsoever remote, that would exceed the freedom of retrogression they might derive from the *Mosaic* account of the creation.

APPENDIX, No. III.

(1.) IN conclusion, the writer feels desirous to inform the reader that, under the terms *elementary structure*, no species of imperfection whatever is to be inferred. With respect to matter, these words certainly imply something not unfolded or developed in its origin ; yet only so far as relates to operations or effects depending merely on modification. So remote, then, is he from designing to intimate the slightest defect in the original structure of the universe, that (on the contrary) his opinion is diametrically opposed to any such groundless insinuation ; well knowing that, without the greatest possible perfection in the elementary state, there could not be an appropriate basis for that almost endless diversity of modification which belongs to the material world.

Whether, therefore, we meditate on the *elementary structure* of light, (as in Gen. i. 4,) or of the stars, (as in Gen. i. 16,) or of any other part of the creation ; we invariably contemplate,

in that very elementary structure, the greatest degree of perfection that could respectively pertain to it.

(2.) There is another subject to which, at present, it may be desirable to revert, the already discussed quotation from Job; even the learned Parkhurst having been led away by a fanciful exposition of that text, calling "the morning stars," there introduced, "holy angels, glorious, and shining like the morning star." It is tolerably evident that, if he had compared it (as in *Disser.* parag. 22) with Gen. i. 16, so judicious a critic would have arrived at a more rational solution of that passage; in which also the term *morning* appears to be simply a poetical adjunct expressive of the primeval duration of those stars, or that period of their duration which preceded the given six days of the completion of our solar system.

(3.) Respecting measures applicable to duration, Locke states, that "the notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have" (said he) "of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the *ideas* I have of them in my memory, derived from my senses, or reflection, I can with the same ease, and for the

same reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration, antecedent to all manner of motion, that at this moment the sun is in."

When, therefore, (as in Disser. parag. 7,) we admit that the period of the earth's chaotic darkness may have been measured by time in other solar systems, we do not differ with this extract. For whether that portion of past duration had or had not been actually measured by periodical revolutions, would make no difference whatever as to the actual duration itself; the mere circumstance of its being measured or not measured not rendering the given duration the less certain.

In reference to the antecedent period mentioned in Part the First, it is manifest that we have fully entered into Locke's view, where we suppose any finite period whatever comprehensible within the antecedent period, or before any actual revolution could have taken place.

As to his imagining "that light existed three days before the sun was, or had any" apparent "motion;" it is evident he viewed "the history of the creation given by Moses," in a different aspect from that in which we have placed it. But in his contemplation of the subject, the *former* three days must have been differently produced from the *latter* three; the *latter* three having been actually generated by the apparent motion of the sun, or the real diurnal revolution

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A BRIEF OUTLINE

OF

SOME PROMINENT PECULIARITIES IN THIS VOLUME.

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takes a new view of the divine attributes, and maintains that the incongruity of the non-elect with the source of election, proceeds from a cause which exists not in the divine mind.

APPENDIX, No. 1,

is intended to intimate that the doctrine of the eternal Trinity is not incompatible with that of reason, which admits only one indivisible First Cause of all things.

PART THE SECOND

proves Election to be conditional on the authority of St. Paul and other Scriptural testimonies, together with that of the Seventeenth Article of the Established Church of England and Ireland.

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APPENDIX, No. 2,

indicates that any species of necessity ought to be rejected which would clash with the constitutional freedom of the intellectual world, or that moral freedom which proves (as it were) inseparably interwoven with its very constitution from the earliest dawn of its existence.

The above, taken as one entire Treatise, is designed as an attempt to prove that there is nothing in the Divine Nature incompatible with the free-agency of the intellectual world.

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of the earth, in the presence of the given solar light. The *former* three, though supposed to be each of the same length of duration as any of the *latter* three, yet being considered as not produced by solar light, are unavoidably estimated (on that hypothesis,) as if differently derived from what any of the *latter* three were. But whence the grounds of this deviation in expounding the sacred text? In every one of the given six days, both evening and morning are represented as having taken place, accompanied with their respective vicissitudes.

There is no variation in the mode of expression, as to those diurnal changes.

The only difference is the numeral designation, such as one day, the second day, the third, fourth, fifth, or sixth day. To adhere, then, to a strict homogeneous mode of interpretation, we should ascribe a similar generation to each of the given six days thus similarly unfolded.

Hence our system of exposition, as in the foregoing Dissertation, while attributing (without the slightest deviation) the same mode of production by solar light to each of the given six days,—has this additional testimony in its favour, that it is homogeneous, and avoids any arbitrary or unfounded deviation from the sacred text.

This difference of interpretation (however)

interferes not with Locke's sentiments of mere finite duration, with which we fully concur.

(4.) In addition to those already introduced, there are several authors whose great and valuable researches, if here considered, would vastly extend our field of observation. But, from the limited nature of our inquiry, it seems more prudent to desist from such an elaborate undertaking, and humbly to hope that this present vindication, imperfect as it is, may yet be found useful in some respects. That part especially, which relates to our amended translation of the original text, is designed merely to elicit some of those remarkable internal evidences of Revelation respecting the great antiquity of our solar system. Nor is this species of knowledge to be estimated beyond its real value, which chiefly consists in overthrowing the unfounded and anti-scriptural aspersions of infidelity, in reference to the past duration of the planetary world.

THE END.

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